6 Aug 2009 Michaela Stanková Politics & Society
LANGUAGE remains at the centre of the ongoing dispute involving Slovak and Hungarian politicians. It is now more than a month since an amendment to the State Language Act was passed by the Slovak parliament requiring public employees to speak Slovak unless more than twenty percent of the local population speaks a minority language. The most significant minority language spoken in Slovakia is Hungarian.
Since being passed the amendment has been okayed by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, though in his official opinion he recommended changes in terminology and amendments to other minorities-related legislation. Representatives of Hungary and the Hungarian-speaking minority living in Slovakia, however, have continued to criticise the law, along with some foreign media.
Hungary confirmed on August 3 that it was ready to turn to every possible international forum because it is convinced that the amendment to the State Language Act is aimed against the Hungarian-speaking minority in Slovakia. Budapest wants to see a change in the language act – if not under the present government, than once other political parties are in power in Slovakia, the SITA newswire reported.
Slovakia and Hungary have also given up efforts to hold bilateral meetings between the two countries’ presidents and prime ministers.
“These meetings cannot be turned into an affirmation of … irresponsible politics, because Slovak politics has become in many respects unreliable,” Zsolt Nemeth, chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the Hungarian parliament and MP for the right-wing opposition Fidesz party, said in an interview with public broadcaster Slovak Radio (SRo).
Hungary has also recommended that Slovak citizens turn to relevant forums at the United Nations in the event that they are fined on the basis of the amended act, SITA reported.
A delegation from the Hungarian parliament will visit European centres such as Brussels and The Hague to discuss the Slovak language law, Nemeth said on SRo.
Slovakia is ready to defend its State Language Act before any international organisation, Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Peter Stano told the SITA newswire. However, the ministry considers the internationalisation of the problem by Hungary fruitless and counterproductive, he added.
The head of one of the junior parties in the Slovak ruling coalition, Slovak National Party (SNS) boss Jan Slota, said he considered the internationalisation of the language law controversy by Hungary “as rubbish and an absurd step and permanent interference in the internal affairs of another country”, SITA reported. Slota also recommended that Hungary instead settle its domestic affairs, such as the “increased number of racially motivated attacks” which he said was leading to “the extermination of the Roma minority”.
The nationalist SNS is well-known for its hard-line attitude to minority issues, both Hungarian and Roma.
The State Language Act is already being discussed internationally. After the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Knut Vollebaek issued an opinion on the law, saying that overall it conforms to international and European requirements but in some contexts the text of the law can be interpreted so that it might lead to violation of internationally recognised minority rights, some of leading international media outlets have also published articles on the topic.
The Financial Times, in a special supplement on Slovakia, wrote that Prime Minister Robert Fico has “tried to steal some of Mr Slota’s nationalist rhetoric, pushing through a law enshrining the status of the Slovak language and attacking Hungarian “irredentism” … That has not helped improve relations with Hungary – arguably the most poisoned of any two EU neighbours.”
The Economist also ran a story with the subtitle ‘Slovakia criminalises the use of Hungarian’.
Miroslav Číž, the head of the Smer parliamentary caucus told the Sme daily that Hungarian lobby groups are most likely behind the article in The Economist.
“The Economist and Financial Times are magazines that work with the world of money and business,” Číž said, as quoted by Sme. “Logically, they are newspapers that do not at all prefer the social-democratic worldview. As soon as the rightwing is in power, we can expect glorifying articles.”
Meanwhile, the World Association of Slovaks Living Abroad (SZSZ) issued a statement on August 4 in support of the amended State Language Act, saying that it is concerned about “the attempts of Hungarian irredentism in Slovakia and its allies, the ultranationalists in Hungary, by purposefully deforming reality and spreading lies to harm the good image of the Slovak Republic in the world and harshly interfere in its sovereign rights.”
The SZSZ said it understands the position of minorities, based on Slovakia’s own experience, but rejects what it called Hungarian attempts to discredit the Slovak Republic.
“No one else but the Slovak nation through its legislative bodies should decide about whether we will be able to talk Slovak everywhere in Slovakia,” read the SZSZ statement.
The Federation of Slovaks in the UK supported the SZSZ’s stance.
“Anyone [in the UK] interested in management positions of any type, or those representing a certain institution and coming into contact with the public must unconditionally be able to communicate well in English regardless of their origin and nationality,” the federation stated, as reported by the TASR newswire. “Without sufficient knowledge of the state language [sic] no person will find a good job, and they are regarded as inferior. This should be a certain memento for the members of national minorities in Slovakia,” wrote the federation.
(soul serenade by aretha franklin:P)
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multilateralare increasingly gaining importance. The values of a multilateral
1. THE VISEGRAD GROUP
Promoting multilateral cooperation in the region, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland set up the
break-up of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia joining individually.
The beginning was no easy matter. Without Western encouragement, the Visegrad
idea would have very likely remained unfulfilled. The natural ties resulting from
centuries' long history proved too weak an adhesive, when conviction was lacking
about the need for a common European policy. But rivalry and controversy (e.g.
between the Czech Republic and Hungary over the so-called Beneš decrees, or
between Slovakia and Hungary over the Hungarian minority) did not yet spell the
death of Visegrad co-operation. The co-operation was eventually revived in 1998, as
problems emerged in accession negotiations. This led to the establishment in June
2000 of the
legal commitments among these countries; at the moment 40% of the budget goes
to cultural projects that are cooperative by definition.
Visegrad Triangle in 1990, renamed Visegrad Group following theInternational Visegrad Fund, the first institution involving international
1.1. Projects supported by the Visegrad Fund
The Visegrad Group does not have projects of their own, although in the future such
development may take place. The financial support goes to projects, submitted
following the periodic calls of the
can be categorised into five fields. These are the promotion of cultural cooperation,
promotion and development of scientific exchanges, research and cooperation in
the field of education, promotion and development of exchanges between young
people and promotion and development of cross-border cooperation. The Fund
mainly supports projects of non-governmental organisations of the V4 countries but
may also accept applications from other countries, if the aims of the projects are in
accordance with the objectives mentioned above.
Within the field of cultural cooperation all the important fields are supported to a
certain extent without any visible priorities. However, looking at the list of the
supported projects, some tendencies can be observed. More projects relating to
film, music and performative arts are supported than others (for example literature).
Visegrad Fund. The projects supported by the Fund
1.2. Financing
Study on Cultural Cooperation in Europe – Interarts and EFAH – June 2003
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The financial contribution is provided either by “standard grants” or by “small grants”.
The amount of the grants does usually not exceed 50% of the total costs of the whole
project. The financial resources granted by the Fund are purpose dedicated
subsidies. This subsidy can be used to cover the expenses of a current project. The
Fund gives financial resources only for specific events.
a) printing of invitations and programmes, and their distribution,
b) printing of periodicals and non-periodic publications,
c) printing of yearbooks from international conferences,
d) contributions to exhibitions, symposia, seminars, discussions, Conferences
e) fees of artists,
f) contributions to subsidies for prizes and awards,
g) renting of rooms and premises including their lighting, acoustic equipment
and other technical facilities,
h) reimbursement of travel costs and accommodation to participants in events,
i) humanitarian aid.
The financial support allocated by the Fund cannot be used for the payment of
capital investments, indirect costs, rent or salaries. Financial resources of the Fund
can only be used to finance new projects. The Fund does not provide subsidies to
projects that fall under public budgets funding. The Fund does not finance projects
that do not allow clear responsibility and control for the Fund.
1.3. Impact
The Visegrad Fund is the most significant, well organised regional cooperation
between four countries in Central Europe. However, unlike other regional
cooperation models such as Ars Baltica, it does not initiate projects or participate in
their realisation.
1.4. Events
A selection of upcoming events supported by the Fund in the year 2003, together
with the short description:
I. Just Say No - performances, exhibitions (Poland, Torun; Czech Republic, Prague)
International anti-drug cultural festival. Fine arts, photography, theatre and
performances.
II. Easter songs from Middle Europe (Poland, Krakow)
Middle Europe-Carpathian Mountains: traditional music and dance workshops for
those interested in music in its commercial form, in workshop and session-like
character.
III. JAZZFEST BRNO (Czech Republic, Brno)
International jazz festival and meeting which aims to create an electrifying creative
atmosphere, which will make a basis for new musical fellowships and artistic
inspiration for the performers and their audience alike.
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IV. International Theatre Festival "On the Border" (Czech Republic,
Český Těšín)
International theatre festival with the participation of professional and amateur
groups from the V4 countries. The main part of the festival is presentation of classical
theatres and big sets, the second part is an alternative scene called Hyde Park,
which includes dramatic, dancing and musical performances. Exhibitions and
conferences are also hosted.
2. ARS BALTICA
Ars Baltica is a forum for multilateral cultural cooperation of the countries surrounding
the Baltic Sea: Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Finland, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Russia
and Sweden.
overall regional forum focusing on needs for intensified cooperation and
coordination among the Baltic Sea States. Ars Baltica puts its emphasis on common
projects within the Baltic Sea Region, and gives priority to art, culture and cultural
history. The key factor is to achieve quality and to implement common cultural
projects of European significance and strengthening common cooperation rather
than bilateral ones. The importance of this kind of cooperation is confirmed by the
biannual
September 1999 in Gdansk, to which a report from the Ars Baltica activities is given.
Ars Baltica has a secretariat hosted by an existing structure within one of the member
states during a period of minimum three years, that can be prolonged if the
committee agrees on it. Since 1993, the Secretariat is located in Estonia and it will
stay there till 2003.
From all regional cooperation schemes reviewed here,
intensive cultural collaboration programme. This year, they include:
The Council of the Baltic Sea States, to which it is linked, serves as anConference of Ministers of Culture of the Baltic Sea States., last held inArs Baltica has had the most
11.04.-01.06.2003 in Kiel, Germany
The 3rd Ars Baltica Triennial of Photographic Art
8.-13.04.2003 in Kaunas, Lithuania
International Festival for Young Musicians in Kaunas
April 2003 in Vilnius, Lithuania
International Contemporary Dance Festival "New Baltic Dance' 03"
May 2003 in Vilnius, Lithuania
International Festival of Professional Theatres for Children "Modern Theatre for
Contemporary Children"
26.-31.05.2003 in Lithuania
"Back to the Future" - seminar on contemporary playwriting
01.06.-31.08.2003 in Schleswig, German
Exhibition "Baltic Rococo - Faiences Around the Baltic Sea"
04.-06.07.2003 in Husum/Kiel and Salzau, Germany
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JazzBaltica Festival / Schleswig-Holstein Musik Festival
August 2003 in Gdansk, Poland
The Baltic Dance University in Gdansk
01.09.2003-31.08.2004
"Baltic Ring - New Perspectives of Cooperation", Finland
Ars Baltica also has a series of programmes, in the course of which several events
take place every year. They include the “Baltic Voices” (Estonia), an Artists in
residence programme , a Screenplay co-operative (Visions of the 21st Century), a
Baltic Photography School, an International Centre of Development of the
Contemporary Dance "Dance Link", and others.
3. OTHER NORDIC AND BALTIC COOPERATION
The Baltic States have several bodies. The
established on May 12, 1990, and included the presidents and primer ministers of the
three states. The CBS was later transformed into regular summits of the Presidents of
the three states. In 1994, the
framework the Prime Ministers of the Baltic states meet at least twice a year.
Committees of Senior Officials of the BCM coordinate the cooperative activities of
the three states in the fields of their competence.
Official Nordic cooperation is channelled through two organisations: the
Council
the forum for
the Nordic Council is conducted via five committees and four political party groups.
The Nordic Council of Ministers, formed in 1971, is the forum for
Council of the Baltic States (CBS) wasBaltic Council of Ministers (BCM) was established. In thisNordicand the Nordic Council of Ministers. The Nordic Council, formed in 1952, isinter-parliamentary cooperation. Continuous work on policy issues ininter-governmental
cooperation. The work is co-ordinated via the Nordic ministers for cooperation. The
composition of the Council of Ministers varies, depending on the nature of the issues
to be covered, e.g. culture, education, the environment, etc. There are thus, in fact,
several Councils of Ministers. Nordic co-operation funds about thirty institutions
throughout the region.
The
on cultural cooperation between the Nordic countries and the adjacent regions.
Among the projects that receive grants there is, for instance,
scholarship programme directed at young artists for their travels abroad, to and from
the Nordic countries and the Baltic countries or Russia respectively. It also gives
support for the translation of literature from the Baltic countries into Nordic
languages; the Baltic Culture Festival 2001; a project on the preservation of industrial
heritage in the Baltic and Nordic countries, and a special campaign in St Petersburg
in 2003, when this town celebrates its 300 years anniversary.
Apart from the Nordic Cultural Fund, there are some smaller allocations for support
under the Nordic Council of Ministers. Special committees cater for the different arts
sector - like for scenic art (
libraries (
support of cooperation between museums, between youth organisations and
media. All these Nordic cooperation units usually demand complementary funding
Nordic Cultural Fund, with a total spending of 3,5 million Euro each year, focusesSleipnir. This is aTeater & Dans i Norden), visual art (NIFCA), literature andNORDBOK) and music (NOMUS). There are also special committees for the
Annex II – Multilateral and Regional Cooperation
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from other organisations. In addition, every application must involve at least three
Nordic countries or self-governing regions.
The
states (also called Nordic-Baltic 5+3). 5+3 meetings started in 1992 on the Prime
Ministerial level; Prime Ministers now meet annually to discuss common foreign policy
and regional issues. Ministers of foreign affairs and of defence also have frequent
consultations. Besides foreign politics and security, practical cooperation between
the Nordic and Baltic countries involves culture, education, environmental
protection, infrastructure, social security, people-to-people contacts, etc. There is
little information, however, about specific cultural cooperation projects in the
framework of Nordic Baltic 8.
Nordic Baltic 8 is the joint cooperation forum of the five Nordic and three Baltic
4. THE MEDITERRANEAN FORUM
In 1992 the group of countries which are known as the ‘Core Group Countries’
namely, Algeria, Morocco, France, Spain, Italy, Egypt, Portugal, Turkey, Greece and
Malta established the platform which is called the Mediterranean Forum. There are
three working groups in the Mediterranean Forum; the Political Working Group, the
Economic Working Group (including, tourism, science and immigration), and the
Cultural and Social Working Group. The Cultural and Social Working Group is
presently chaired by Turkey. The Group covers dialog between different cultures,
cooperation in the fields of education, preservation of the Mediterranean cultural
heritage and exchange of information. The Mediterranean Forum also works in close
cooperation with the EUROMED, which monitors contacts of the European Union with
all the Mediterranean Countries.
The main goal of the Mediterranean Forum is to constantly analyse the political,
economical and socio-cultural situation of the Mediterranean region in order to
consider long and short term implications for Western, in particular European, politics
towards the region. The geographic area considered by the Mediterranean Forum
covers not only the Mediterranean countries but takes into consideration extra
European countries and their sub-regional areas such as North Africa (Morocco,
Algeria, Tunis, Libya), Near East (Egypt, Sudan, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and
Turkey), the Persian Gulf ( Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other countries from the
Arabic Gulf) and the sub-regional areas such as the African Horn, the Black Sea area
and the Indo-Pakistan region.
Thus the Mediterranean Forum is not a multilateral cultural cooperation forum, but a
strictly regional institution of inter-governmental dialogue. Seminars and workshops
are held regularly on topics of common interest, including cultural affairs. The Forum
also does not have any funds, therefore all activities are catered for by the state or
states wishing to engage in an activity such as a seminar or meeting.
Study on Cultural Cooperation in Europe – Interarts and EFAH – June 2003
6
Eleven member-states of the Mediterranean Forum participate in the programme
"Cooperation for the preservation, conservation, restoration and enhancement of
classical, Hellenistic and roman monuments of the member-states of Mediterranean
Forum": Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain,
Tunisia and Turkey.
5. TÜRKSOY 12
Türksoy12 is a Turkish Culture and Arts Common Administration. In 1992, Culture
Ministers of the Turkish Speaking Countries (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan, Turkey and Turkmenistan) decided to establish TÜRKSOY to reveal,
explore, protect and develop the socio-cultural similarity among the peoples
speaking the Turkic language.
6. THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN INITIATIVE
Founded by Austria, Italy, Hungary and Yugoslavia in 1989 as a Quadrilateral
Cooperation Forum, its membership increased to 10 by 1994, to 16 by 1996 and to 17
in 2000 with the accession of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia and
Montenegro). The CEI has established an integrated framework of dialogue,
coordination and cooperation among and between its member countries in the
political, economic, cultural and parliamentary fields, creating, thereby, an
atmosphere of mutual understanding in which national projects and transnational
programmes are discussed, planned, studied and implemented. However, little
information is available about concrete cultural cooperation projects.
7. THE QUADRILATERAL INITIATIVE
The initiative for trilateral cooperation between Slovenia, Hungary and Italy was
launched by Slovenia in 1996. With the admission of the Republic of Croatia in
September 2000, the initiative became the
cooperation of countries situated in the same geopolitical area, sharing the same
interests and participating in joint projects.
In 2003, the Quadrilaterale is being chaired by Slovenia. The main political aspect of
cooperation remains active support for the candidates in their integration into the EU
and NATO. Among the cross-border cooperation aims culture is mentioned,
alongside with the fight against organised crime and illegal migration, military and
defence activities, the construction of Pan European Corridor V, cooperation
between the North Adriatic ports, protection of the sea and coastal regions, labour
market and employment, culture and development of the information society.
Quadrilaterale1. It is a form of concrete
8. THE ADRIATIC-IONIAN INITIATIVE
1
beginning.
Not to be confused with the Central European Initiative that also used to bear this name at the very
Annex II – Multilateral and Regional Cooperation
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The Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII) officially came into being in Ancona in May 2000. Its
members are: Italy, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Greece, Serbia and
Montenegro, Slovenia. The Initiative received support from the EU and
representatives of the European Commission participate in all its major meetings.
The purpose of the Initiative is cooperation between members situated along the
Adriatic and Ionian Seas in the development and security of the entire region.
Considering the specific nature of the sea and the coastal area, the countries
cooperate in a number of fields covered within six round tables representing the
framework of AII activities. The round tables include: the fight against organised
crime; environmental protection and sustainable development; economy, tourism
and SME cooperation; transport and maritime cooperation; culture; education and
inter-university cooperation.
9. COOPERATION ON THE BALKAN
In spite of significant non-governmental initiatives, e.g. The European Cultural
Foundation, Open Society Institute, KulturKontakt Austria, EricArts, governmentdependent
transnational cooperation has not reached the same level of
institutionalisation as in other sub-regions. In spite of repeated efforts, the Stability
Pact for South-East Europe has no mandate for culture.
“It is characteristic that multilateral initiatives in South-Eastern Europe were, right up
until the 1970's, channelled first and foremost at issues concerning border security,
territorial integrity and defence (Balkan Conference, Balkan Entente, Balkan
alliance), while issues of broader economic and cultural cooperation were present –
but rather as ones of lesser importance, in the background. The minority issue has
been, as they are proclaimed, ‘bridges of cooperation’. Association in the Balkans,
when it was not comprehensive, was primarily conceived or accepted in Balkan
political circles as ‘association against’ some other Balkan country, are not
‘association in favour of’ the realization of the positive idea of cooperation and
integration”.
2
One initiative of multilateral cultural cooperation with ministries of Balkan states is
called
establish a non-governmental organisation called Balkan Cultural Network,
functioning with the support and participation of arts institutions in all Balkan
countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia
(now Serbia and Montenegro).
Balkan Cultural Cooperation. It was originally a Greek proposal (1996) to
10. FRANCOPHONIE
The
in Paris. Now it has over fifty members, including Bulgaria and Romania. Five more
accession countries are observers in the organisation: Czech Republic, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia.
Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, OIF held its first assembly in 1986
2
Fragment taken from the book „Regional Initiatives in South-Eastern Europe” by Dusko Lopandic.
Study on Cultural Cooperation in Europe – Interarts and EFAH – June 2003
8
In the field of culture the main guiding principle of the activity of the organisation is
the struggle for the preservation of cultural diversity. Conferences are held on the
issue, grants are given to the audio-visual sector, to publishers of periodicals and
radio stations. Support is given to the cooperation of artists in the various language
areas.
11. EURO-REGIONS AND WORKING COMMUNITIES
11.1. Euroregions
In recent years there has been a steady increase in regional transfrontier
cooperation bodies which are increasingly known by the term "Euroregions",
particularly in central and eastern European countries.
forms of transfrontier cooperation structures do not however create a new type of
government at transfrontier level; they do not have political powers and their work is
limited to the competences of the local and regional authorities which constitute
them.
Within the limits of the geographical scope of cooperation (the "Regio"), the
transfrontier structures are arrangements for cooperation between units of local or
regional government across the border in order to promote common interests and
enhance the living standards of the border populations. These increasingly include
culture, as the examples below show. There are Euroregions in Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the UK.
3 These Euroregions and other
Euregio Maas-Rhein
One of the oldest transnational associations in Europe (founded in 1976), the Euregio
Maas-Rhein includes regions in three countries (Netherlands, Germany and Belgium).
It is a foundation in Dutch law. One of the four main thematic areas is concerned
with “Youth, Culture and Euregional Identity”.
:
Großregion Saar-Lor-Lux
The European
interest group that conducts projects and cooperation initiatives. The region was
named European Culture Capital for 2007. On 15
SaarLorLuxRhein
fosters cooperation and collaboration in different sectors, including culture, heritage,
tourism and youth (such as the
counts with the participation of the German-speaking Community in Belgium. A
further transational cooperation initiative in this cultural area is the
Institute
Rhineland-Palatinate, The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and the German-speaking
Community in Belgium.
Greater Region Saar-Lor-Lux is a geographical region as well as anth February 1995, the EuRegiowas founded as a charitable organisation in Luxembourg law; itInternational Youth Choir Robert Schumann), andEuropean Tourism(ETI) with seat at the University of Trier (Germany), and maintained by the
11.2. Working Communities
3
objectives, if they exist at all, compared with other transfrontier structures which are given different
names.
It seems that the term "Euroregion" does not always clearly show the differences in aims and
Annex II – Multilateral and Regional Cooperation
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Other co-operation bodies are the working communities of the European regions.
The
friendship between borders in the region. Members are regions in Germany, Austria,
Italy, Slovenia, Hungary, and Croatia. One part of its concerns are cultural relations.
The Lake of Constance Conference (
cooperation organism of the regions bordering the Lake of Constance (Germany,
Austria, Switzerland, plus Liechtenstein). First held in 1972, they have since branched
out and become a regular cooperation mechanism. They hold a cultural festival
each year, and promote cultural cooperation in the area.
Alps-Adriatic Working Community was founded in 1978 out of an informalInternationale Bodenseekonferenz) is a
ANNEX II
MULTILATERAL AND
REGIONAL COOPERATION
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Annex II – Multilateral and Regional Cooperation
1
Multilateral and Regional Cooperation
Alongside with the bilateral instruments of the classical arsenal,
agreements
approach for cooperation, not only on the European or global levels, but rather in
larger geographical regions with a common history, such as the Baltic or the
Mediterranean, are becoming more noticeable by the day. The following is a
selection of multilateral cooperation organisations or working groups active in
transnational cultural cooperation in Europe today.
anguage Wars
Frustrations Grow Among Slovakia's Hungarian Minority
By Jan Puhl
The Slavic majority and Hungarian minority in Slovakia are embroiled in a bitter dispute over language that is spilling across the border. Nowhere in the European Union are relations worse between neighbors than those between Bratislava and Budapest.
The Hungarian high school in Komarno, Slovakia is the picture of bourgeois solidity. Its facade is 101 years old and typifies the colossal architectural style typical of the late Austro-Hungarian Empire. The building is a haven of classical education and an elite training center for the children of the upper classes in the town of 40,000 inhabitants situated at the confluence of the Danube and Vah rivers.
To mark the start of the new school year, the pupils are wearing white shirts and a blue tie emblazoned with the school crest. And today they also intend to break the law.
Some 600 boys and girls walk two abreast onto the basketball court to the strains of Beethoven's "Ode to Joy." A senior reads a poem in Hungarian about the beauty of the surroundings. The school principal then addresses the pupils in Hungarian, and he is followed by the principal of a partner school in Hungary, who also speaks in Hungarian.
After half an hour standing in the sun, the pupil's shirts are sweated through, but not a single Slovakian word has been uttered. And that is apparently now illegal.
According to legislation passed in Bratislava that came into effect on Sept. 1, the Slovakian language must have precedence in public -- on billboards, in official declarations and on monuments. The pupils and teachers of Janos Selye High School consider that a restriction of their liberty, and that is why they have decided to use only their mother tongue today.
'Unshakeably Loyal to Your Motherland'
At the close of the ceremony, the music blaring out of the loudspeakers is not the Slovakian national anthem but the "Szozat," a patriotic Hungarian song from the 19th century. One of the lines of the song is "Oh Hungarian, be unshakably loyal to your motherland."
More than half a million ethnic Hungarians live in southern Slovakia. Nationwide, they account for almost 10 percent of the population. In Komarno -- the Slovak half of the Hungarian town of Komarom cut in two after World War I -- ethnic Hungarians are even in the majority.
Apart from a few scuffles between soccer hooligans, the Slavs and Magyars -- that is, ethnic Hungarians -- have lived side-by-side in relative peace up to now, as they have more-or-less throughout history. There have been occasional flare-ups over sovereignty of the Carpathian Basin, but the Slovaks and Hungarians have not engaged in any bloody ethnic cleansing in recent times -- a veritable anomaly in multiethnic Eastern Europe. And yet fully five years after Hungary and Slovakia joined the European Union, Bratislava and Budapest suddenly find themselves squabbling over the ethnic Hungarian minority.
The Slovaks are driven by fears of age-old Hungarian megalomania. Not without reason: Their country was known as Upper Hungary and ruled by the Hungarian monarchy for almost a thousand years. "Hungarians keep insisting that southern Slovakia is their territory," says Slovakian President Ivan Gasparovic.
For their part, ethnic Hungarians are frustrated at being a minority in the small Carpathian state. Hungarian President Laszlo Solyom calls Slovakia's new language law "a breach of multilateral agreements" that degrades Hungarian and demotes it to a "kitchen language." Although Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico and his Hungarian counterpart, Gordon Bajnai, sought to calm the waters at a summit last Thursday, the fact remains that relations between Bratislava and Budapest are worse than those between any other neighboring countries in the EU.
Diplomatic Crisis
One of the guests of honor at the high school is Mayor Tibor Bastrnak. He is also an ethnic Hungarian. Bastrnak recently sparked a relatively major diplomatic crisis when he erected a monument on the town's main road. The monument is topped by a statue of Hungarian national hero Stephen I on horseback and in imperial pose. The guest list for the unveiling ceremony included Hungarian President Laszlo Solyom, but not Gasparovic, the Slovak head of state.
In a tit-for-tat move, the piqued Slovakian government refused to allow Solyom to cross the bridge over the Danube that marks the border separating the divided town and the two countries. After all, Stephen I (969-1038) is seen as not only the founder of the Hungarian empire but also the conqueror of Great Moravia, the entity nationally conscious Slovaks consider the medieval precursor to modern-day Slovakia.
Mayor Bastrnak attempts to defuse the tension. "Slovaks can be proud of Stephen, too," he says graciously. Hadn't King Steven, he asks, expressly wanted "many languages to be spoken in his kingdom"?
Just in case local ethnic Slovaks think otherwise, Bastrnak has taken the precaution of posting a squad car next to the statue, which is now guarded by two police officers around the clock.
The mayor chairs a municipal council in which the ratio of ethnic Hungarians to ethnic Slovaks is 23:2. Hungarians also dominate the public spaces in the beautifully restored old town, which is packed with monuments to Hungarian heroes. Freedom fighter Lajos Kossuth has a plaque next to the town hall just because he spent the night of November 6, 1848 in Komarno.
National Symbols and Monuments
Bastrnak doesn't think he and the other ethnic Hungarians are being oppressed in Slovakia. He says most sections of the controversial new language law only apply in areas in which ethnic Hungarians make up less than 20 percent of the population, and official forms and inscriptions are always bilingual anyway. Nevertheless, he thinks the language law has had a devastating psychological effect. "It gives the impression that we now have to assimilate," he says. And he blames Slovak nationalists for the worsening relations.
Bastrnak has a point. Jan Slota, the founder and head of the Slovak National Party (SNS), has gained political capital for years with anti-Hungarian rhetoric. The SNS is part of the governing coalition, and the language law was enacted to appease him.
The Hungarians aren't alone in having national symbols; the Slovaks also cherish theirs. A few hundred yards from the stone statue of Stephen, a bronze twin-bar cross points up into the sky. The distinctive cross erected in 2003 above the entrance to the Matica Slovenska, a global Slavic cultural institute, is one of the five national symbols of Slovakia and associated with Saints Cyril and Methodius -- medieval missionaries and national heroes credited with bringing Christianity to the Slavs.
Josef Cernek heads the office in Komarno. But the 31-year-old businessman is anything but a fervent nationalist. "The language law is completely superfluous and creates unnecessary concern," he says. Cernek even admits he envies his ethnic Hungarian compatriots for their "strong feelings of cohesion and great pride in their culture."
Playing the National Card
Cernek organizes concerts and poetry readings and is keen to show Hungarians that "the Slovaks also have something to offer." He's less worried about the flood of Hungarian monuments in his town than the fact that Hungarian politicians are trying to play the national card. "Because they don't have a solution to the crisis, they claim Slovakia is doing minority Hungarians an injustice," Cernek says. That, he believes, could have serious consequences.
Former Slovakian Deputy Prime Minister Pal Csaky, the leader of the Party of the Hungarian Coalition, wants to raise the issue of the alleged discrimination against ethnic Hungarians before the US Congress. And Hungary's opposition leader, former Prime Minister Viktor Orban, promises to represent the interests of "all Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin" if his party wins next year's election. That would include not only ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia, but also the larger groups living in Romania, Serbia and Croatia. Orban's party believes the plight of all Europe's minorities could be solved by adopting the Kosovo model.
The Magyars have been scattered across a number of eastern European countries ever since Hungary was chopped up by the 1920 Treaty of Trianon imposed by the victorious Allies after World War I and the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The treaty slashed Hungary's sovereign territory from 282,870 square kilometers to 92,963, and cut the domestic population from 18.3 million to just 7.6 million.
'We Are Repressed'
Another world war later and after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and Hungary's return to a democratic Europe, many ethnic Hungarians are still suffering from the after-effects of this dispersal. Peter Korpas is one such example. The slim 39-year-old studied protestant theology in Budapest, and worked as a pastor for a few years. When he could no longer satisfy the needs of both his family and his congregation, he quit the church and began selling PVC flooring. He speaks Slovakian with a very strong accent.
Korpas doesn't feel comfortable in Komarno. "We are repressed," he says -- even though the borders are now open and he could wander across the bridge into Hungary and back again whenever he wants. "It's just not our state," Korpas insists, adding that his Hungarian grandfather was expropriated after the war. "What became of the land?" he asks. "I never got it back."
Korpas has formed a citizens' action group. He's had silver rings made and engraved "1920, Trianon." He sells them for 8,000 Hungarian forints (about €30 or $44) each. Korpas says he's already sold 400 of his rings. In another 18 months, he reckons he'll have enough money to set up a monument to commemorate what he considers the disgrace of 1920. And he plans to erect it in Komarno -- that is, on Slovakian territory. "The monument will remind Hungarians that we will never accept Trianon," Korpas says defiantly.
If he does, he'll probably trigger yet another monumental row.
link: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,649443,00.html
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Despite the bilateral summit, Slovak-Hungarian relations are still freezing
On November 15, the two Prime Ministers held official consultations on the current bilateral relations in Révkomárom (Komarno, Slovakia). Although the two PMs exchanged strong verbal punches, they mutually signed an agreement on fighting against extremism at the end of the summit. Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány presented a six-point proposal to his Slovak coutrepart Robert Fico which was later completely rejected by the Slovak PM.
Fico: Fascism is rolling over from Hungary to Slovakia, and the Hungarian government fails to do enough to stop them.
Gyurcsány: Slovakia's government had not so much as flirted with radical nationalism and anti-Hungarian policies as embraced them fully.
Gyurcsány: Fico is not doing enough to distance himself from the anti-Hungarian remarks of his coalition partner, and he had stood by while Slovak policies discriminating against ethnic Hungarians had been implemented.
Fico: no one should attempt to dictate how democratic Slovakia forms its government.
Fico: The action taken by riot police at the Dunajska Streda (Dunaszerdahely) game was lawful.
Gyurcsány: Fico's response to the issue of the police assault on Hungarian citizens at the match is unacceptable and Hungary is still waiting to receive the results of an independent inquiry into the incident.
Gyurcsány presented six-point proposals to his Slovak counterpart at the summit and said that Hungary will honor the proposal, even if the neighboring country does not follow suit.
Both governments should assume a guarantee to support the ethnic minorities' educational and cultural institutions with extra funding and affirmative action
Minority schools should be free to use textbooks published in one another's country
Hungarian and Slovak politicians should approve a code of conduct on national and ethnic minority issues
Should set up a body to adjudicate on cases of harm caused to ethnic minorities through joint investigations
Slovak National Council should consider electing an ombudsman for national and ethnic minorities
Slovak National Council should suspend and revoke its decree limiting the use of foreign national – including Hungarian – flags and symbols to domestic sports events in Slovakia
Eventually, the two politicians have signed a joint statement expressing "strong and unequivocal opposition" to radical ideologies and movements which can be considered as a move forward. The statement also commits the two countries to exchange information and co-operation during the investigation of specific cases of harm against national minorities and determination to advance "the cause of cross-border co-operation", economic and social ties
The aftermath of the Gyurcsány-Fico meeting
December 3, Fico rejected all six proposals put to him by Gyurcsány by declaring that the Slovak government "will not deal with demands seeking to interfere with Slovakia's independence." Fico said the rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia are safeguarded even by European standards in the Slovak constitution and in other laws. Therefore, he said, “we see no reason to pass more ethnic minority bills”.
December 3, Hungarian Speaker of Parliament Katalin Szili met her Slovak counterpart Pavol Paska in Komárom (Komarno, Slovakia). Szili criticized Slovakia’s objection to the Forum of Hungarian MPs in the Carpathian Basin (KMKF) by stating that KMKF does not harm the sovereignty of any country and there are several similar formations in Europe. Szili also condemned the Slovak resolution on the Benes decrees.
December 6, Hungarian President László Sólyom and Slovak President Ivan Gasparovic met in Érsekújvár (Nove Zamky, Slovakia). Sólyom asked Gasparovic to initiate a bill on the protection of ethnic minorities in Slovakia and to speed up the publication of a common history textbook. Sólyom also proposed to consider the establishment of an ombudsman’s post for ethnic minorities similarly to what exists in Hungary. Gasparovic turned down the requests by saying that the Slovak head of state has no power to initiate bills in Parliament.
Bilateral debates on European Stage
November 17, European Parliament hosted a debate on Hungarian-Slovak relations. Hungarian MEP Pál Schmitt drew his fellow MEPs’ attention to the events of November 1 in Dunaszerdahely (Dunajska Streda). Austrian MEP Hannes Swoboda said in her contribution that “radicals must be prevented from poisoning Hungarian-Slovak relations further”, adding that her remarks equally apply to Slovak National Party chairman Ján Slota and the Magyar Gárda. Hungarian MEP Csaba Tabajdi said it is disproportionate to put an equal sign between the Slovak and the Hungarian situations. Slovak MEP Vladimir Manka asserted that he greatly appreciates Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány taking steps to amend anti-extremist legislation only two days after meeting Robert Fico. Hungarian MEP József Szájer replied that condemnation of fascist actions by Slovak MEPs would have been more credible if they had been made after Slota called for the expulsion of ethnic Hungarians from Slovakia.
December 8, a committee of the Council of Europe has considered Hungary’s response to the police attack on ethnic Hungarian fans at Dunaszerdahely (Dunajska Streda) as ‘relevant’ and called on Slovakia to respond.
Friendly Civil Gestures
November 17, Hungary's Green Democrats and the Slovak Green Party formed a live chain along the bridge spanning the Danube River between Esztergom (Hungary) and Párkány (Sturovo, Slovakia) demonstrating for reconciliation between the two countries. Organizers of the demonstration tied the Hungarian and Slovak national flags onto a large green heart which they placed in the middle of the bridge.
November 28, Gabor Ivady, mayor of a Hungarian village in hills near the Slovak border, decided to host a friendly soccer game between mayors of Hungarian and Slovak villages, and finish off with goulash and Slovak "halusky" (potato dumplings with sheep cheese). "The tensions fuelled by Slovak and Hungarian extremists have nothing to do with us, with our feelings," Ivady said. "We like each other, we often meet and have good relations and we don't want anybody to try to manipulate us," he added.
December 10, the local council of a city of 6,500 inhabitants (including Slovak ethnic minorities) in South East Hungary, Tótkomlós decided to introduce street and public-institution signs in Slovak too.
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Deteriorating Slovak-Hungarian relations
November 11, 2008
On November 1, about 800 hardcore football fans from Hungary came to the Dunajska Streda (Dunaszerdahely) stadium, in Slovakia, to see the football game between the ethnic Hungarian football team Dunajska Streda and the ethnic Slovak team Slovan Bratislava. They carried banners of maps of the historical “Greater Hungary” that included Slovakia as a province of Hungary. The Hungarian and Slovak fans verbally insulted each other before the start of the game and later the Slovak fans threw smoke bombs and other missiles to the field. Eventually the Slovak riot police did not take any action against the Slovak football fans, only against the Hungarians leaving more than 60 injured; one severely. The result of the game was 4-0 to Slovakia.Strong Reactions from Hungary
On November 2 and 3, some 200-300 people held protest outside the Slovak embassy in Budapest in response to the incident and also burned a Slovak flag. The Hungarian government and opposition condemned the flag-burning action but also asked the Slovak authorities to investigate and provide detailed information about the legality of the police action. Ethnic Hungarian football fans staged a silent candlelight procession in Dunajska Streda (Dunaszerdahely) on November 4 to protest against the police assault.
Hungarian Minister of Justice Tibor Draskovics stated that “the media images of events at the game raise doubts about whether the measure police took were justified and appropriate. In his response, Slovak Prosecutor General Dobroslav Trnka described the police action as “timely, appropriate and lawful”.
What happened in the football stadium is just the consequence of the recently cold state-level bilateral relations which were steadily deteriorating in the past one and a half year. Public officials of the two neighboring countries -both members of the EU and the NATO- regularly targeted each other with various public frictions and strains which naturally reinforced the ever existing hostile feelings toward each other at the ground level.
Roots of Public Hostility
Anti-Hungarian sentiment in Slovakia were incited greatly by the Chairman of the government coalition member Slovak National Party Jan Slota. Slota publicly insulted Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kinga Göncz several times by criticizing her hair, her appearance and size and indirectly comparing her to Hitler; Slota has also described Hungary’s first King Saint Stephen as a clown on a horse; suggested sending tanks into Budapest; called President László Sólyom an extremist figure; Fidesz chairman Viktor Orbán a nationalist pressing for the restoration of “Greater Hungary”; and deemed Hungarians as cancerous tumors from the Gobi desert, rather than the Carpathian basin. Slovak prime minister Robert Fico fails to distance himself from the coalition partner’s statements.
Due to the governing position of the Slovak national party, radicalism became state policy in Slovakia. As a consequence, the unfriendly Slovak public attitude towards its southern neighbour and the 600,000 ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia transformed more and more into general public hatred. November 6, “Death to Hungarians” had been scrawled on a village bus stop in Čechynce (Nyitracsehi).
August 2008, a survey published by the Open Society Institute on the current situation of the Hungarian minority reveals that among 12-17 year old ethnic Slovaks Hungarians are the most hated minority, not good citizens of Slovakia; 63% of Slovakian students agree that Hungarians are allowed to speak their native language solely at home, speaking only in Slovakian in public.
In line with this gerenal public opinion, an ethnic Hungarian student, Hedvig Malina, has been brutally beaten for speaking in Hungarian on her mobile phone while walking in the city of Nitra (Nyitra) in August 2006. However, in the course of investigation the Slovak police was trying to prove that the student had beaten up herself and charged her with false accusation. The case is still pending.
State Level Disagreements
The degrading comments targeting the entire Hungarian nation haven't exceed the threshold of the Hungarian officials for a long time. The “casus belli” for the Hungarians was that Slovakia violated the linguistic status quo by failing to meet its earlier commitment to include the Hungarian version of geographical names in Slovak school books used by Hungarian schools. Hungarian government officials also complained that Hungarian schools are not subsidized from EU funds in Slovakia.
As a matter of fact, the ministries of education and EU funds are controlled by Jan Slota’s Slovak National Party. In addition, Hungary resented the remarks made by Slovak coalition party SNS leaders, which were considered to be within the realm of hate speech. Ambassadors of both countries were summoned by the host countries’ ministries of foreign affairs and were questioned about the situation.
Increasing tensions
November 8, over a thousand football fans and club members demonstrated in front of the Hungarian prime minister’s office, calling on Ferenc Gyurcsány to protect Hungarians and condemn the Slovak police. These football fans regularly fight with each other but now demonstrated hands in hands against the abuse of the Slovak police in Dunajska Streda (Dunaszerdahely). Slovak authorities denounced the Hungarian reactions.
November 8, 28 members of the Nyiregyhaza-based Hungarian far right group, the National Guard, commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the First Vienna Award (in which Axis Powers such as Germany and Italy compelled Czechoslovakia to return southern Slovakia and southern Subcarpathia – now in Ukraine – to Hungary in 1938) in Kralovsky Chlmec (Királyhelmec). Slovak police detained and launched criminal proceedings, on charges of carrying emblems of tyranny - the group’s members wearing an arm band showing the letter H written in old Hungarian script, classified as a dictatorship symbol. ‘It is unacceptable that Hungarian Nazis march on Slovak territory in uniforms,’ Slovak PM Robert Fico said on the same day in an extraordinary press conference. Slota urged the UN Security Council and the EU institutions to take action against Hungary. The Hungarian government condemned the march of extremists from Hungary in uniforms in Kralovsky Chlmes.
November 10, Hungarian radical activists mounted partial road blocks near the Slovak border at five locations in protest against Slovak police treatment of Hungarian football fans. The demonstration was organized by the non-Parliamentary far right Jobbik party which members held banners reading “Welcome to Slotakia”, a reference to Slota. The protests ended peacefully. Fico condemned on the road blocks and said that if they had been staged in his country Slovak police would have intervened.
Is this a Case for Europe to Act as a Mediator?
Hungary, which seemed paralyzed by the hostile bilateral relations, looks at the EU hoping to receive European assistance in solving the situation. On October 20, the mayor of a Hungarian town, Leányfalu removed the EU flag from public institutions in the municipality which must be raised above all the country’s public institutions according to the Hungarian law. The mayor said that the removal of the flag was to protest EU policy on Slovakia, notably that the EU did not condemn measures regarding the country’s Hungarian minority. When Hungary turned to the EU regarding the case of ethnic Hungarian schools in Slovakia, Slovakia immediately condemned Hungary for seeking confrontation and interfering in its internal affairs.
The current negative feelings towards and hostile actions against each other can easily further deteriorate between the two nations and it seems obvious that their present public leaders are not capable of handling this situation. Maybe it is time now for the EU to step up to the plate and help her two young kids to get finally over of their historical fights and feel that they are now members of one single family.
Hungary and Slovakia signed a bilateral basic treaty in 1995 and an agreement in 1998 on the mechanisms for implementing the basic treaty. In line with this agreement the two foreign ministers must annually review the implementation of the Treaty and identify further tasks if necessary. Minister Göncz invited her Slovak counterpart to a working meeting in December.
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Slovak-Hungarian FMs disagree on minority issues
December 5, 2007
Slovak Foreign Minister Jan Kubis and Hungarian counterpart Kinga Goncz exchanged dissenting views regarding minority issues and relations between their countries. Goncz told a Hungarian parliamentary foreign affairs committee on Tuesday that on short term, diplomatic relations with Slovakia should concentrate on conflict management. She criticized Slovakia's use of ambiguous communication with Hungary and said the situation of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia had suffered of late. She added that the Slovak government had failed to see Slovakia's ethnic Hungarian SMK party as the advocate of minority rights for ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia, and instead treated it merely as an opposition force. Goncz said until these areas of conflict were resolved, "we have to question the idea of a meeting of the prime ministers of the two countries."
Talking to the press after a Slovak government session on Wednesday, Kubis rejected the claim that ethnic Hungarian minority rights were faltering and said that the problems regarding the Hungarian minority were small and should not affect bilateral relations. Kubis said Slovakia was still preparing for a meeting of Hungarian-Slovak premiers. He criticised SMK's leadership for failing to communicate in a manner that reflected their role of protecting minority rights for ethnic Hungarians.
The 2008 Slovak budget approved yesterday sets aside no funds for Hungarian-language broadcasts of Radio Pátria. The state-run Slovak Radio will cease all broadcasts, including those of Radio Pátria, on the medium wave band. Ethnic minority broadcasts will be aired only by satellite and on the internet from January, said Slovak Radio programming director Lubos Machaj.
Ildikó Nagy, director of Radio Pátria, said in Tuesday’s edition of the Bratislava-based Hungarian-language daily Új Szó that Hungarian-language broadcasts in Slovakia will come to an end after 80 years, if the decision is endorsed by the Radio Council.
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Slovak gov't gives thumbs up to Hungarian border bridge construction
November 14, 2007
The Slovak government voted on Wednesday to authorize foreign minister Jan Kubis to join Hungarian FM Kinga Göncz in Sturovo (Párkány), Slovakia, on Friday and add his signature to an interstate agreement calling for reconstruction of two bridges spanning the Ipoly river that marks the border between the two countries. The two bridges on the Ipoly will connect the Hungarian Pösténypuszta with the Slovak Pető and the Hungarian Ráróspuszta with the Slovak Rárós. The constructions will be co-financed with EU funds by the two countries.
The brief meeting between the two FMs and the accord are the first substantive event in ties between the two countries since the Bratislava parliament recently reaffirmed the post-WWII Benes Decrees, which deprived ethnic Hungarians of their property under the principle of collective guilt, sources in the Slovak capital have noted.
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Slovak reiteration of collective guilt unacceptable, says Hungarian government
September 21, 2007
The Hungarian government rejects the principle of collective guilt and believes the vote by Slovakia's parliament that reconfirmed the post-WWII Benes Decrees passed to punish German and Hungarian nationals living in Czechoslovakia at the time, runs counter to European Union principles, the government spokesman said on Thursday.
Speaking for the prime minister, David Daroczi said Hungary would prefer conciliation to the incitement of tension and cannot support measures to the contrary. Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany called the portions of the Benes Decrees directed against residents unjust. The decrees deprived many Hungarians of their homes and property, holding them responsible for the war, and they have never received compensation.
Speaking for the senior government coalition partner MSZP, Jozsef Kozma, who is responsible for foreign affairs, said the offensive action on the part of the Slovak legislature came after Hungary's parliament had made a special attempt to evolve good-neighbour relations on the basis of European norms. He too voiced shock that it came just after Hungary's political parties had issued a joint appeal for cooperation. "This type of historical anachronism has no place in a free, democratic, and tolerant Europe," said Kozma.
"While the heads of government agreed to build bridges and the majority of residents in both countries want forward-pointing relations, the idea of looking backwards appears to be gaining the upper hand, and that will not help to heal historical wounds," said Gyurcsany. He called for confidence-building measures and mutually advantageous cooperation rather than re-confirming past punishments.
On behalf of the biggest opposition party Fidesz Zsolt Nemeth said they had been shocked to learn that Slovakia's parliament had passed a resolution on the inviolability of the Benes Decrees. Nemeth called the move unfriendly, particularly coming after a meeting of ethnic Hungarian MPs from throughout the Carpathian Basin, at which MPs from all five parties in Hungary's parliament signed a statement on the need for Slovakia and Hungary to reconcile their differences. Nemeth said the move proved that Slovakia's parliament had adopted the extremist nationalism and chauvinism of the Slovak National Party, a member of the government coalition. He called on the parties making up Slovakia's parliament to return to the European principles of human rights.
Another protest was issued in the European Parliament, where MEPs from Hungary, Slovakia, and Germany protested the move.
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Comments
Lubos Motl | 1. Friday, September 21 2007, 21:42
Re-opening the Benes decrees is nothing else than a step to destabilize the property rights in Slovakia, Czechia, and maybe Central Europe in general, and a step to return us closer to a revival of the second world war. I am surely no fan of the Slovak National Party but whether they're behind it or not, the resolution is a sane one. After the war, Germans and Hungarians were indeed treated as both the originators of the war as well as the members of the nations that lost the war. It would have surely been better if culprits could have been punished individually but their huge number has simply made such a precision solution impossible. If there is a consensus that some/all displaced Hungarians or Germans should be compensated, they should be clearly compensated by the Hungarian or German governments. Expecting anything else means to return the bloody past to the present. There are way too many other bad things that Hungarians and Germans did to Slovaks and Czechs. I assure you that accepting the current state of affairs including the facts about the history and including the validity of the laws behind the status quote - including the Benes decrees - is the most peaceful approach that Europe can make.
lorant | 2. Monday, November 12 2007, 23:39
Dear Lubos,
I believe - and I am sure you do too - that as Europeans we are entitled to settle our disputes in a peaceful way. I agree with you on that the bringing up of the Benes-Decrees was not a wise step either from Bratislava or from Budapest. It is far more than clear that this issue was used to build political popularity on it on both sides. Therefore, the best would be, as I think you just suggested, to settle this problem for good and continue living next to each other as good neighbours.
On a more substantive point, however, I am afraid I cannot share your views. Some points of the Benes-Decrees were indeed very harmful for the Slovak-Hungarian and Slovak-German relations. Some points of the Benes-decrees do indeed raise the problem of collective guilt which is indeed unacceptable (at least hopefully) for most of the Europeans in the 21st century. For these reasons I do not think that the Slovak parliament adopted a good solution to find the way out. What they did was to freeze the current status quo in the bilateral relations already charged with some tensions if not degrading them even more. Honestly I do not think that this is a "sane" thing to do.
"Germans and Hungarians were indeed treated as both the originators of the war as well as the members of the nations that lost the war. It would have surely been better if culprits could have been punished individually but their huge number has simply made such a precision solution impossible."
I hope we can agree on the point that WWII was the most terrible chapter in the history of Europe in the 20th century. Whether it is wise to say that Germans (and Hungarians) were treated as originators of the war (do you mean every single German and Hungarian?) and therefore it was okay to confiscate their property is somewhat troubling for me. Would it be the same to say that because the PKK caused many Turks suffer, it is perfectly justified to say that all Kurd property should be confiscated in Turkey? I do not see it like that. It would just drive us back to the good old notions of collective guilt, wouldn't it?
"If there is a consensus that some/all displaced Hungarians or Germans should be compensated, they should be clearly compensated by the Hungarian or German governments. Expecting anything else means to return the bloody past to the present. There are way too many other bad things that Hungarians and Germans did to Slovaks and Czechs."
Compensation is not a viable solution. It would just create even more tensions on both sides. However, I do think that an official apology from Bratislava and Prague would do for most of the victims. To say that what happened in the past was inhuman and that it would never happen again. On the same note I would really expect the Hungarian side to do the same in connection with the Slovaks and Czechs suffered any damage in connection with any Hungarian action during WWII. There are way too many bad things the people in Central Europe did to each other and keep on doing them. Unfortunately this is true for all of the nations, I don't think that there are "good" and "bad" nations, as there are lot of good people in both of our countries and some bad who occasionally dress up as politicians and make us believe that others are worse then us. All in all, we just speak a different language.
I am still convinced that the Benes-Decrees should be talked about and should be withdrawn. Forgetting the bad things is the biggest trap of history in which peoples of this part of the globe just keep on falling. To debate those decrees would be a really good solution not to forget our dark past in order to make our futures brighter.
Best regards,
Lóránt
zoli 04 | 3. Wednesday, November 5 2008, 19:15
I would only like to add that Slovakia (=upperland) was not a province of hungary it WAS (and until hungarians live in the world it will be) Hungary.Just to be faithful to history.
My personal oppinion about the slovakian goverment is and mostly about Jan Slota and his nationalist friends that they are only afraid of hungarians and Hungary because they couldnt destroy it totally in 1920 and since they have no history no foundation to build upon (i mean slovakia) it is hard for them to accept true historical facts which connect them to Hungary.In addition to this a on a recent interview with slota he claimed that hungary wants total territorial revision-well i personaly think that a least the territorries lived still by hungarians in the surrounding countries should be reconnected- but the point is that this is the fact the fear which generates hate in the slovakians againt hungarians and also the lack of history .Moreover when i heared the recent news that slovakia banned the use of any hungarian symbol as the hungarian national flag or our coat of arms or pictures and maps which show Great Hungary is a shame and only gives evidence to the cause of thier fear. Finally it is also a shame that this whole "tradegy-commedy" can be made in the European Union and that they do nothing about it.But what can we expect after all the made up the whole idea of the treaty of trianon and responsible for the situation in the Carpathian-basin.
Ivan | 4. Thursday, November 6 2008, 13:33
…but this is not about Benes decrees. How come we lived in peace (although there were some conflicts between Slovaks and Hungarians) but this problem started couple months ago. The people in other countries see what is presented to them and unfortunately believe to it.
After Bela Bugar lost his number one position in SMK (Hungarian political party in SVK) where he was superseded by Pal Czaky and SNS (Slovak national party) won the last election, everything started almost straight away. Two very national oriented leaders but everybody on the other side…
They usually have very provocative, misleading statements which cause a lot of troubles between Slovak people (including Hungarian).
But everybody sees only conflict in Slovakia but you should look at the other countries contiguous with Hungary. All of them have some issues with Hungarian government not just Slovakia.
Slovakia established Hungarian University; a lot of schools with Hungarian language but Slovak minority don’t have any school with Slovak language in Hungary. Slovakia has problem only with Hungarian minority, there are no problems with Ukraine, Czech, Poland…
The world should ask why Hungarian hooligans came to Slovakia to “watch” soccer between two Slovak teams! - They were armed from boxers to knifes, were vulgar and wanted just riot etc. Just have a look at the chat internet links and you will see that both Slovak and Hungarians don’t want to have any conflict; they want to live in peace without any riot. The police attack was lawful and many people feel the same – no respect to hooligans – to all hooligans in the world! Why is it so political The same is happening all over the world and nobody is complaining.
Just have a look at the recent Hungarian history (I mean couple years ago), how many riot and violence they had comparing with other countries in EU. If you don’t remember here are some reminders:
http://www.velkaepocha.sk/content/v...
http://spravy.pravda.sk/nepokoje-v-...
http://www.sme.sk/c/3780036/madarsk...
…and what about their armed groups, fascists from Jobbik and 64 zump - absolutely no action from Hungarian government.
There is a tension between these two countries firstly between political parties. If this doesn't end this conflict will never end. And diplomacy is not working properly for both countries because people already have this anger in them.
milan | 5. Sunday, November 9 2008, 19:11
"eventually the Slovak riot police did not take any action against the Slovak football fans, only against the Hungarians leaving more than 60 injured; one severely."
--- please be objective in your "investigations"! The "slovak" fans as you call them (since both teams are slovak teams) were among the most injured fans by this police action. Again, slovak police knew that hungerian activists and extremists are to come to see this match (which has never happened before that hungarian fans would come from hungary to see the slovak soccer league!). This act from hungarian fans was only a stupid provocation in already boiling mutual relations.
I find this completly vain and absurd when many countries are trying to get together (EU) regardless of nationalities and yet some teenage-provocaters are trying the very oposite. Furthermore, such sick story should not take any place in medias..
Yes, there is one slovak stupid politician - a nationalist, which doesnt help this situation, however, words of such alcoholic person should never be taken into account on an international level..
..just please get everyone clever and forget about the uncertain and blurred past! look forward and improve the damn relationship - we live in this place almost 1500 years together!
sue | 6. Monday, November 10 2008, 12:32
i just like to add that before writing the article - the first excerpt- and publising, should the author finds out the FACTS about event in dunajska streda... the correct number of injuries was not 60 injuried, but approximately 50, both Slovakian and Hungarian nationalities....
Marian | 7. Monday, November 10 2008, 23:36
why slovak school in hungary didnt use slovak book, like in slovakia(hungarian school)?
Valderrama | 8. Monday, November 24 2008, 19:23
Just to begin with, I'm Hungarian - you will forgive me this. Second, moving the borders has never been a solution for people's problems - I hope you are all able to trust me that I don't want Slovakia become Hungary. I want that Slovakia becomes able to solve the problems of its own citizens! If the Slovak government does not mess into this, local Slovaks and Hungarians will live together as peacefully as they always did. Three, you ought to believe me too that most Hungarians think likewise. I think there are awfully few Hungarians ready to shed Slovakian blood for moving f...g borders. There are a lot however who would be ready to fight for Hungarian brothers anywhere. This is why it is important that the Slovak government in particular is able to solve the problems of its own citizens. If they, Hungarians in Slovakia are able to live freely and happily in their country, Hungarians in Hungary will not be concerned about them. Four, this should have come second, maybe: I regret Hungarian crimes in history against Slovak people, I am sorry for that. I never did anything against Slovaks, however, Hungarian repression against Slovak identity before the WWI and Nazi aggression or any other crimes against national or cultural identity (like the Benes decrees) are a shame, sorry for that. I hope my government or the Hungarian Parliament will once become able to formulate a similar but official sorry.
In some of the opinions above, there are a lot of things I disagree with. I believe they are based on disinformation, fear, misinterpretation etc. This is why I think we need a clear basis on which we can build our discussion. My (perhaps idealistic) idea is that a list of facts is established. (Here is my list, I would be happy if you commented or added others – only that they should be corrections of “my facts” or look like a fact of yours.)
- Benes decrees are based on the principle of collective guilt. The decrees had punished ethnic Hungarians, citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic, most of whom innocent civilians. The decrees are in force in Slovakia. The decrees were confirmed in the Slovak legislature by an overwhelming majority in 2007, the Parliament of a country that is member of the European Union.
- Mr. Slota declared King Stephen - Hungary’s first king, a national symbol - a clown on a horse. According to him, Hungarians are a burden on Slovakia. SNS, the political party presided by Mr. Slota, is coalition member of Slovakia’s democratically elected government. Among others, the minister of education is delegated to the government by this party, headed by Mr. Slota. (Ad Ivan’s post) revisionist parties are not part of the Hungarian Parliament. Radical right wing political formations (mentioned by Ivan) have never been part of any Hungarian government since 1990. According to regular opinion surveys, neither of them has the support necessary to pass the threshold for Parliament membership.
- (Ad Ivan’s and Marian’s post) there ARE Slovak language kindergartens and schools in Hungary. According to Hungarian legislation, all schools in Hungary, including Slovak schools are free to choose their teaching material. These teaching materials, written in Slovak, indicate geographical names – not surprisingly - in Slovak, with their Hungarian corresponding in brackets. Ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia can also learn from teaching materials written in Hungarian, these however indicate geographical names in Slovakian (illustration for “ethnic English” staying in France: “The capital of the United Kingdom is Londres”.) This is the decision of the Slovakian minister for education, delegated to the government by SNS, the party headed by Mr. Slota.
milomiki | 9. Wednesday, September 2 2009, 15:02
Ah no, everyone magyar , no hungar, why do you call hungar yourself and world as well? Do you know who is huns ? Problem for all magyars is that they mix history zig zag, from asian language and no more exist nation as was huns/hunnen. What has together huns and magyar ? That is first problem. You wraiting about history but explain me what is hunnes and magyar. When did they come and where? Was Attila your king ? How looks magyar today ? Magyarization do you know meaning of that ? So if you do not know that magyars parasited 1000 years on others lands never will not for me magyar exist as nation but Austrian. So are you Austrian . No magyar . I am ging your logic. Upland was mean for you it is not mean for people what lives here that is Slovakia. Same as madarsko is exactly downland of Austria. Austrian should go back. You exist just from 1867 ? So haw looks for that magyar through theyrt logic others can look same but worse for you. If you feel as huns , o my god, then your really home is between front mongolia and Caspics sea. (but you can't be you look different not as asiats you look as slavonians with magyar language)If you feel magyar You should be happy that your country is still alive because Russian Empire wanted do deal with magyar. But got good lack that you have been in Austria teritory.
milomiki | 10. Wednesday, September 2 2009, 15:16
About books for school in Slovakia. Some names had to be cleaned from book. Example Filvedek. The country names isSlovakia. If we start to learn our children that Hungary is Moravia Empire or Slavonic down land how will be it ? Serbian will use theyr name and Romanian theyr. Sometime I heard Down land . Example where are you going ? I ma going to Down land I know that is hungary - madarsko. Some names was changed you can not use name from Middle Ages. Ugro no more exist just in magyar heads . Ugro is Middle Ages name , state with colonies and persecution ect. We slovakians we got different names for parts in Madarsko but we do not learn our children they will start taht is our land and then will want compensation of you . After war you took some Slovaks villages by Horthy. What ? So because Romenias and other your neighbourts has right to use names what is original not magyar middle bages names what is mean ugry. You understand ?
Aion kinah | 11. Sunday, February 21 2010, 04:55
Serbian will use theyr name and Romanian theyr. Sometime I heard Down land . Example where are you going ?
Eve Isk | 12. Sunday, February 21 2010, 04:56
Magyarization do you know meaning of that ? So if you do not know that magyars parasited 1000 years on others lands never will not for me magyar exist as nation but Austrian. So are you Austrian .
Despite the bilateral summit, Slovak-Hungarian relations are still freezing
On November 15, the two Prime Ministers held official consultations on the current bilateral relations in Révkomárom (Komarno, Slovakia). Although the two PMs exchanged strong verbal punches, they mutually signed an agreement on fighting against extremism at the end of the summit. Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány presented a six-point proposal to his Slovak coutrepart Robert Fico which was later completely rejected by the Slovak PM.
Fico: Fascism is rolling over from Hungary to Slovakia, and the Hungarian government fails to do enough to stop them.
Gyurcsány: Slovakia's government had not so much as flirted with radical nationalism and anti-Hungarian policies as embraced them fully.
Gyurcsány: Fico is not doing enough to distance himself from the anti-Hungarian remarks of his coalition partner, and he had stood by while Slovak policies discriminating against ethnic Hungarians had been implemented.
Fico: no one should attempt to dictate how democratic Slovakia forms its government.
Fico: The action taken by riot police at the Dunajska Streda (Dunaszerdahely) game was lawful.
Gyurcsány: Fico's response to the issue of the police assault on Hungarian citizens at the match is unacceptable and Hungary is still waiting to receive the results of an independent inquiry into the incident.
Gyurcsány presented six-point proposals to his Slovak counterpart at the summit and said that Hungary will honor the proposal, even if the neighboring country does not follow suit.
Both governments should assume a guarantee to support the ethnic minorities' educational and cultural institutions with extra funding and affirmative action
Minority schools should be free to use textbooks published in one another's country
Hungarian and Slovak politicians should approve a code of conduct on national and ethnic minority issues
Should set up a body to adjudicate on cases of harm caused to ethnic minorities through joint investigations
Slovak National Council should consider electing an ombudsman for national and ethnic minorities
Slovak National Council should suspend and revoke its decree limiting the use of foreign national – including Hungarian – flags and symbols to domestic sports events in Slovakia
Eventually, the two politicians have signed a joint statement expressing "strong and unequivocal opposition" to radical ideologies and movements which can be considered as a move forward. The statement also commits the two countries to exchange information and co-operation during the investigation of specific cases of harm against national minorities and determination to advance "the cause of cross-border co-operation", economic and social ties
The aftermath of the Gyurcsány-Fico meeting
December 3, Fico rejected all six proposals put to him by Gyurcsány by declaring that the Slovak government "will not deal with demands seeking to interfere with Slovakia's independence." Fico said the rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia are safeguarded even by European standards in the Slovak constitution and in other laws. Therefore, he said, “we see no reason to pass more ethnic minority bills”.
December 3, Hungarian Speaker of Parliament Katalin Szili met her Slovak counterpart Pavol Paska in Komárom (Komarno, Slovakia). Szili criticized Slovakia’s objection to the Forum of Hungarian MPs in the Carpathian Basin (KMKF) by stating that KMKF does not harm the sovereignty of any country and there are several similar formations in Europe. Szili also condemned the Slovak resolution on the Benes decrees.
December 6, Hungarian President László Sólyom and Slovak President Ivan Gasparovic met in Érsekújvár (Nove Zamky, Slovakia). Sólyom asked Gasparovic to initiate a bill on the protection of ethnic minorities in Slovakia and to speed up the publication of a common history textbook. Sólyom also proposed to consider the establishment of an ombudsman’s post for ethnic minorities similarly to what exists in Hungary. Gasparovic turned down the requests by saying that the Slovak head of state has no power to initiate bills in Parliament.
Bilateral debates on European Stage
November 17, European Parliament hosted a debate on Hungarian-Slovak relations. Hungarian MEP Pál Schmitt drew his fellow MEPs’ attention to the events of November 1 in Dunaszerdahely (Dunajska Streda). Austrian MEP Hannes Swoboda said in her contribution that “radicals must be prevented from poisoning Hungarian-Slovak relations further”, adding that her remarks equally apply to Slovak National Party chairman Ján Slota and the Magyar Gárda. Hungarian MEP Csaba Tabajdi said it is disproportionate to put an equal sign between the Slovak and the Hungarian situations. Slovak MEP Vladimir Manka asserted that he greatly appreciates Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány taking steps to amend anti-extremist legislation only two days after meeting Robert Fico. Hungarian MEP József Szájer replied that condemnation of fascist actions by Slovak MEPs would have been more credible if they had been made after Slota called for the expulsion of ethnic Hungarians from Slovakia.
December 8, a committee of the Council of Europe has considered Hungary’s response to the police attack on ethnic Hungarian fans at Dunaszerdahely (Dunajska Streda) as ‘relevant’ and called on Slovakia to respond.
Friendly Civil Gestures
November 17, Hungary's Green Democrats and the Slovak Green Party formed a live chain along the bridge spanning the Danube River between Esztergom (Hungary) and Párkány (Sturovo, Slovakia) demonstrating for reconciliation between the two countries. Organizers of the demonstration tied the Hungarian and Slovak national flags onto a large green heart which they placed in the middle of the bridge.
November 28, Gabor Ivady, mayor of a Hungarian village in hills near the Slovak border, decided to host a friendly soccer game between mayors of Hungarian and Slovak villages, and finish off with goulash and Slovak "halusky" (potato dumplings with sheep cheese). "The tensions fuelled by Slovak and Hungarian extremists have nothing to do with us, with our feelings," Ivady said. "We like each other, we often meet and have good relations and we don't want anybody to try to manipulate us," he added.
December 10, the local council of a city of 6,500 inhabitants (including Slovak ethnic minorities) in South East Hungary, Tótkomlós decided to introduce street and public-institution signs in Slovak too.
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Deteriorating Slovak-Hungarian relations
November 11, 2008
On November 1, about 800 hardcore football fans from Hungary came to the Dunajska Streda (Dunaszerdahely) stadium, in Slovakia, to see the football game between the ethnic Hungarian football team Dunajska Streda and the ethnic Slovak team Slovan Bratislava. They carried banners of maps of the historical “Greater Hungary” that included Slovakia as a province of Hungary. The Hungarian and Slovak fans verbally insulted each other before the start of the game and later the Slovak fans threw smoke bombs and other missiles to the field. Eventually the Slovak riot police did not take any action against the Slovak football fans, only against the Hungarians leaving more than 60 injured; one severely. The result of the game was 4-0 to Slovakia.Strong Reactions from Hungary
On November 2 and 3, some 200-300 people held protest outside the Slovak embassy in Budapest in response to the incident and also burned a Slovak flag. The Hungarian government and opposition condemned the flag-burning action but also asked the Slovak authorities to investigate and provide detailed information about the legality of the police action. Ethnic Hungarian football fans staged a silent candlelight procession in Dunajska Streda (Dunaszerdahely) on November 4 to protest against the police assault.
Hungarian Minister of Justice Tibor Draskovics stated that “the media images of events at the game raise doubts about whether the measure police took were justified and appropriate. In his response, Slovak Prosecutor General Dobroslav Trnka described the police action as “timely, appropriate and lawful”.
What happened in the football stadium is just the consequence of the recently cold state-level bilateral relations which were steadily deteriorating in the past one and a half year. Public officials of the two neighboring countries -both members of the EU and the NATO- regularly targeted each other with various public frictions and strains which naturally reinforced the ever existing hostile feelings toward each other at the ground level.
Roots of Public Hostility
Anti-Hungarian sentiment in Slovakia were incited greatly by the Chairman of the government coalition member Slovak National Party Jan Slota. Slota publicly insulted Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kinga Göncz several times by criticizing her hair, her appearance and size and indirectly comparing her to Hitler; Slota has also described Hungary’s first King Saint Stephen as a clown on a horse; suggested sending tanks into Budapest; called President László Sólyom an extremist figure; Fidesz chairman Viktor Orbán a nationalist pressing for the restoration of “Greater Hungary”; and deemed Hungarians as cancerous tumors from the Gobi desert, rather than the Carpathian basin. Slovak prime minister Robert Fico fails to distance himself from the coalition partner’s statements.
Due to the governing position of the Slovak national party, radicalism became state policy in Slovakia. As a consequence, the unfriendly Slovak public attitude towards its southern neighbour and the 600,000 ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia transformed more and more into general public hatred. November 6, “Death to Hungarians” had been scrawled on a village bus stop in Čechynce (Nyitracsehi).
August 2008, a survey published by the Open Society Institute on the current situation of the Hungarian minority reveals that among 12-17 year old ethnic Slovaks Hungarians are the most hated minority, not good citizens of Slovakia; 63% of Slovakian students agree that Hungarians are allowed to speak their native language solely at home, speaking only in Slovakian in public.
In line with this gerenal public opinion, an ethnic Hungarian student, Hedvig Malina, has been brutally beaten for speaking in Hungarian on her mobile phone while walking in the city of Nitra (Nyitra) in August 2006. However, in the course of investigation the Slovak police was trying to prove that the student had beaten up herself and charged her with false accusation. The case is still pending.
State Level Disagreements
The degrading comments targeting the entire Hungarian nation haven't exceed the threshold of the Hungarian officials for a long time. The “casus belli” for the Hungarians was that Slovakia violated the linguistic status quo by failing to meet its earlier commitment to include the Hungarian version of geographical names in Slovak school books used by Hungarian schools. Hungarian government officials also complained that Hungarian schools are not subsidized from EU funds in Slovakia.
As a matter of fact, the ministries of education and EU funds are controlled by Jan Slota’s Slovak National Party. In addition, Hungary resented the remarks made by Slovak coalition party SNS leaders, which were considered to be within the realm of hate speech. Ambassadors of both countries were summoned by the host countries’ ministries of foreign affairs and were questioned about the situation.
Increasing tensions
November 8, over a thousand football fans and club members demonstrated in front of the Hungarian prime minister’s office, calling on Ferenc Gyurcsány to protect Hungarians and condemn the Slovak police. These football fans regularly fight with each other but now demonstrated hands in hands against the abuse of the Slovak police in Dunajska Streda (Dunaszerdahely). Slovak authorities denounced the Hungarian reactions.
November 8, 28 members of the Nyiregyhaza-based Hungarian far right group, the National Guard, commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the First Vienna Award (in which Axis Powers such as Germany and Italy compelled Czechoslovakia to return southern Slovakia and southern Subcarpathia – now in Ukraine – to Hungary in 1938) in Kralovsky Chlmec (Királyhelmec). Slovak police detained and launched criminal proceedings, on charges of carrying emblems of tyranny - the group’s members wearing an arm band showing the letter H written in old Hungarian script, classified as a dictatorship symbol. ‘It is unacceptable that Hungarian Nazis march on Slovak territory in uniforms,’ Slovak PM Robert Fico said on the same day in an extraordinary press conference. Slota urged the UN Security Council and the EU institutions to take action against Hungary. The Hungarian government condemned the march of extremists from Hungary in uniforms in Kralovsky Chlmes.
November 10, Hungarian radical activists mounted partial road blocks near the Slovak border at five locations in protest against Slovak police treatment of Hungarian football fans. The demonstration was organized by the non-Parliamentary far right Jobbik party which members held banners reading “Welcome to Slotakia”, a reference to Slota. The protests ended peacefully. Fico condemned on the road blocks and said that if they had been staged in his country Slovak police would have intervened.
Is this a Case for Europe to Act as a Mediator?
Hungary, which seemed paralyzed by the hostile bilateral relations, looks at the EU hoping to receive European assistance in solving the situation. On October 20, the mayor of a Hungarian town, Leányfalu removed the EU flag from public institutions in the municipality which must be raised above all the country’s public institutions according to the Hungarian law. The mayor said that the removal of the flag was to protest EU policy on Slovakia, notably that the EU did not condemn measures regarding the country’s Hungarian minority. When Hungary turned to the EU regarding the case of ethnic Hungarian schools in Slovakia, Slovakia immediately condemned Hungary for seeking confrontation and interfering in its internal affairs.
The current negative feelings towards and hostile actions against each other can easily further deteriorate between the two nations and it seems obvious that their present public leaders are not capable of handling this situation. Maybe it is time now for the EU to step up to the plate and help her two young kids to get finally over of their historical fights and feel that they are now members of one single family.
Hungary and Slovakia signed a bilateral basic treaty in 1995 and an agreement in 1998 on the mechanisms for implementing the basic treaty. In line with this agreement the two foreign ministers must annually review the implementation of the Treaty and identify further tasks if necessary. Minister Göncz invited her Slovak counterpart to a working meeting in December.
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Slovak-Hungarian FMs disagree on minority issues
December 5, 2007
Slovak Foreign Minister Jan Kubis and Hungarian counterpart Kinga Goncz exchanged dissenting views regarding minority issues and relations between their countries. Goncz told a Hungarian parliamentary foreign affairs committee on Tuesday that on short term, diplomatic relations with Slovakia should concentrate on conflict management. She criticized Slovakia's use of ambiguous communication with Hungary and said the situation of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia had suffered of late. She added that the Slovak government had failed to see Slovakia's ethnic Hungarian SMK party as the advocate of minority rights for ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia, and instead treated it merely as an opposition force. Goncz said until these areas of conflict were resolved, "we have to question the idea of a meeting of the prime ministers of the two countries."
Talking to the press after a Slovak government session on Wednesday, Kubis rejected the claim that ethnic Hungarian minority rights were faltering and said that the problems regarding the Hungarian minority were small and should not affect bilateral relations. Kubis said Slovakia was still preparing for a meeting of Hungarian-Slovak premiers. He criticised SMK's leadership for failing to communicate in a manner that reflected their role of protecting minority rights for ethnic Hungarians.
The 2008 Slovak budget approved yesterday sets aside no funds for Hungarian-language broadcasts of Radio Pátria. The state-run Slovak Radio will cease all broadcasts, including those of Radio Pátria, on the medium wave band. Ethnic minority broadcasts will be aired only by satellite and on the internet from January, said Slovak Radio programming director Lubos Machaj.
Ildikó Nagy, director of Radio Pátria, said in Tuesday’s edition of the Bratislava-based Hungarian-language daily Új Szó that Hungarian-language broadcasts in Slovakia will come to an end after 80 years, if the decision is endorsed by the Radio Council.
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Slovak gov't gives thumbs up to Hungarian border bridge construction
November 14, 2007
The Slovak government voted on Wednesday to authorize foreign minister Jan Kubis to join Hungarian FM Kinga Göncz in Sturovo (Párkány), Slovakia, on Friday and add his signature to an interstate agreement calling for reconstruction of two bridges spanning the Ipoly river that marks the border between the two countries. The two bridges on the Ipoly will connect the Hungarian Pösténypuszta with the Slovak Pető and the Hungarian Ráróspuszta with the Slovak Rárós. The constructions will be co-financed with EU funds by the two countries.
The brief meeting between the two FMs and the accord are the first substantive event in ties between the two countries since the Bratislava parliament recently reaffirmed the post-WWII Benes Decrees, which deprived ethnic Hungarians of their property under the principle of collective guilt, sources in the Slovak capital have noted.
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Slovak reiteration of collective guilt unacceptable, says Hungarian government
September 21, 2007
The Hungarian government rejects the principle of collective guilt and believes the vote by Slovakia's parliament that reconfirmed the post-WWII Benes Decrees passed to punish German and Hungarian nationals living in Czechoslovakia at the time, runs counter to European Union principles, the government spokesman said on Thursday.
Speaking for the prime minister, David Daroczi said Hungary would prefer conciliation to the incitement of tension and cannot support measures to the contrary. Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany called the portions of the Benes Decrees directed against residents unjust. The decrees deprived many Hungarians of their homes and property, holding them responsible for the war, and they have never received compensation.
Speaking for the senior government coalition partner MSZP, Jozsef Kozma, who is responsible for foreign affairs, said the offensive action on the part of the Slovak legislature came after Hungary's parliament had made a special attempt to evolve good-neighbour relations on the basis of European norms. He too voiced shock that it came just after Hungary's political parties had issued a joint appeal for cooperation. "This type of historical anachronism has no place in a free, democratic, and tolerant Europe," said Kozma.
"While the heads of government agreed to build bridges and the majority of residents in both countries want forward-pointing relations, the idea of looking backwards appears to be gaining the upper hand, and that will not help to heal historical wounds," said Gyurcsany. He called for confidence-building measures and mutually advantageous cooperation rather than re-confirming past punishments.
On behalf of the biggest opposition party Fidesz Zsolt Nemeth said they had been shocked to learn that Slovakia's parliament had passed a resolution on the inviolability of the Benes Decrees. Nemeth called the move unfriendly, particularly coming after a meeting of ethnic Hungarian MPs from throughout the Carpathian Basin, at which MPs from all five parties in Hungary's parliament signed a statement on the need for Slovakia and Hungary to reconcile their differences. Nemeth said the move proved that Slovakia's parliament had adopted the extremist nationalism and chauvinism of the Slovak National Party, a member of the government coalition. He called on the parties making up Slovakia's parliament to return to the European principles of human rights.
Another protest was issued in the European Parliament, where MEPs from Hungary, Slovakia, and Germany protested the move.
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Comments
Lubos Motl | 1. Friday, September 21 2007, 21:42
Re-opening the Benes decrees is nothing else than a step to destabilize the property rights in Slovakia, Czechia, and maybe Central Europe in general, and a step to return us closer to a revival of the second world war. I am surely no fan of the Slovak National Party but whether they're behind it or not, the resolution is a sane one. After the war, Germans and Hungarians were indeed treated as both the originators of the war as well as the members of the nations that lost the war. It would have surely been better if culprits could have been punished individually but their huge number has simply made such a precision solution impossible. If there is a consensus that some/all displaced Hungarians or Germans should be compensated, they should be clearly compensated by the Hungarian or German governments. Expecting anything else means to return the bloody past to the present. There are way too many other bad things that Hungarians and Germans did to Slovaks and Czechs. I assure you that accepting the current state of affairs including the facts about the history and including the validity of the laws behind the status quote - including the Benes decrees - is the most peaceful approach that Europe can make.
lorant | 2. Monday, November 12 2007, 23:39
Dear Lubos,
I believe - and I am sure you do too - that as Europeans we are entitled to settle our disputes in a peaceful way. I agree with you on that the bringing up of the Benes-Decrees was not a wise step either from Bratislava or from Budapest. It is far more than clear that this issue was used to build political popularity on it on both sides. Therefore, the best would be, as I think you just suggested, to settle this problem for good and continue living next to each other as good neighbours.
On a more substantive point, however, I am afraid I cannot share your views. Some points of the Benes-Decrees were indeed very harmful for the Slovak-Hungarian and Slovak-German relations. Some points of the Benes-decrees do indeed raise the problem of collective guilt which is indeed unacceptable (at least hopefully) for most of the Europeans in the 21st century. For these reasons I do not think that the Slovak parliament adopted a good solution to find the way out. What they did was to freeze the current status quo in the bilateral relations already charged with some tensions if not degrading them even more. Honestly I do not think that this is a "sane" thing to do.
"Germans and Hungarians were indeed treated as both the originators of the war as well as the members of the nations that lost the war. It would have surely been better if culprits could have been punished individually but their huge number has simply made such a precision solution impossible."
I hope we can agree on the point that WWII was the most terrible chapter in the history of Europe in the 20th century. Whether it is wise to say that Germans (and Hungarians) were treated as originators of the war (do you mean every single German and Hungarian?) and therefore it was okay to confiscate their property is somewhat troubling for me. Would it be the same to say that because the PKK caused many Turks suffer, it is perfectly justified to say that all Kurd property should be confiscated in Turkey? I do not see it like that. It would just drive us back to the good old notions of collective guilt, wouldn't it?
"If there is a consensus that some/all displaced Hungarians or Germans should be compensated, they should be clearly compensated by the Hungarian or German governments. Expecting anything else means to return the bloody past to the present. There are way too many other bad things that Hungarians and Germans did to Slovaks and Czechs."
Compensation is not a viable solution. It would just create even more tensions on both sides. However, I do think that an official apology from Bratislava and Prague would do for most of the victims. To say that what happened in the past was inhuman and that it would never happen again. On the same note I would really expect the Hungarian side to do the same in connection with the Slovaks and Czechs suffered any damage in connection with any Hungarian action during WWII. There are way too many bad things the people in Central Europe did to each other and keep on doing them. Unfortunately this is true for all of the nations, I don't think that there are "good" and "bad" nations, as there are lot of good people in both of our countries and some bad who occasionally dress up as politicians and make us believe that others are worse then us. All in all, we just speak a different language.
I am still convinced that the Benes-Decrees should be talked about and should be withdrawn. Forgetting the bad things is the biggest trap of history in which peoples of this part of the globe just keep on falling. To debate those decrees would be a really good solution not to forget our dark past in order to make our futures brighter.
Best regards,
Lóránt
zoli 04 | 3. Wednesday, November 5 2008, 19:15
I would only like to add that Slovakia (=upperland) was not a province of hungary it WAS (and until hungarians live in the world it will be) Hungary.Just to be faithful to history.
My personal oppinion about the slovakian goverment is and mostly about Jan Slota and his nationalist friends that they are only afraid of hungarians and Hungary because they couldnt destroy it totally in 1920 and since they have no history no foundation to build upon (i mean slovakia) it is hard for them to accept true historical facts which connect them to Hungary.In addition to this a on a recent interview with slota he claimed that hungary wants total territorial revision-well i personaly think that a least the territorries lived still by hungarians in the surrounding countries should be reconnected- but the point is that this is the fact the fear which generates hate in the slovakians againt hungarians and also the lack of history .Moreover when i heared the recent news that slovakia banned the use of any hungarian symbol as the hungarian national flag or our coat of arms or pictures and maps which show Great Hungary is a shame and only gives evidence to the cause of thier fear. Finally it is also a shame that this whole "tradegy-commedy" can be made in the European Union and that they do nothing about it.But what can we expect after all the made up the whole idea of the treaty of trianon and responsible for the situation in the Carpathian-basin.
Ivan | 4. Thursday, November 6 2008, 13:33
…but this is not about Benes decrees. How come we lived in peace (although there were some conflicts between Slovaks and Hungarians) but this problem started couple months ago. The people in other countries see what is presented to them and unfortunately believe to it.
After Bela Bugar lost his number one position in SMK (Hungarian political party in SVK) where he was superseded by Pal Czaky and SNS (Slovak national party) won the last election, everything started almost straight away. Two very national oriented leaders but everybody on the other side…
They usually have very provocative, misleading statements which cause a lot of troubles between Slovak people (including Hungarian).
But everybody sees only conflict in Slovakia but you should look at the other countries contiguous with Hungary. All of them have some issues with Hungarian government not just Slovakia.
Slovakia established Hungarian University; a lot of schools with Hungarian language but Slovak minority don’t have any school with Slovak language in Hungary. Slovakia has problem only with Hungarian minority, there are no problems with Ukraine, Czech, Poland…
The world should ask why Hungarian hooligans came to Slovakia to “watch” soccer between two Slovak teams! - They were armed from boxers to knifes, were vulgar and wanted just riot etc. Just have a look at the chat internet links and you will see that both Slovak and Hungarians don’t want to have any conflict; they want to live in peace without any riot. The police attack was lawful and many people feel the same – no respect to hooligans – to all hooligans in the world! Why is it so political The same is happening all over the world and nobody is complaining.
Just have a look at the recent Hungarian history (I mean couple years ago), how many riot and violence they had comparing with other countries in EU. If you don’t remember here are some reminders:
http://www.velkaepocha.sk/content/v...
http://spravy.pravda.sk/nepokoje-v-...
http://www.sme.sk/c/3780036/madarsk...
…and what about their armed groups, fascists from Jobbik and 64 zump - absolutely no action from Hungarian government.
There is a tension between these two countries firstly between political parties. If this doesn't end this conflict will never end. And diplomacy is not working properly for both countries because people already have this anger in them.
milan | 5. Sunday, November 9 2008, 19:11
"eventually the Slovak riot police did not take any action against the Slovak football fans, only against the Hungarians leaving more than 60 injured; one severely."
--- please be objective in your "investigations"! The "slovak" fans as you call them (since both teams are slovak teams) were among the most injured fans by this police action. Again, slovak police knew that hungerian activists and extremists are to come to see this match (which has never happened before that hungarian fans would come from hungary to see the slovak soccer league!). This act from hungarian fans was only a stupid provocation in already boiling mutual relations.
I find this completly vain and absurd when many countries are trying to get together (EU) regardless of nationalities and yet some teenage-provocaters are trying the very oposite. Furthermore, such sick story should not take any place in medias..
Yes, there is one slovak stupid politician - a nationalist, which doesnt help this situation, however, words of such alcoholic person should never be taken into account on an international level..
..just please get everyone clever and forget about the uncertain and blurred past! look forward and improve the damn relationship - we live in this place almost 1500 years together!
sue | 6. Monday, November 10 2008, 12:32
i just like to add that before writing the article - the first excerpt- and publising, should the author finds out the FACTS about event in dunajska streda... the correct number of injuries was not 60 injuried, but approximately 50, both Slovakian and Hungarian nationalities....
Marian | 7. Monday, November 10 2008, 23:36
why slovak school in hungary didnt use slovak book, like in slovakia(hungarian school)?
Valderrama | 8. Monday, November 24 2008, 19:23
Just to begin with, I'm Hungarian - you will forgive me this. Second, moving the borders has never been a solution for people's problems - I hope you are all able to trust me that I don't want Slovakia become Hungary. I want that Slovakia becomes able to solve the problems of its own citizens! If the Slovak government does not mess into this, local Slovaks and Hungarians will live together as peacefully as they always did. Three, you ought to believe me too that most Hungarians think likewise. I think there are awfully few Hungarians ready to shed Slovakian blood for moving f...g borders. There are a lot however who would be ready to fight for Hungarian brothers anywhere. This is why it is important that the Slovak government in particular is able to solve the problems of its own citizens. If they, Hungarians in Slovakia are able to live freely and happily in their country, Hungarians in Hungary will not be concerned about them. Four, this should have come second, maybe: I regret Hungarian crimes in history against Slovak people, I am sorry for that. I never did anything against Slovaks, however, Hungarian repression against Slovak identity before the WWI and Nazi aggression or any other crimes against national or cultural identity (like the Benes decrees) are a shame, sorry for that. I hope my government or the Hungarian Parliament will once become able to formulate a similar but official sorry.
In some of the opinions above, there are a lot of things I disagree with. I believe they are based on disinformation, fear, misinterpretation etc. This is why I think we need a clear basis on which we can build our discussion. My (perhaps idealistic) idea is that a list of facts is established. (Here is my list, I would be happy if you commented or added others – only that they should be corrections of “my facts” or look like a fact of yours.)
- Benes decrees are based on the principle of collective guilt. The decrees had punished ethnic Hungarians, citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic, most of whom innocent civilians. The decrees are in force in Slovakia. The decrees were confirmed in the Slovak legislature by an overwhelming majority in 2007, the Parliament of a country that is member of the European Union.
- Mr. Slota declared King Stephen - Hungary’s first king, a national symbol - a clown on a horse. According to him, Hungarians are a burden on Slovakia. SNS, the political party presided by Mr. Slota, is coalition member of Slovakia’s democratically elected government. Among others, the minister of education is delegated to the government by this party, headed by Mr. Slota. (Ad Ivan’s post) revisionist parties are not part of the Hungarian Parliament. Radical right wing political formations (mentioned by Ivan) have never been part of any Hungarian government since 1990. According to regular opinion surveys, neither of them has the support necessary to pass the threshold for Parliament membership.
- (Ad Ivan’s and Marian’s post) there ARE Slovak language kindergartens and schools in Hungary. According to Hungarian legislation, all schools in Hungary, including Slovak schools are free to choose their teaching material. These teaching materials, written in Slovak, indicate geographical names – not surprisingly - in Slovak, with their Hungarian corresponding in brackets. Ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia can also learn from teaching materials written in Hungarian, these however indicate geographical names in Slovakian (illustration for “ethnic English” staying in France: “The capital of the United Kingdom is Londres”.) This is the decision of the Slovakian minister for education, delegated to the government by SNS, the party headed by Mr. Slota.
milomiki | 9. Wednesday, September 2 2009, 15:02
Ah no, everyone magyar , no hungar, why do you call hungar yourself and world as well? Do you know who is huns ? Problem for all magyars is that they mix history zig zag, from asian language and no more exist nation as was huns/hunnen. What has together huns and magyar ? That is first problem. You wraiting about history but explain me what is hunnes and magyar. When did they come and where? Was Attila your king ? How looks magyar today ? Magyarization do you know meaning of that ? So if you do not know that magyars parasited 1000 years on others lands never will not for me magyar exist as nation but Austrian. So are you Austrian . No magyar . I am ging your logic. Upland was mean for you it is not mean for people what lives here that is Slovakia. Same as madarsko is exactly downland of Austria. Austrian should go back. You exist just from 1867 ? So haw looks for that magyar through theyrt logic others can look same but worse for you. If you feel as huns , o my god, then your really home is between front mongolia and Caspics sea. (but you can't be you look different not as asiats you look as slavonians with magyar language)If you feel magyar You should be happy that your country is still alive because Russian Empire wanted do deal with magyar. But got good lack that you have been in Austria teritory.
milomiki | 10. Wednesday, September 2 2009, 15:16
About books for school in Slovakia. Some names had to be cleaned from book. Example Filvedek. The country names isSlovakia. If we start to learn our children that Hungary is Moravia Empire or Slavonic down land how will be it ? Serbian will use theyr name and Romanian theyr. Sometime I heard Down land . Example where are you going ? I ma going to Down land I know that is hungary - madarsko. Some names was changed you can not use name from Middle Ages. Ugro no more exist just in magyar heads . Ugro is Middle Ages name , state with colonies and persecution ect. We slovakians we got different names for parts in Madarsko but we do not learn our children they will start taht is our land and then will want compensation of you . After war you took some Slovaks villages by Horthy. What ? So because Romenias and other your neighbourts has right to use names what is original not magyar middle bages names what is mean ugry. You understand ?
Aion kinah | 11. Sunday, February 21 2010, 04:55
Serbian will use theyr name and Romanian theyr. Sometime I heard Down land . Example where are you going ?
Eve Isk | 12. Sunday, February 21 2010, 04:56
Magyarization do you know meaning of that ? So if you do not know that magyars parasited 1000 years on others lands never will not for me magyar exist as nation but Austrian. So are you Austrian .
__________________
Hungarians in Slovakia
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Hungarians in Slovakia (census 2001)
50-100%
10-50%
0-10%
Hungarians in Slovakia according to their local share of the population (census 1991). Almost half of the Hungarians of Slovakia live in settlements with Hungarian majority over 80%.
János Esterházy - martyr of the Slovakian Hungarians - politician, countHungarians in Slovakia are the largest ethnic minority of the country, numbering 520,528 people or 9.7% of population (2001 census). They are concentrated mostly in the southern part of the country, near the border with Hungary. Averaged on district level, they form the majority in two districts: Komárno (Komáromi járás) and Dunajská Streda (Dunaszerdahelyi járás).
Contents [hide]
1 History
1.1 Origins of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia
1.2 Population statistics before and immediately after the end of World War I
1.3 The aftermath of World War II
1.3.1 Population exchanges
1.3.2 Re-Slovakization
1.4 Population statistics after World War II
1.5 The Velvet Revolution and the independence of Slovakia
2 The situation of the Hungarian minority today
2.1 Language law
3 Culture
4 Education
5 Hungarian political parties
6 Towns with large Hungarian populations
6.1 Towns with a Hungarian majority
6.2 Towns with a Hungarian population of between 25% and 50%
6.3 Towns with a Hungarian population of between 10% and 25%
7 Famous Hungarians born in the area of present-day Slovakia
7.1 Born before 1918 in the Kingdom of Hungary
7.2 Born after 1918 in Czechoslovakia
7.3 Born in Czechoslovakia, career in Hungary
7.4 Hungarian politicians in Slovakia
8 See also
9 Footnotes
10 References
11 Further reading
12 External links
[edit] History
See also: Slovakization
[edit] Origins of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia
Map showing the border changes after the Treaty of Trianon. As a result, Hungary lost over two-thirds of its territory, about two-thirds of its inhabitants under the treaty and 3.3 million out of 10 million ethnic Hungarians.[1][2]After the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian army in 1918, the winning Entente powers imposed the Treaty of Trianon on Hungary in 1920, at the Paris Peace Conference. In consideration of the strategic and economic interests of their new ally Czechoslovakia, the victorious allies set the Czechoslovakian-Hungarian border further south than the Slovak-Hungarian language border. Consequently, the newly created state annexed areas that were overwhelmingly ethnic Hungarian.[3]
When Czechoslovakia was established, many Slovak-language schools were established in Slovak lands, while some Hungarian-language schools in chiefly Hungarian regions remained Hungarian and some German schools in largely German regions remained German. The Hungarians, for example, had 31 kindergartens, 806 elementary schools, 46 secondary schools, and 576 Hungarian libraries at schools in the 1930s. A Department of Hungarian literature was created at the Charles University of Prague. The number of Hungarian elementary schools increased from 720 in 1923/1924 to the above number 806.[4] The Hungarian University in Bratislava/Pozsony was closed after the Czechoslovak occupation of the town.
[edit] Population statistics before and immediately after the end of World War I
According to the 1910 census conducted in Austria–Hungary, there were 884,309 ethnic Hungarians, constituting 30.2% of the population, in what is now Slovakia. The Czechoslovak census of 1930 recorded 571,952 Hungarians. (In the 2001 census, by contrast, the percentage of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia was 9.7%, a decrease of two thirds.)
St. Elisabeth Cathedral
Betliar - Andrássy CastleAll censuses from the period are disputed, and some give conflicting data. For example, according to the Czechoslovak censuses, 15-20% of the population in Košice was Hungarian. During the parliamentary elections, however, the ethnic Hungarian parties received 35-45% of the total votes (excluding those Hungarians who voted for the Communists or the Social Democrats)[5]. The fact that a high percentage of bilingual, mixed "Slovak-Hungarian" persons could claim both Slovak and Hungarian ethnicity complicated matters.
Some authors interpreted the difference between the 1910 census and the 1930 census as follows: the decrease between 1918 and 1924 of 106,000 people was due to those who were expelled from Czechoslovakia or fled to Hungary after World War I, when the state authorities refused to grant Czechoslovak citizenship to a disproportionate number of Hungarians. Later, when they added 'Jewish' as a separate ethnicity, there was an apparent decrease in the number and percentage of Hungarians (some of whom were Jews and self-identified as such.)[3] Slovak sources acknowledge that many Hungarian teachers and civil clerks were forced to leave Czechoslovakia or left for Hungary voluntarily. The numbers are confusing but the censuses do show a rapid decline in the number of Hungarians. Two famous examples of people forced to leave were the families of Béla Hamvas[6] and Albert Szent-Györgyi). The numerous refugees (including even more from the newly created Romania) necessitated the construction of new housing projects in Budapest (Mária-Valéria telep, Pongrácz-telep), which gave shelter to refugees numbering at least in the ten-thousands.[7]
[edit] The aftermath of World War II
In 1945, at the end of World War II, Czechoslovakia was recreated. Some politicians intended to completely remove the ethnic German and Hungarian minorities from the territory of Czechoslovakia via expulsion or ethnic cleansing. Many citizens considered both minorities collectively to be "war criminals", because representatives from those two minorities had supported redrawing the borders of Czechoslovakia before World War II, via the Munich Agreement and the first Vienna Award.[4] In addition, Czechs were suspicious of ethnic German political activity before the war. They also believed that the presence of so many ethnic Germans had encouraged Nazi Germany in its pan-German visions. In 1945, President Edvard Beneš revoked the citizenship of ethnic Germans and Hungarians by decree #33, except for those with an active anti-fascist past (see Beneš Decrees).
[edit] Population exchanges
Slovak and Hungarian officers are inspecting the relocation of Hungarians at Nové Zámky in September 1946.[8]Immediately at the end of World War II, some 30,000 Hungarians left the formerly Hungarian re-annexed territories of southern Slovakia (see Vienna Awards). While Czechoslovakia expelled ethnic Germans,the Allies prevented a unilateral expulsion of Hungarians. They did agree to a forced population exchange between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, one which was initially rejected by Hungary. This population exchange proceeded by an agreement whereby 55,487; 74,407; 76,604 or 89,660 Hungarians from Slovakia were exchanged for 60,000; 71,787; or 73,200 Slovaks from Hungary (the exact number depends on the source.)[3][9][10][11] Slovaks leaving Hungary moved voluntarily, but Czechoslovakia forced Hungarians out of their nation.
After expulsion of the Germans, Czechoslovakia found it had a labor shortage, especially of farmers in the Sudetenland. As a result, the Czechoslovak government deported more than 44,129 Hungarians from Slovakia to the Sudetenland between 1945 and 1947. Some 2,489 were resettled voluntarily and received houses, good pay and citizenship in return. Later on, from November 19, 1946 to September 30, 1946, the government resettled the remaining 41,666 by force, with the Police and Army transporting them like "livestock" in rail cars. The Hungarians were required to work as indentured laborers, often offered in village markets to the new Czech settlers of Sudets.
These conditions eased slowly. After a few years, the resettled Hungarians started to return to their homes in Slovakia. By 1948 some 18,536 had returned, causing conflicts over the ownership of their original houses, since Slovak colonists had often taken them over. By 1950 the majority of indentured Hungarians had returned to Slovakia. The status of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia was resolved, and the government again gave citizenship to ethnic Hungarians.
[edit] Re-Slovakization
Materials from Russian archives prove how insistent the Czechoslovak government was on destroying the Hungarian minority in Slovakia.[12] Hungary gave the Slovaks equal rights and demanded that Czechoslovakia offer equivalent rights to Hungarians within its borders.[13]
In the spring and summer of 1945, the Czech government in exile approved a series of decrees that stripped Hungarians of property and all civil rights.[14] In 1946 in Czechoslovakia, the process of "Reslovakization" was implemented with the objective of eliminating the Magyar nationality[15]. It basically required the acceptance of Slovak nationality[15]. Ethnic Hungarians were pressured to have their nationality officially changed to Slovak, otherwise they were dropped from the pension, social and healthcare system[16]. Since Hungarians in Slovakia were temporarily deprived of many rights at that time (see Benes decrees), as many as some 400,000 (sources differ) Hungarians applied for, and 344,609 Hungarians received, a re-Slovakization certificate and thereby Czechoslovak citizenship.
After Eduard Benes was out of office, the next Czechoslovak government issued decree No. 76/1948 on April 13, 1948, allowing those Hungarians still living in Czechoslovakia, to reinstate Czechoslovak citizenship[15]. A year later, Hungarians were allowed to send their children to Hungarian-language schools, which reopened for the first time since 1945[15]. Most re-Slovakized Hungarians gradually readopted their Hungarian nationality. As a result, the re-Slovakization commission ceased operations in December 1948.
Despite promises to settle the issue of the Hungarians in Slovakia, in 1948 Czech and Slovak ruling circles still maintained the hope that they could deport the Hungarians from Slovakia.[17] According to a 1948 poll conducted among the Slovak population, 55% were for resettlement (deportation) of the Hungarians, 24% said "don't know", and 21% were against.[18] Under slogans related to the struggle with "class enemies", the process of dispersing dense Hungarian settlements continued in 1948 and 1949.[18] By October 1949, the government prepared to deport 600 Hungarian families.[18] Those Hungarians remaining in Slovakia were subjected to heavy pressure to assimilate,[18] including the forced enrollment of Hungarian children in Slovak schools.[18]
[edit] Population statistics after World War II
Krásna HôrkaIn the 1950 census the number of Hungarians in Slovakia decreased by 240,000 in comparison to 1930. By 1961 census it increased by 164,244 to 518,776. The low number in the 1950 census is likely due to the re-Slovakization; the higher number in the 1961 census is due to the fact that the re-Slovakization was cancelled[citation needed].
The number of Hungarians in Slovakia increased from 518,782 in 1961 to 567,296 in 1991. The number of self-identified Hungarians in Slovakia decreased between 1991 and 2001, due in part to assimilation accelerated by continued pressure from the Slovak society and state institutions, and introduction of new ethnic categories, such as the Roma.
[edit] The Velvet Revolution and the independence of Slovakia
After the Velvet Revolution of 1989, Czechia and Slovakia separated peacefully in the Velvet Divorce of 1993. Following the independence of Slovakia, the situation of the Hungarian minority worsened, especially under the reign of Slovak Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar (1993-March 1994 and December 1994-1998).
An official language law required the use of the Slovak language not only in official communications but also in everyday commerce, in the administration of religious bodies, and even in the realm of what is normally considered private interaction, for example, communications between patient and physician.[citation needed] On January 23, 2007, the local broadcasting committee shut down BBC's radio broadcasting for using English, and cited the language law as the reason.[19]
Especially in Slovakia's ethnic Hungarian areas[20], critics have attacked the administrative division of Slovakia as a case of gerrymandering, designed so that in all eight regions, Hungarians are in the minority. Under the 1996 law of reorganization, only two districts (Dunajská Streda and Komárno) have a Hungarian-majority population. While also done to maximize the success of the party HZDS, the gerrymandering in ethnic Hungarian areas worked to minimize the Hungarians' voting power.[21] In all eight regions, Hungarians are in the minority, though five regions have Hungarian populations within the 10 to 30 per cent range. The Slovak government established new territorial districts from north to south, dividing the Hungarian community into five administrative units, where they became a minority in each administrative unit. The Hungarian community saw a substantial loss of political influence in this gerrymandering.[22]
On March 12, 1997, the Undersecretary of Education sent a circular to the heads of the school districts, ordering that in Hungarian-language schools, the Slovak language should be taught exclusively by native speakers. The same requirement for native Slovak-language speakers applied to teaching of geography and history in non-Slovak schools. In 1998 this measure was repealed by the Mikuláš Dzurinda government.
On April 10, 2008 the Hungarian Coalition Party (MKP) voted with the governing Smer and SNS supporting the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon[23]. This is the result of an alleged political bargain[24]: Robert Fico promised to change the Slovak education law that would have drastically limited the Hungarian minority's usage of their native language in education facilities[25]. The two Slovak opposition parties saw this as a betrayal[24], because originally the whole Slovak opposition had planned to boycott the vote to protest a new press code that limited the freedom of the press in Slovakia[26].
[edit] The situation of the Hungarian minority today
Ján Slota, the chairman of Slovak government Party SNS, according to whom the Hungarian population of Slovakia "is a tumour in the body of the Slovak nation."[27][28][29]The 1992 Slovak constitution is derived from the concept of the Slovak nation state.[30] The preamble of the Constitution, however, cites Slovaks and ethnic minorities as the constituency. Moreover, the rights of the diverse minorities are protected by the Constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights, and various other legally binding documents. The Party of the Hungarian Coalition(SMK) is represented in Parliament and was part of the government coalition from 1998 to 2006.
The Constitution also declares that Slovak is the state language on the territory of the Slovak Republic. Make this rules concrete, the 1995 Language Law declares that the State language has a priority over other languages applied on the whole territory of the Slovak Republic. The 2009 amendment of the language law retricts the use of minoritiy languages, and extend the obligatory use of the state language, eg. in communities where the number of minority speaker is less than 20% of the population. Under the 2009 amendment a fine up to 5000 euros may be imposed on those committing a misdemeanor in relation to the use of the state language.
In 1995, a so-called Basic Treaty was signed between Hungary and Slovakia, regarded by the US and leading European powers as a pre-condition for these countries to join NATO and the EU. In the basic treaty the Hungary and Slovakia undertook a wide range of legal obligations among others the acceptance of recommendation 1201 of the European Council which in its article 11 states that 'in the regions where they are in a majority the persons belonging to a national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status, matching the specific historical and territorial situation and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the state.'
After the Regions of Slovakia became autonomous in 2002, the SMK was able to take power in the Nitra Region. It became part of the ruling coalition in several other regions. Since the new administrative system was put in place in 1996, the SMK has asked for the creation of a Hungarian-majority Komárno county. Although a territorial unit of the same name existed before 1918, the borders proposed by the SMK are significantly different. The proposed region would encompass a long slice of southern Slovakia, with the explicit aim to create an administrative unit with an ethnic Hungarian majority. Hungarian minority politicians and intellectuals are convinced that such an administrative unit is essential for the long-term survival of the Hungarian minority. The Slovak government has so far refused to change the boundaries of the administrative units, and ethnic Hungarians continue as minorities in each.
The coalition formed after the parliamentary elections in 2006 saw the Slovak National Party headed by Ján Slota (frequently described as ultra-nationalist[31][32], right-wing extremist[31][33] and neo-fascist[34]) become a member of the ruling coalition, led by the allegedly social-democratic Smer party. After its signing of a coalition treaty with far-right extremist party SNS, the Smer's Social-Democratic self-identification was questioned.
In August 2006, a few incidents motivated by ethnic hatred caused diplomatic tensions between Slovakia and Hungary. Mainstream Hungarian and Slovak media blamed Slota's anti-Hungarian statements from the early summer for the worsening ethnic relations. The Party of European Socialists, with which the Smer is affiliated, regards SNS as a party of the racist far-right. It reacted to news of the coalition by expressing grave concern. The PES suspended Smer's membership on 12 October 2006 and decided to review the situation in June 2007. The decision was then extended until February 2008, when Smer's candidacy was readmitted by PES. On 27 September 2007, the Slovak parliament reconfirmed the Beneš decrees, appearing to legitimize the historic accusation of collective guilt and deportation of Hungarians and Germans from Czechoslovakia after World War II.[35]
[edit] Language law
Main article: Language law of Slovakia
On September 1, 2009 more than ten thousand Hungarians held demonstrations to protest against the so-called language law that limits the use of minority languages in Slovakia.[36] The law calls for fines of up to £4,380 for anyone "misusing the Slovak language[37] There were demonstrations in Dunajská Streda, Slovakia (Hungarian: Dunaszerdahely), in Budapest, Hungary and in Brussels, Belgium.
[edit] Culture
Új Szó, a Hungarian-language daily newspaper published in Bratislava [2]
Madách - former Hungarian publishing house in Bratislava
Kalligram - Hungarian publishing house in Bratislava [3]
[edit] Education
Some 585 schools in Slovakia, kindergartens inclusive, use the Hungarian language as the main language of education. Nearly 200 schools use both Slovak and Hungarian. In 2004, the J. Selye University of Komárno was the first state-financed Hungarian-language university to be opened outside Hungary.
[edit] Hungarian political parties
Party of the Hungarian Coalition (Strana maďarskej koalície - Magyar Koalíció Pártja) (MKP), in the government between 1998-2006.
Most–Híd
[edit] Towns with large Hungarian populations
Note: only towns are listed here, villages and rural municipalities are not.
[edit] Towns with a Hungarian majority
Veľký Meder (Nagymegyer) - 9,113 inhabitants, of whom 84.6% are Hungarian
Kolárovo (Gúta) - 10,756 inhabitants, of whom 82.6% are Hungarian
Dunajská Streda (Dunaszerdahely) - 23,562 inhabitants, of whom 79.75% are Hungarian
Kráľovský Chlmec (Királyhelmec) - 7,966 inhabitants, of whom 76.94% are Hungarian
Štúrovo (Párkány) - 11,708 inhabitants, of whom 68.7% are Hungarian
Šamorín (Somorja) - 12,339 inhabitants, of whom 66.63% are Hungarian
Fiľakovo (Fülek) - 10,198 inhabitants, of whom 64.40% are Hungarian
Šahy (Ipolyság) - 7,971 inhabitants, of whom 62.21% are Hungarian
Tornaľa (Tornalja) - 8,016 inhabitants, of whom 62.14% are Hungarian
Komárno (Komárom) - 37,366 inhabitants, of whom 60.09% are Hungarian
Čierna nad Tisou (Tiszacsernyő) - 4,390 inhabitants, of whom 60% are Hungarian
Veľké Kapušany (Nagykapos) - 9,536 inhabitants of whom 56.98% are Hungarian
Želiezovce (Zselíz) - 7,522 inhabitants, of whom 51.24% are Hungarian
Hurbanovo (Ógyalla) - 8,041 inhabitants, of whom 50.19% are Hungarian
[edit] Towns with a Hungarian population of between 25% and 50%
Moldava nad Bodvou (Szepsi) - 9,525 inhabitants of whom 43.6% are Hungarian
Sládkovičovo (Diószeg) - 6,078 inhabitants of whom 38.5% are Hungarian
Galanta (Galánta) - 16,000 inhabitants of whom 36.80% are Hungarian
Rimavská Sobota (Rimaszombat) - 24,520 inhabitants of whom 35.26% are Hungarian
Nové Zámky (Érsekújvár) - 42,300 inhabitants of whom 27.52% are Hungarian
Rožňava (Rozsnyó) - 19,120 inhabitants of whom 26.8% are Hungarian
[edit] Towns with a Hungarian population of between 10% and 25%
Senec (Szenc) - 15,193 inhabitants of whom 22% are Hungarian
Šaľa (Vágsellye) - 24,506 inhabitants of whom 17.9% are Hungarian
Lučenec (Losonc) - 28,221 inhabitants of whom 13.11% are Hungarian
Levice (Léva) - 35,980 inhabitants of whom 12.23% are Hungarian
[edit] Famous Hungarians born in the area of present-day Slovakia
[edit] Born before 1918 in the Kingdom of Hungary
Gyula Andrássy (politician)
Gyula Andrássy the Younger (politician)
Bálint Balassi (poet)
Miklós Bercsényi (politician, military leader)
Lujza Blaha (actress, "the nightingale of the nation")
Béla Gerster (engineer, canal architect)
Mór Jókai (writer)
Imre Madách (poet)
Pál Maléter (military leader of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution)
Sándor Márai (world-famous writer)
Kálmán Mikszáth (writer)
Francis II Rákóczi (prince, military leader, freedom fighter)
Gyula Reviczky (poet)
Mihály Tompa (poet)
Lajos Kassák (poet, painter, typographer, graphic artist)
Ernő Dohnányi (conductor, composer, pianist)
Lajos Batthyány (politician, martyr)
[edit] Born after 1918 in Czechoslovakia
Balázs Borbély (sportsman)
Imrich Bugár Imre Bugár (sportsman)
George Feher György Fehér (biophysicist)
Koloman Gögh Kálmán Gögh (sportsman)
László Mécs (Družstevná pri Hornáde, Slovakia; poet)
Szilárd Németh (sportsman)
Alexander Pituk Sándor Pituk (sportsman)
Tamás Priskin (sportsman)
Richard Réti (sportsman)
[edit] Born in Czechoslovakia, career in Hungary
Katalin Szvorák
János Manga
Attila Kaszás
[edit] Hungarian politicians in Slovakia
Béla Bugár - former chairman of Party of the Hungarian Coalition
Edit Bauer - member of Member of the European Parliament
László Nagy
Pál Csáky - chairman of Party of the Hungarian Coalition
László Gyurovszky
Miklós Duray
Count János Esterházy - World War II politician
Károly Tóth - Leader of the Forum institute, which compiles statistics on minorities in Slovakia.
[edit] See also
Magyarization
Hungarian-Slovak relations
Demographics of Slovakia
2006 Slovak-Hungarian diplomatic affairs
Hungarian minority in Romania
Slovakization
Hungarians in Vojvodina
Székely
Székelys of Bukovina
Csángó
[edit] Footnotes
^ Macartney, C.A. (1937). Hungary and her successors - The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences 1919-1937. Oxford University Press.
^ "East on the Danube: Hungary's Tragic Century". The New York Times. 2003-08-09. http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B07E3D91531F93AA3575BC0A9659C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2. Retrieved 2008-03-15.
^ a b c 1
^ a b Marko, Martinický: Slovensko-maďarské vzťahy. 1995
^ kovacs-4.qxd
^ HamvasBéla.org
^ Magyarország a XX. században / Szociálpolitika
^ Rubicon, történelmi folyóirat, 2005/6 (in Hungarian), Rubicon Hungarian History Magazine, 2006/6.
^ Bobák, Ján: Maďarská otázka v Česko-Slovensku. 1996
^ http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2003/Erika%20Harris.pdf
^ Zvara, J.: Maďarská menšina na Slovensku po roku 1945. 1969
^ Alfred J. Rieber (2000). Forced Migration in Central and Eastern Europe, 1939-1950. Routledge. p. 84. ISBN 9780714651323.
^ Rieber, p. 91
^ Mandelbaum, p. 40
^ a b c d "Human Rights For Minorities In Central Europe: Ethnic Cleansing In Post World War II Czechoslovakia: The Presidential Decrees Of Edward Benes, 1945-1948". http://migrationeducation.de/15.1.html?&rid=14&cHash=944ca081bb.
^ Largest Hungarian portal's article about re-Slovakization
^ Rieber, p. 92
^ a b c d e Rieber, p. 93
^ "BBC's radio license yanked for use of English". The Slovak Spectator. http://slovakspectator.sk/clanok-26424.html.
^ O'Dwyer, Conor : Runaway State-building, p. 113 online
^ O'Dwyer, Conor : Runaway State-building, p. 113 online
^ Minton F. Goldman: Slovakia since independence, p. 125. online
^ "SMK will vote for Lisbon Treaty, to SDKÚ & KDH dismay". Slovak Spectator. 2008-04-10. http://www.spectator.sk/articles/view/31392/10/smk_will_vote_for_lisbon_treaty_to_sdku_kdh_dismay.html. Retrieved 2008-04-15.
^ a b "Csáky "tehénszar" helyett már "tökös gyerek" - Fico "aljas ajánlata"" (in Hungarian). Hírszerző. 2008-04-14. http://www.hirszerzo.hu/cikkr.csaky_tehenszar_helyett_mar_tokos_gyerek_-_fico_aljas_ajanlata.63108.html. Retrieved 2008-04-15.
^ "Készek tüntetni a szlovákiai magyarok" (in Hungarian). Hírszerző. 2008-03-26. http://www.hirszerzo.hu/cikk.keszek_tuntetni_a_szlovakiai_magyarok.61236.html. Retrieved 2008-04-15.
^ "Fico's post-Press Code era has begun". The Slovak Spectator. 2008-04-14. http://www.spectator.sk/articles/view/31432/11/ficos_post_press_code_era_has_begun.html. Retrieved 2008-04-15.
^ "Separatist Movements Seek Inspiration in Kosovo". Der Spiegel. 2008-02-22. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,537008-2,00.html. Retrieved 2008-08-06.
^ Slovakia and Hungary just won't get along
^ Slovakia and Hungary 'Dangerously Close to Playing with Fire'
^ Hungarian Nation in Slovakia|Slovakia
^ a b New Slovak Government Embraces Ultra-Nationalists, Excludes Hungarian Coalition Party HRF Alert: "Hungarians are the cancer of the Slovak nation, without delay we need to remove them from the body of the nation." (Új Szó, April 15, 2005)
^ International Herald Tribune's article about Hungarian-Slovak relations
^ The Steven Roth Institute: Country reports. Antisemitism and racism in Slovakia
^ Democratic Dilemma - OhmyNews International
^ "The Beneš-Decrees Are Untouchable" (PDF). mkp. 2007. http://www.mkp.sk/eng/images/pdf/MINORITY%20REPORT%20-%20OCTOBER.pdf. Retrieved October 2008.
^ Protests over Slovak language law
^ [1]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magyarization
[edit] References
Alfred J. Rieber (2000). Forced Migration in Central and Eastern Europe, 1939-1950. Routledge. ISBN 9780714651323.
Michael Mandelbaum (2000). The New European Diasporas: National Minorities and Conflict in Eastern Europe. Council on Foreign Relations. ISBN 9780876092576.
[edit] Further reading
LINK: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hungarians_in_Slovakia
______________________________________________________
The Euromosaic study
Slovak in Hungary
General information
The language
History, geography and demography
Legal status and official policies
Presence and use of the language in various fields
Education
Judicial Authorities
Public Authorities and services
Mass media and Information technology
Arts and Culture
The business world
Language use in family and society
The European dimension
Conclusion
1. General information
1.1 The language
Slovak [slovenský jazyk] is a Slavic language that together with Czech, Polish and Sorbian belongs to the group of west Slavic languages. The number of Slovak speakers is estimated at 5.7 to 7 million. Most of them live in Slovakia (4.9 million or approx. 85.7% of the country’s population). The varieties of Slovak spoken in Hungary are influenced by Hungarian and differ from the Slovak used in Slovakia.
1.2 History, geography and demography
The presence of the Slovak minority in Hungary mainly dates back to the 17th and 18th century when they started settling in the northern parts of Hungary and developed strong mutual language contact with the Hungarians. Following a period of Slovak demand for autonomy within Hungarian territory rivalries between Slovaks and Hungarians arose. With the Treaty of Trianon (1920) Hungary lost a significant part of its Slovak-speaking territory. The population movement from Hungary to Slovakia that took place after 1920 was repeated after World War II when about 73,000 Slovaks resettled from Hungary to Slovakia.
The Slovaks in Hungary mainly live in three areas: in the southeast (the counties of Békés and Csongrád), in the northern middle mountain range (county of Nógrád), and in Transdanubia (counties of Pest and Komárom-Esztergom).
The number of people belonging to the Slovak national minority is estimated to be between 17,692 (according to provisional results of the 2001 census) and 110,000 (according to minority organisations, see the country profile on Hungary). Of those declaring themselves as belonging to the Slovak national minority about 8% belong to the age group ‘0-14’, about 24% to the age group ‘15-39’, about 33% to the age group ‘40-59’ and about 34% to the age group ‘60+’. Of the 34% of Slovaks that according to the 2001 census are economically active about 5% work in the primary, 29% in the secondary and 56% in the tertiary sector.
1.3 Legal status and official policies
Information on the legal status of Slovak and of official policies affecting Slovak in Hungary can be found in section 4 of the country profile.
2. Presence and use of the language in various fields
2.1 Education
In the school year 1999/2000 there were 73 pre-primary Slovak schools. The Slovak native language pre-primary schools (first type of minority pre-school education, see section 4 of the country profile) had an enrolment of 103 pupils, the bilingual pre-primary schools (second type of minority pre-school education, see section 4 of the country profile) had 2,947 pupils. In the same school year 59 schools offered primary Slovak education. 92 pupils attended native language primary schools (first type of minority primary education, see section 4 of the country profile), 658 pupils attended bilingual primary schools (second type of minority primary education, see section 4 of the country profile) and 3,674 pupils enrolled in Slovak language teaching education (third type of minority primary education, see section 4 of the country profile). Secondary education in Slovak took place at 2 schools offering native language or bilingual instruction. 105 pupils attended native language or bilingual classes in grammar schools, and 13 attended native language or bilingual education in specialised schools. In the academic year 1999/2000 228 students studied Slovak in institutions of higher education. In the academic year 2000/2001, 13 students were granted scholarships by the Hungarian government to study in Slovakia. Nursery-school teacher training is offered at Tessedik Sámuel College Brunszvik Teréz College Faculty of Nursery-school Teacher Training in Szarvas. Primary school teacher training is offered at Tessedik Sámuel College, College Faculty of Pedagogy in Szarvas and Vitéz János Roman Catholic Teacher Training College in Esztergom. Secondary school language teachers are trained at the Eötvös Lóránt University of Arts and Sciences (ELTE) Faculty of Arts (BTK) in Budapest, and the Pázmány Péter Chatolic University in Piliscsaba. Secondary school teacher training is offered at the Szeged University of Arts and Sciences Juhász Gyula Teacher Training College Faculty in Szeged.
2.2 Judicial authorities
General information on this issue is given in section 4 of the country profile.
2.3 Public authorities and services
General information on this issue is given in section 4 of the country profile.
2.4 Mass media and information technology
The Slovak weekly newspaper Ludové noviny, founded in 1957, is now controlled by the Slovak National Self-Government and funded by the state. It now has a distribution of approximately 2,000 copies. Other entirely Slovak independent periodicals are the regional monthlies Čabän (400 copies are distributed) and Budapeštianský Slovák (500 copies). In a few local newspapers Slovak contributions sometimes appear but never exceed 50% of the total volume. The Association of Slovaks in Hungary distributes its annual calendar ‚Naš kalendár’ and the ‘Čabiansky kalendár’ is published in Békéscsaba. In recent years more and more Slovak books are published in Hungary (fiction as well as poetry, school books, children’s books and religious books). In 2001, 21 Slovak books were published. The demand for reading materials in the Slovak language is met through the four regional libraries and the network of local and school libraries which are supplied by them.
Hungarian public radio transmits a daily two-hour Slovak regional programme and a daily half-hourly country-wide programme. The national programme is broadcast between 6:30 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. The regional programme is broadcast in the morning as well as in the afternoon. The Slovak programmes are produced in the regional studio in Szeged. No information was obtained on the existence of private local Hungarian radio stations that broadcast Slovak programmes.
Hungarian television broadcasts a 26 minute weekly Slovak programme entitled Domovina. It is broadcast between 2 and 3 p.m. on workdays on Channel 1 of the Hungarian television, and is repeated on Saturday mornings on satellite Channel 2. These Slovak programmes are produced in the studio in Szeged. Besides the programmes mentioned the religious editors of public television regularly broadcast masses in Slovak. No information was obtained on the existence of private local Hungarian television stations that broadcast programmes in Slovak.
At the end of 2003 10 homepages operated by the Slovaks in Hungary were present on the internet. Links to several Slovak organisations and institutions are given on www.kisebbseg.lap.hu. (see section 4 of the country profile for general information on the situation of the new media in the case of Hungary’s minorities)
2.5 Arts and Culture
Several institutions play an important role in preserving and developing the cultural identity of the Slovak minority in Hungary. Among the most important ones are the national and local offices of the Association of Slovaks in Hungary, the Slovak House of Culture, the Research Institute of the Slovak Minority (Békéscsaba), the Further Education Centre (Bánk) and various NGOs. The Slovak House of Culture opened in the autumn of 1996 in the town of Békéscsaba with the financial support of the Hungarian and Slovak governments. The Mihály Munkácsy Museum in Békéscsaba functions as the Slovak central museum. Most of the settlements of the Slovak minority in Hungary are serviced by some sort of local institution or cultural centre to meet the cultural needs and by a local primary school responsible for local general education needs. More than half of these settlements have an active local community which also organises local cultural events on its own initiative. The Slovak community in Hungary has about 30 adult choirs, 15 dance ensembles, 10 brass bands, 5 traditional bands, several children's choirs and bands, and 10 amateur theatre companies. In recent years, the regional libraries have been actively involved in organizing literary discussions, meetings between authors and readers, and exhibitions as well.
2.6 The business world
General information on this issue is given in section 4 of the country profile.
2.7 Language use in family and society
While in the 1990 census 12,745 people declared Slovak to be their mother tongue, only 11,816 did so in the 2001 census. Although census figures have to be treated with great caution (section 3 of the country profile) this relatively small decline of 7% seems to indicate that the language shift from Slovak to Hungarian still continues. Slovaks are mostly bi- or trilingual (meaning that they use Hungarian and/or a local variety of Slovak and/or standard Slovak). There are intergenerational differences: whereas the older generation predominantly is dominant Slovak bilingual the younger generation is Hungarian dominant bilingual (if not Hungarian monolingual). According to a study carried out in 1991 slightly less than 30 percent of the children of the parents who are linguistically the most Slovak have learned Slovak to native proficiency, and 70 percent have deficient or no knowledge of Slovak. The use of Slovak is mainly restricted to the private domain, whereas Hungarian is used in most cases in the public and semi-public domain.
2.8 The European dimension
On the basis of the Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic on Good-neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation, twelve joint committees were created to provide the framework for the co-operation between the two countries in different areas of economic and social life. On 23 April 2001 the Governments of the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic signed in Budapest an Agreement on the Cross-border Co-operation of Local Self-governments and Public Administration Bodies. The agreement enables the promotion of national minority language education, the nurturing of the minority cultures, the support to the co-operation among twinned schools and the formation of partnerships between local and regional municipalities in the territory of which a significant population of Hungarian or Slovak national minorities is established.
3. Conclusion
Together with the Croatian minority the Slovak minority is one of the larger minorities within Hungary. The number of people belonging to the Slovak minority is estimated between 17,692 (2001 census) and 110,000 (estimates of minority organisations). The Slovaks, whose predecessors settled in what is today Hungary mainly in the 17th and 18th century, have largely assimilated to Hungarian over the past centuries. Nowadays the rather limited presence of Slovak in the media, as well as its use in several cultural organisations only slightly help to slow down the further assimilation of Slovaks to Hungarian. It appears that the intergenerational transmission of Slovak is faltering. Attempts are being made to reverse Slovak-Hungarian language shift by establishing Slovak native language schools or Slovak-Hungarian bilingual schools as allowed by the Education Act. Whereas pre-primary and primary Slovak education is successful, measures to encourage the flow of Slovak pupils into secondary Slovak minority education seem to be necessary. But even if that succeeds it remains unclear whether that will help in revitalising the use of Slovak in the daily life of the Slovak minority. To guarantee a successful revitalization of Slovak, complementary measures will have to be deployed in different areas of the lives of the Slovak minority. Despite the sophisticated Minorities Act such measures have not yet been put in place. A lack of funding, the apparent gap between the legal framework and the actual implementation of the legal provisions in the field and the convictions of some minority members that Slovak culture and identity can survive without the Slovak language seem to be the main reasons for this.
LINK: http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/archive/languages/langmin/euromosaic/hu6_en.html
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I beg to differ this time.
Hungarian extremism is not wipped up by Slota, as you say, but the Hungarian extremists. They are proliferating rapidly and out-bid one an other in extremism and brazenness. Slota is only taking advantage of them.
I also failed to feel sympathy for the savage treatment they received at the hands of the Slovakian police, because they went there to provoke and they received their comeuppance.
In fact, they should have received it long time ago, from our own police. As they say, anti-nazism begins at home. But not in Hungary.
The domestic police spoiled them enough that by now they feel emboldened enough to go abroad to export their politics.
The Hungarian public should send a thank you note to the Slovakian police for showing resolve and balls.
If these huligans are harmful at home, and they certainly are, then so they are harmful in Slovakia but even more.
To this subject wrote one of the Slovakian-Hungarian papers that the visit of these extremists just exacerbates the ethnic tensions in Slovakia, making the life of the local Hungarian minority even more precarious.
Posted by: Sandor | November 09, 2008 at 10:32 PM
Trivia note: Andrássy út 60. was referred to as the "Zöldház" (green house) because of the use of green shirts by the Arrow Cross Party. This was a reference to the little green houses that you can still see preserved on some street corners in Budapest - they are the original public toilets. Ref: http://nevarchivum.klte.hu/szleng/zol_ged/epulet.htm
Posted by: [sic] | November 10, 2008 at 02:16 AM
Sandor: "I beg to differ this time. Hungarian extremism is not wipped up by Slota, as you say, but the Hungarian extremists."
I have the feeling that you misunderstood me. I didn't say that Slota is responsible for Hungarian extremism. I think and wrote that the two sides reinforce each other.
Posted by: Eva S. Balogh | November 10, 2008 at 02:01 PM
That's a good post, I think.
I just want to add a note.
you wrote: "the arrow crosses are not the exact duplicates of the old." Yes, because the symbol is something else, as I know. The GREEN part is a character of the ancient Hungarian runic alphabet (rovásírás), namely the "h" if I remember well.
Posted by: Árpád | November 21, 2008 at 05
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In territory between Budapest and todays slovak border lived ine year 1880-1890, in many villages lived more than 50% slovaks but they were also 100% in some villages. [3 back]. In Niregyhasa (established in 1749 like pure slovak village) lived in 1890 exactly 8600 slovaks and 13000 hungarians. Szegedin has in 19th century also many slovak citizens. [11]
In year 1920 lived slovaks as minority in 78 hungarian communities, and slovaks had majority in 41 communities (= cities or villages), that was 50-75% slovaks in 21 cities/villages, 75-100% slovaks in 20 cities/villages.
After Benes decrets were 70.000 slovaks sent to slovakia from hungary, and 70.000 hungarians from slovakia to hungary as exchange.
Immediately after TRIANON lived in Hungary (after different sources) 630.000 [1], 350.000 - 450.000 [2], 450.000/ 500.000-550.000 [3] slovaks.
In year 1946 czecholsovak-hungarian commition counted in hungary 473.556 slovaks which wanted to be exchanged with hungarians from slovakia (benes decrets)
In year 1990 and 2001 lives in hungary only 70.000 [statistic research 2], respectively 110.000 [approximation 4] slovaks
In last 40 years was reduction of slovaks in hungary - minus 95.5%
Slovak minority is today bigger in Serbia or Romania, what is paradox, because in year 1920 lived in Serbia and Romania much smaller slovak minorities than in Hungary.
Thanks for attention.
Sources :
1] Conférence de la paix 1919-1920. Recueil des actes de la conférence. Partie IV.Paríž 1929, str.30
[2] “Slovaks abroad” in: Slovakia and the Slovaks, A concise encyclopaedia. Bratislava
[3] Marko A., Martinický P.: Slovensko-maďarské vzťahy – história a súčasnosť vo faktoch. Bratislava 1995
[4] Baláž C.:„Slovenská republika a zahraniční Slováci“ in: Desaťročie Slovenskej republiky. Martin 2004
[5] Deák, L: Viedenská arbitráž 2. november 1938 Dokumenty I. Martin 2002
[6] Mesároš J.: Zložité hľadanie pravdy o slovenských dejinách. Bratislava 2004
[7] „Slováci v Maďarsku“ in: Slovenský náučný slovník III. Bratislava-Praha 1932
[8] Stanislav J.: Slovenský juh v stredoveku I, II. 1999
[9] Bobák J.: Maďarská otázka v Česko-Slovensku 1944-1948. Martin 1996
[10] Krejčí O.: Geopolitics of the Central European Region. The view from Prague and Bratislava. Bratislava 2005.
[11] Beksics G.: Maďarizácia a pomaďarčovanie s osobitným zreteľom na naše mestá. Bratislava 2000 (pôvodne maďarský text vydaný v Budapešti 1883)
I got you slovak AND french scientific sources.
Just like there are many german , french, romanian, austrian and polish descendants in Hungary.
In summary, there are all kinds of slavic, germanic and even celtic origin people living in Hungary.
Is this what you were looking for us to say?
Just like there are many german , french, romanian, austrian and polish descendants in Hungary.
In summary, there are all kinds of slavic, germanic and even celtic origin people living in Hungary.
Is this what you were looking for us to say?
I just simple only have a feeling that hungarian sources dont give you such informations. They only say - there were 550.000 hungarians in Czechoslovakia in 1920 after Trianon, but they dont say - there were also 550.000 slovaks in hungary in 1920.
Or they speak aboute reduction of hungarians in slovakia - from 550.000 to 500.000, but they dont speak aboute reduction of slovaks in Hungary from 550.000 to 60.000.
Or they speak aboute reduction of hungarians in slovakia - from 550.000 to 500.000, but they dont speak aboute reduction of slovaks in Hungary from 550.000 to 60.000.
Jaroslav, that is because of minority school systems that are totaly diferent in Slovaka and in Hungary.
In Magyar school in Slovakia, the teaching language is magyar and in slovak they are learning only Slovak language. All the other subjects are teaching in magyar. So after a magyar high school most of students of magyar origin dont know speak the official language - slovak.
In contrary, in the so called slovak schools in hungary, the only subject that is teaching in slovak is again Slovak language, and all the others are teaching in magyar:confused:.
Do you see the difference?
But to be honest there are also other factors leading to disappearing of Slovaks in Hungary. There are two main that I see:
Magyars in Slovakia are concentrated in southern parts of the country, while Slovaks in Hungary were dispersed all over the country. And the second one is that civilisation and cultural differences between Slovaks and Magyars simply dont exist ( the only difference that I see is the language ), and therefore is it easier for Magyars to assimilate Slovaks, than Serbs or Romanians. And therefore also Slovak minorities in Romania and Serbia retained their identity till today.
Do you consider Slovak sources a priori as untrue and inobjective?
i must defend him - its allways good to look at more sources, from both sides. But i was not able to find in whole internet one hungarian source aboute these facts (in my 1st comment in this thread)
Not all of them. And there are a lot of untrue and unobjective hungarian sources too, I know.
Please note this: I can't accept Trianon, but Trianon is not my bigest problem with slovaks, romanians and serbs. My bigest problem with this nations is the lies, like "hungarians are mongols, gypsies, Asians, non-Aryans, etc." This chauvinist lies makes me very angry. And this lies are very popularin Serbia, Slovakia, and Romania. I hate every kind of chauvinism. (I hate hungarian chauvinism ("turanism") too, of course).
Please answer me one question: do you think that I'm not White?!
Please note this: I can't accept Trianon, but Trianon is not my bigest problem with slovaks, romanians and serbs. My bigest problem with this nations is the lies, like "hungarians are mongols, gypsies, Asians, non-Aryans, etc." This chauvinist lies makes me very angry. And this lies are very popularin Serbia, Slovakia, and Romania. I hate every kind of chauvinism. (I hate hungarian chauvinism ("turanism") too, of course).
Please answer me one question: do you think that I'm not White?!
The answer to your qestion: I have never seen you, so how could I answer? But if you look like other magyars I have seen, than you are probably white.
And for the mongol theories, no serious man could consider present Magyars as asiats. That is simply nonsense. All of this you say goes back to the times when proto magyars entered europe. But today you are mix of mostly slavic and germanic people.
Are you satisfied now?:)
And for the mongol theories, no serious man could consider present Magyars as asiats. That is simply nonsense. All of this you say goes back to the times when proto magyars entered europe. But today you are mix of mostly slavic and germanic people.
Are you satisfied now?:)
Actually its quite funny. According to the inspected proto Magyar graves, the common proto Magyars were fully europids. Only the upper class had mongoloid features, but the upper class [leaders] were very small in numbers. The skulls were reconstructed with computers.
But yeah, present day Hungarian population is slavic/germanic. Semino's genetic analysis proved it.
But yeah, present day Hungarian population is slavic/germanic. Semino's genetic analysis proved it.
what do you say on this ?
www.turania.com
Please note this: I can't accept Trianon, but Trianon is not my bigest problem with slovaks, romanians and serbs. My bigest problem with this nations is the lies, like "hungarians are mongols, gypsies, Asians, non-Aryans, etc." This chauvinist lies makes me very angry. And this lies are very popularin Serbia, Slovakia, and Romania. I hate every kind of chauvinism. (I hate hungarian chauvinism ("turanism") too, of course).
Please answer me one question: do you think that I'm not White?!
1.) Trianon
Trianon was absolutely correct. Not only that on both sides of the border remains same minorities, but also :
There are old slavic ports, like Komarno, Ostrihom, which were cities of old slovaks (slavs) sooner than hungarians came to europe, sooner than Great-moravian empire started to exist, these old slovak cities allready existed in times of Principiality of Nitra under king Pribina (that was a 2nd state of slovak)
Principiality of Nitra had borders identical with borders of todays slovakia, Felvidek too.
2.) Mongols
i never said to hungarian person that hes a mongol, but similarities in language (mongolian-hungarian) you may study here :
http://www.federatio.org/mi_bibl/AlfredToth_EDH_5.pdf
www.turania.com (http://www.turania.com)
Please do not mention it. That site is terrible. A collection of Race-traitor hungarians and non-Whites. I once registered on that site, but they banned me, because I'm pro-White, and anit-chauvinist.
That "Turan" stuff is just a jewish lie. The word "Turan" means nothing.
That "Turan" stuff is just a jewish lie. The word "Turan" means nothing.
How can so many hungarians use nicks like "Magyaristan" and call idiot mongols tatars uzbeks turks as hungarian brothers and one race with hungarians ?
That "Turan" stuff is just a jewish lie. The word "Turan" means nothing.
Indeed. The same is true about hunmagyar.org
There are some crazy turanist fanatics in Hungary. :rofl
But yeah, present day Hungarian population is slavic/germanic. Semino's genetic analysis proved it.
That is very possible, because the rulling class were the turkic khazars ( converted to judaism ) And the others were collected from all arround. While the old magyars were under the khazar rule they were southern neighbours to slavic tribes ( from which the Russian nation evolved ). And Imagine your sef, you can choose: You will mary an ugly turkic woman ( that is following jewish religion ), or you can ride several miles up to the north and you can kidnap a blond and blue eyed slavic girl. What will you choose?:D After two or three generations this race mixing have to be visible.
There are some crazy turanist fanatics in Hungary. :rofl
And that is now your ( Magyar ) dilema: Would you follow the call of your blood, or the call of your language? The sooner you answer to yourselves this point, the better for you.
My blood of course. Language is not as important. If I begin to speak in an African language, I'll not transform into a ******. :)
I am glad to read this:clink
In the North-Eastern regions like the Mátra there are still Slovak schools (they all have Slovak names) but only a fraction of the population says that they are anything other the hungarians. Ofcourse they acknowledge that they are of Slovak descent. For example: my grandparents are german on one side, but I dont claim to be part of the hungarian german minority either.
There is a big trouble in Slovakia and Hungary nowdays. It is called: The Jew.
And folks of Carpathia must solve this problem as soon as possible.
:clink
In the North-Eastern regions like the Mátra there are still Slovak schools (they all have Slovak names) but only a fraction of the population says that they are anything other the hungarians. Ofcourse they acknowledge that they are of Slovak descent. For example: my grandparents are german on one side, but I dont claim to be part of the hungarian german minority either.
3 of my best friends (from childhood) were slovakian origin, another 2 serbs. Myself I'm partially polish and real "magyar"- as far as I know, but I can't trace my origin back more than 4 generations.
None of them claimed to be anything else than "magyars' even though some of their grandparents were bilingual , speaking both hungarian and slovak or serbian.
Basically you just need to live here and after a while you don't want to be anyone else. No one will force you to be a "hungarian". ;)
It was the same with Kossuth (partially slovak), Petofi (serbian) , Zrinyi (Zrinski -Croatian), Szalasi (partially Armenian) and many more.
by the way..
For you to understand what "hungarian" means is:
In the late middle age, the Latin terms "Natio Hungarica" and "Hungarus" referred to all noblemen of the Kingdom. A Hungarus-consciousness (loyalty and patriotism above ethnic origins) existed among all inhabitants of this state. However, according to István Werbőczy's Tripartitum, the "Natio Hungarica" were only the privileged noblemen, subjects of the Holy Crown of Hungary regardless of ethnicity.
Uhorské kráľovstvo.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kingdom_of_Hungary
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Hungary, Slovakia: Tense Relationship
Saturday, November 22nd, 2008 @ 04:12 UTC
by Veronica Khokhlova
Full Category List
Excerpt
On Nov. 15, Slovak prime minister Robert Fico and his Hungarian counterpart, Ferenc Gyurcsány, met in the border town of Komárno, Slovakia, in an attempt to ease nationalist tensions that have escalated due to Nov. 1 football game violence in Dunajská Streda, Slovakia. Eva S. Balogh of Hungarian Spectrum has been blogging a lot recently about the Slovak-Hungarian relations, and here are some of the highlights.Post-Thumbnail
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On Nov. 15, Slovak prime minister Robert Fico and his Hungarian counterpart, Ferenc Gyurcsány, met in the border town of Komárno, Slovakia, in an attempt to ease nationalist tensions that have escalated due to Nov. 1 football game violence in Dunajská Streda, Slovakia.
Eva S. Balogh of Hungarian Spectrum has been blogging a lot recently about the Slovak-Hungarian relations, and here are some of the highlights.
On Nov. 1, Eva provided details and background on the football game incident:
On Nov. 9, Eva noted that it was “difficult to know exactly what happened” when the Slovak police chose to interfere:
In Hungary, people were “outraged” by the presumed actions of the Slovak police:
On Nov. 3, an ultra-nationalist rally was held in Budapest:
On Nov. 12, Eva wrote pessimistically about the upcoming meeting between the prime ministers of the two sabre-rattling neighbor nations:
She also commented on the Hungarian politicians' stance:
There were cases of dissent, however, as Eva pointed out in her Nov. 14 post:
The right-wing Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union, mentioned in the passage above, is Hungary's largest opposition party; an earlier GV roundup of Hungarian Spectrum's posts on Fidesz politics is here. Also, in this post, Eva discussed an article on the “managers of populism” - Austria's late Jörg Haider, Hungary's Viktor Orbán, and Slovakia's Robert Fico - written by sociologist Pál Tamás.
In her Nov. 15 post, Eva put part of the blame for the Hungarian government's failure to rein in “small but vocal and active far-right groups” on Fidesz:
As for the meeting between Fico and Gyurcsány, it resulted in a joint statement, in which the two leaders pledged to take steps towards eliminating “any kind of extremism, xenophobia, intolerance, chauvinism, nationalism and every manifestation of violence.” Eva commented on the meeting's outcome in her Nov. 16 post:
In her Nov. 18 post, Eva wrote about the media coverage of the meeting:
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3 comments
Unfortunately, history paints a grim picture of Hungarian-Slovakian relations. I wonder if the EU will really do anything to help…
Raf
http://uzar.wordpress.com/
http://newzar.wordpress.com/
I think it is a political issue, unfortunatelly.
There was a living chain formed by Slovak and Hungarian people hand in hand from Komarom to Komarno (neighbour boarder cities) to show to the politicians and to the world that they live in peace.# 2008-12-16 at 22:29 pm
_______________________________________
thalweg in navigable waterways.Convention relating to the Settlement ofsigned at Prague on 14 November 1928 with ratifications exchanged at Budapest onVienna Award of 2 November 1938, this was annulledMoscow Agreement signed
The Nagymaros-Gabcikovo barrage dispute:
Since 1 January 1993 when the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was divided, the boundary line has
become the Hungarian-Slovak international boundary. One major issue has continued to dominate the
management of the international boundary since this change: the continuing dispute over the Nagymaros-
Gabcikovo dam, and the alignement of the Danube river.
The Nagymaros-Gabcikovo dam scheme was designed as a joint Czechoslovak-Hungarian project to dam
the river Danube in order to generate hydroelectric power, and to improve communications by constructing
navigation channels past the dam. Such a project was first discussed by the two governments in the early
1960s, however a formal agreement was not signed until September 1977 in Budapest, entitled the
on the Construction and Operation of the System of Waterworks of Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
1978). One major problem with the scheme is that it will change the course of the river Danube, and
therefore the relationship between the river and the international boundary as delimited by the Treaty of
Trianon and the 1947 Treaty of Peace.
During the late 1970s and early 1980s progress on the scheme was slow, mainly for financial reasons. In
1981 negotiations were started to consider a postponement of the scheme, and in October 1983 a Protocol
was signed by the two governments in Prague, by which it was agreed to postpone the scheme for five
years. Though construction was started in the mid-1980s with considerable Austrian financial backing, there
was opposition to the scheme particularly in Hungary, where doubts were expressed by environmental
groups about the impact of the scheme on the Danube. There was also increasing concern over the huge
cost. However in Slovakia the government gave strong backing to the scheme, not least because it would
dramatically increase power generation capacity in the region, something Slovakia needed desperately.
On 13 May 1989 the Hungarian government announced the unilateral suspension of construction of the dam
at Nagymaros, and this was approved by the Hungarian Parliament on 2 June 1989. The Czechoslovak
government opposed the Hungarian position in diplomatic correspondence in July and August 1989,
however in November 1989 the Hungarian side terminated contracts with Austrian companies related to the
construction of the scheme.
Relations between the two governments regarding the dam project deteriorated, and in May 1990 the new
Hungarian government published its general political programme in which it announced that it considered
the scheme to be a mistake, and would initiate negotiations with the Czechoslovak government to change
the scheme. Discussions were held between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak governments during 1990 and
early 1991 on various proposals for the future of the scheme. On 22 April 1991 an intergovernmental
meeting was held in Budapest at which the Hungarian government argued for a complete termination of the
1977 Treaty. The Czechoslovak government rejected this, and little progress was made at a second
intergovernmental meeting held in Bratislava on 15 July 1991.
At a subsequent meeting in Budapest held in December 1991 the two sides agreed to establish a joint expert
committee to review the scheme. However this did not prove successful. The Czechoslovak side argued that
it could not suspend construction, and the Hungarian side demanded that the river should not be diverted by
the scheme until full agreement had been reached.
Treaty(ratified in JuneArticles Section 68
IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin July 1993 ©
69 Articles Section
IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin July 1993 ©
At a meeting in February 1992 in Prague between representatives of the two sides no agreement was
reached over the construction of the dam. Hungary wanted construction to be stopped and a new agreement
between the two countries to be drafted. However the Czechoslovak side rejected this, arguing that the
1977 Treaty gave sufficient scope for any changes which experts might propose.
On 24 March 1992 the Hungarian Parliament voted to terminate the 1977 Treaty unilaterally. The official
statement of the Parlaiment, together with a diplomatic note from the Hungarian government was presented
to the Czechoslovak government on 19 May 1992.
Disagreement between the two states continued during 1992. As well as a dispute over the financial
implications for stopping the project, there was strong disagreement over the environmental impacts of the
scheme, and the change in the flow of the Danube along the border region between the two states. One of
Hungary's main concerns was that the scheme would change the course of the river Danube, thereby
changing the relationship of the river and the international boundary line as defined by the Treaty of
Trianon. Hungary argued that any movement of the river channel would violate Hungarian territory, as well
as the Treaty of Trianon and the 1947 Treaty of Peace. Hungary was also concerned to prevent the
Czechoslovak authorities from instituting a temporary water management scheme which would involve a
partial redirection of the waters of the Danube, and so possibly lead to the
the
Hungary's Application to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic over the projected diversion of the Danube submitted on 23 October 1992. In its Application
Hungary invited the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
The Government of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic did not submit its consent to the jurisdiction of
the ICJ before the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic was dissolved on 31 December 1992. After 1
January 1993 the international boundary divided Hungary and the new republic of Slovakia. Negotiations
were held between the Governments of Hungary and Slovakia in early 1993 regarding a new Application to
the ICJ.
In March 1993 the European Parliament in Strasbourg considered the issue, and on 12 March 1993 it passed
a resolution calling on Hungary and Slovakia to take the dispute to the ICJ immediately, and to leave the
decision regarding the future of the dam project to the ICJ. On 31 March 1993 the Hungarian Foreign
Ministry issued a press statement accepting the European Community proposal, and on 7 April 1993 the
Foreign Ministers of Hungary and Slovakia signed an agreement to take the dispute to the ICJ, and to accept
the decision of the ICJ as binding.
To date no new formal Application had been made to the ICJ by either government. It is therefore not
known what the formal nature of the dispute is, or will be, and there are no indications as to when both sides
might submit the dispute to the ICJ. Though it is reassuring that two states in the region are prepared to
take a boundary dispute to the ICJ, when so many other disputes have led to open conflict, this
disagreement is likely to continue for some considerable time.
de facto permanent movement ofthalweg of the Danube (see map 2). Argument between the two states continued, culminating in* Paralegal associate, Clifford Chance Partnership, London.
Articles Section 66
IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin July 1993 ©
The International Boundary Between Hungary And Slovakia: The
Nagymaros-Gabcikovo Dispute
Greg Englefield*
Central and Eastern Europe has witnessed a dramatic growth in boundary conflicts and disputes in the past
three years, with attention focussed particularly on inter-ethnic (or inter-national) conflict over territory -
the most obvious case being the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. One exception to this trend is the
dispute between Hungary and Slovakia (Czechoslovakia prior to 1 January 1993) over the Nagymaros-
Gabcikovo dam (see map 1), and the international boundary along the river Danube. Of especial interest is
the fact that both sides have now agreed to take the dispute to the International Court of Justice in The
Hague for resolution, a welcome change from so many other international disputes in the region.
Delimitation History:
The present Hungarian-Slovak international boundary stems from the treaties and acts ending World Wars I
and II. No treaty prior to 1918 is of significance for the boundary alignment since the region was controlled
by the Austro-Hungarian empire and was previously part of the Hungarian Kingdom.
The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary and Protocol and Declaration
signed at Trianon on 4 June 1920 included a detailed delimitation of the boundary (Article 27, paragraph 4).
Article 29 of the treaty created a boundary commission to demarcate the boundary on land. Where the
boundary followed a waterway, according to Article 30 of the treaty, the boundary should follow the
median line in non-navigable waterways and the
A Czechoslovak-Hungarian Boundary Commission worked from 1921 to 1925 on the demarcation of the
boundary. Maps of the boundary were incorporated into the
Questions arising out of the Delimitation of the Frontier between the Kingdom of Hungary and the
Czechoslovak Republic
2 December 1930. The 1928 Convention provides detailed descriptions of the management of the
boundary.
Though the boundary was altered temporarily by the
by the Treaty of Peace signed on 10 February 1947 by Hungary and the Allied powers which came into
effect on 15 September 1947. The boundary had been reduced in length however by the transfer of
5,500 square miles of Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union by the
on 29 June 1945 by Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. This shortened the Hungarian-Czechoslovak
boundary by about 50 miles, though it did not alter the alignment of the boundary line - now between
Hungary and Ukraine.
One minor change to the prewar boundary was made by the 1947 Treaty of Peace in the Antonienhof sector,
close to the Austria-Czechoslovakia-Hungary tripoint.
67 Articles Section
IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin July 1993 ©
I have left Czechoslovakia (Slovak part) 40 years ego, even then this nonsense was going on. I like the idea of people holding hands across what used to be border. I believe both sides are part of EU now. I think guys you should elect new people to your local parliament and throw out those 19th century nationalists.
Hungarians the Atilla the Hun is long gone, Slovaks the Janosic was make believe character. After 1000 years of inter marriage and sorry to say “rape” they are not pure Slovaks or Hungarians.
__________________________________________________
1
Human Development Report, Slovakia and Hungary
Roma, poverty, and social exclusion in Eastern Slovakia and
Northern Hungary
Working Paper
Draft
standards. The content does not necessarily represent the opinion or position of the
UN Development Programme
has not undergone the review and language proof-reading according to officialContents:
I. Introduction
II.
Poverty and InequalityII.1 Poverty indicators
II. 2 Expenditures overview
III. Demographics and Education
III.1 Demographic structure of the population
III.2 Educational attainment of the population
IV. Housing, Living Conditions and Health
V. Labor Market Situation
V.1 Labor market overview
V.2 Unemployment profile
V.3 Employment profile
VI. Income and Earnings
VII. Mobility
VII.1 Internal migrations
VII.2 External/international migrations
VIII. Conclusion
2
I. Introduction
The challenges facing the regions of Eastern Slovakia and Northern Hungary include
ending poverty and overcoming social exclusion of marginalized segments of
population. The Roma population represents the group which is amongst the most
vulnerable, that means among those who are threatened by social exclusion and
poverty. Many researches identified Roma in Slovakia as to be ‘at-risk group’ which
social exclusion had a long-term character and which “despite improvements of their
situation in the period of socialism, … ranked for a long-time among the poorest
because in their case the key factors in the reproduction of poverty – unequal life
opportunities- were not eradicated” (Kusa 1997). In Hungary, Roma has been
identified most likely to be long-term unemployed through an analysis of a Hungarian
households being “…in the lowest income decile, of whom nearly half were poor…”
(Andorka, Speder 1996, Kemeny, Janky Lengyel 2005). Roma as an ethnic group are
mentioned explicitly in political documents and action plans of the Slovak republic,
for eradication of poverty and exclusion. For example National Action Plan on Social
Inclusion 2004-2006 identifies groups within the population which are the most
vulnerable to poverty as “long term unemployed … migrants, people with disabilities
included people living in Roma communities”. Also regional documents pay attention
to these issues. According to the Development Plan of Eastern Slovakia, one of the
strategic objectives is “to increase the employment rate as well as the employability of
the marginalized groups of society” Within the priorities of social area there are
formulated specific aims such as i) to improve labour market access conditions for
the marginalized groups of inhabitants including the members of the Roma
community, so that the percentage of those in the total number of registered
unemployment drops by 15 percent until 2010 and ii) to improve qualification and
skills of the marginalized groups of the society. Similar attention is paid to the
integration of marginalized groups and the Roma population in Program of Economic
and Social Development of Presov self-governing region for 2007- 2013.
In Hungary the North Hungary Operational Programme 2007-2013 identifies Roma
also as the vulnerable and “the chances for life of the population in micro-regions
inhabited by major Roma population is worsened by these areas mostly lacking
towns, being areas covered by small villages which get depopulated” (NORDA,
2006).
The socio-economic conditions and the development challenges in the three different
regions of Northern Hungary and Eastern Slovakia are sufficiently similar (see
Chapter 2) that is why some common problems could be treated together.
3
The actual sample frequencies in the 2004 Vulnerable Groups Survey (VGS),
designed and administered with the help of UNDP, are also in comparable magnitudes
for the three regions of interest (Table 4.1). The survey used is rich in information
concerning Roma and proximity non-Roma populations, and characterize the situation
of the most vulnerable to poverty residents in those regions. Based on the VGS,
indicators for Roma in Northern Hungary, Kosicky and Presovsky regions are
presented in the following sections. As a substantial part of the survey sample was
collected in the North region of Hungary and the Eastern regions of Slovakia, the
computed indicators are based on statistically significant large sub samples, and are
thus themselves statistically significant. As control group, the VGS provides data on
non-Roma populations living in close proximity to Roma. Their sub sample is of
much smaller size is therefore not statistically significant comparison group.
Table 4.1 Vulnerable group survey sample sizes
Individuals Households
Hungary 4,140 1,005
Roma in North Region 1,411 276
Slovakia 4,973 1,075
Roma in Kosicky Region 1,399 248
Roma in Presovsky Region 1,095 192
Source: UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
It is important to bear in mind that the data collected in the VGS reflect only
vulnerable groups. These data are therefore not representative of two countries as a
whole. The survey targeted only areas where estimated Roma population shares were
equal or greater than national averages. Majority populations in the survey are
likewise representative of communities living in closer proximity to Roma
communities. The majority-in-proximity sampled may share some of their Roma
neighbors’ vulnerability determinants, and thus may be more vulnerable to poverty
than national averages. Because of the interest in a small regional sub sample, the
number of non-Roma observations is too small to provide meaningful information.
Another note to mention is that the surveys differ somewhat between the two
countries, so it is not possible to merge two datasets. Whenever the questions are not
the same, the Slovak and Hungarian regions were studied independently. In several
subsections, Hungary and Slovakia are represented in separate tables. However,
wherever possible, the tables compare jointly the similarities and differences of those
regions and the Roma populations living there. Ideally the Roma indicators are
compared to certain national benchmarks whenever available.
The regional indicators covered in this Chapter are grouped in the following sections:
1) poverty and inequality; 2) demographics and education; 3) housing and living
conditions, 4) labor market situation, 5) income and earnings; and 6) mobility. Data
are compiled from National Statistical Office of Hungary (HCSO) and the Statistical
Office of the Slovak Republic (SOSR) for indicators on national and regional level,
and from UNDP’s Vulnerable Groups Survey (VGS, 2004) for data on Roma
populations. Other specific sources used in this report are mentioned in footnotes.
4
II.
Poverty and InequalityOn the whole, in the new EU member states, Slovakia and Hungary, poverty remains
substantially lower than that of other, poorer, countries in Eastern Europe. However,
even in these more prosperous countries, significant poverty pockets persist within
some segments of the population. The unemployed, the poorly educated, rural
populations and children are more likely to be poor. Roma minority populations
represent one of the main poverty groups. They are both poorer than other population
groups and they are more likely to fall into poverty and remain poor.
Poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon that goes well beyond low income or lack
of material consumption. In the case of Roma, poverty is particularly multifaceted.
Many Roma are deprived of the resources necessary for adequate living conditions, as
well as access to opportunities and channels for participation. These problems are
often interconnected.
II.1 Poverty indicators
In this section, the incidence and depth of poverty and the extent of inequality among
Roma across the three regions is assessed and contrasted with that of the whole
countries. Indicators on poverty and inequality are not yet widely produced by the
national statistical offices of Hungary and Slovakia. Therefore, the various indicators
which are available from international sources such as the UNDP, the World Bank
and the European Commission were used. All sources report slightly different
indicators or different values due to different base years and various datasets used for
calculation. Overall, world wide Hungary and Slovakia rank very closely with
Hungary showing slightly better indicators than the Slovak Republic.
Table 4.2 EUROSTATS poverty indicators
Hungary Slovakia
At-risk-of-poverty rate before social transfers 17% 28%
At-risk-of-poverty after social transfers 12% 21%
Relative at-risk-of-poverty gap 20% 39%
Inequality of income distribution (income quintile share ratio) 3.3 5.8
Dispersion of regional employment rates 9.4 9
Early school leavers 12.6% 7.1%
Long term unemployment rate (12 months or more) 2.7% 11.8%
Very long term unemployment rate (24 months or more) 1.3% 8.2%
Children aged 0 – 17 living in jobless households 13.2% 12.8%
People aged 18 - 59 living in jobless households 11.9% 10.8%
Source: Eurostats (See Box 1.1 in Annex for definitions)
Note: Indicators for Hungary are based on 2003 calculations, while for Slovakia, they are based on
2004.
EUROSTATS’ indicators are broadly defined beyond the material consumption and
resources (Table 4.2). At-risk-of-poverty before social transfers is 17% in Hungary
and 28% in Slovakia. The system of social transfers in those countries manage to
attenuate poverty but the indicators still remain relatively high – at-risk-of-poverty
5
after social transfer falls down to 12 % in Hungary and down to 21% in Slovakia.
The relative at-risk-of-poverty gap is almost twice lower in Hungary signifying higher
difference between individuals at the poverty threshold and those below it suggesting
existence of pockets of extreme poverty. The other measure of inequality, income
quintile share ratio, is almost twice higher in Slovakia, which suggests that there is a
higher general inequality in the population, with rich people holding higher shares of
the overall income. The shares of children and adults living in jobless households are
very similar between the two countries. Lastly, the indicators related to employment
differ substantially which reflect major structural differences between the labor
markets in Hungary and Slovakia. Long term unemployment is more than 4 times
higher in Slovakia than it is in Hungary.
Table 4.3 UNDP poverty indicators
Hungary Slovakia
Probability at birth of not surviving to age 60 (% of cohort)
(2000 – 2005) 18.3% 14.9%
Long term unemployment (% of labor force) (2003) 2.5% 10.7%
Population below poverty income line (%)
50% of median income (1999 – 2000) 6.7% 7.0%
$4.00/day (1996 – 1999) <1% 8%
Share of income or consumption (%)
Poorest 10% 4.0% 3.1%
Poorest 20% 9.5% 8.8%
Richest 20% 36.5% 34.8%
Richest 10% 22.2% 20.9%
Inequality measures
Richest 10% to poorest 10% 5.5 6.7
Richest 20% to poorest 20% 3.8 4.0
Gini coefficient 26.9 25.8
Source: UNDP HDR 2005, tables 4 and 15, pp 230 and 270.
Notes: The source of poverty line of $4.00/day did not specified whether in PPP terms. The share of
income and inequality measures for Hungary are computed based on a consumption survey in 2002,
while for Slovakia these indicators are computed based on income survey in 1996.
The slightly different indicators released by UNDP depict similar situation between
the two countries (Table 4.3). Hungary is ranked 35
42
of median income Hungary and Slovakia do not diverge too much, with about 7% of
the population. At the threshold of $4.00/day, however, the population below the
poverty income line is less than 1% in Hungary while it is close to 8% for Slovakia.
This again implies that in Slovakia some pockets of acute poverty are contributing to
the overall higher poverty rates. Nevertheless, the Gini coefficients to the two
countries do not reflect major differences in the overall inequality distributions. In
Slovakia the share of income of poorest 10% is only 3.1% vs. 4.0% in Hungary and
the share of income of the poorest 20% is only 8.8% vs. 9.5% in Hungary, which
suggests somewhat deeper impoverishment. On the other end, the richest 20% of
Hungary hold among them 36.5% of the national income vs. 34.8% in Slovakia and
6
the richest 10% of Hungary hold 22.2% of the national income vs. 20.9% in Slovakia
which suggest that the top quintiles in Hungary are richer relative to the top quintiles
of the Slovak distribution. However, the overall inequality, measured by Gini index,
is very similar between the two countries, which imply that large middle classes keep
the inequality levels down overall.
The World Bank uses two poverty lines, an absolute and a relative, to compare
poverty across countries: US$2.15 purchasing power parity (PPP
and $PPP 4.30 per capita per day. Extreme poverty threshold, at $PPP 2.15/day,
which is most often used for low-income countries, is practically nonexistent in
Hungary (Table 4.4). However, at the more appropriate level of $PPP 4.30/day, the
relative poverty rate in Hungary reaches 12%. Contribution to poverty seems equally
from rural and urban areas, excluding the affluent capital, which is attracting the most
highly educated and where better employment opportunities are available. It has been
shown in the literature as well as confirmed by the data, that location has significant
effects on income and welfare and thus on poverty.
Table 4.4 Hungarian poverty indicators according to the World Bank
$PPP 2.15/day $PPP 4.30/day
th in the world and Slovakia isnd within the High Human Development group. According the poverty line of 50%1) per capita per dayPoverty indices
Poverty rate 0 12
Poverty dept 0 2
Poverty severity 0 1
Contribution to poverty
Rural 35% 46%
Urban 65% 54%
Capital 13% 11%
Other urban 52% 42%
Inequality indices
Gini coefficient (per capita) 24.96
Share of the lowest 20% 10%
Source: Growth, Poverty and Inequality, World Bank, 2005.
Data analyzed in this Chapter reveal a worrying picture of poverty among Roma in
those regions with about two thirds of Roma households living in poverty there. In
contrast, only a share of about 9-12% of the whole countries lives in poverty. Roma
poverty there is also deeper – the shortfall from the poverty line of average Roma
households in poverty is bigger than that of the whole countries, making it more
difficult to get out of poverty (Table 4.5). The calculations using vulnerable
households’ data confirm the World Bank finding that in Hungary the fraction of
people living with $PPP 2.15 or less per day is quite small even among Roma in the
poorer North region, only 4%. Poverty in Hungary, seems to be clustered around the
upper threshold of $PPP 4.30/day. In Slovakia, however, 2% of the whole population
is below the $PPP 2.15/day threshold, which suggests of the presence of extreme
poverty there, in addition to 9% of relatively poor population. Focusing on Roma, the
data shows a worrying picture of poverty in those regions: about two thirds of Roma
1
The adjustment to PPP accounts for differences in price levels across countries.7
are living in relative poverty. In North Hungary, as well as in Kosicky and Presovsky
regions, more than 60% live below relative poverty line of $PPP 4.30/day. Moreover,
28% of Roma in East Slovakia live with barely $PPP 2.15/day which represents much
higher concentration of extremely poor (in comparison with North Hungarian Roma).
The Gini index for Hungary is 24.96 while the one calculated only for North Roma is
26.10. Both numbers are of very similar magnitudes, which indicate that the overall
low inequality in the Hungarian society is preserved even among the most vulnerable
groups. The overall Gini index for Slovakia is 25.80, and for Roma alone in Eastern
region – 26.75 in Kosicky and 29.31 in Presovsky regions. Those figures suggest that
even among Roma, expenditure inequality remains similar to the national average or
slightly above.
The numbers provided by the international sources show how official poverty
statistics do not always capture the status of the poorest minorities – Roma fall out of
the scope of typical household budget and labor force surveys which are used for the
computation of those indicators.
Table 4.5 Poverty rates from Vulnerable Groups Survey
Hungary Slovakia
Roma in
North
Hungary
Roma in
Kosicky
region
Roma in
Presovsky
region
At $PPP 2.15/day 0% 2% 4% 28% 28%
At $PPP 4.30/day 12% 9% 61% 62% 58%
Gini index 24.96 25.80 26.13 26.75 29.37
Source: Growth, Poverty and Inequality, World Bank, 2005,Slovak Republic: Living Standards,
Employment, and Labour Market Study, World Bank 2002, UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
The composition of poverty at the threshold of $PPP 2.15/day shows 46% children
below the age of 16 and 56% adults in Hungary (Table 4.6). The VGS confirms the
characteristics similar to the Hungarian national averages. The number of children in
a household has been shown to have a strong negative relationship with welfare
(Revenga, Ringold and Tracy, 2002). As Roma households have on average more
children than the rest of the countries, the number of children could be a contributing
factor to the higher incidence of poverty among Roma households. Children of Roma
families in the three regions are very vulnerable to poverty with 39-46% among them
living below $PPP 2.15/day. According the number of children the families with
children constitute 60-86% of the poor families.
The survey data also exhibits significant benefits of education for Roma who seek to
escape poverty. The huge problem of education is seen among Roma with 80-93% of
the poor with at most primary education. However, those with secondary or more are
barely 2-3% among the extreme poor. This points out to the importance of education,
and particularly, the lack of it, as a possible determinant of poverty. Another
observation is secondary special education contributing to poverty with as much as
28% of the poor. These numbers imply that completing secondary school has in fact
adverse effects as it is inadequately adapted for the needs of pupils with disability and
handicaps. Moreover, the Roma children face higher likelihood to end up in special
classes which in turn leads to higher vulnerability to absolute poverty.
8
Table 4.6 Composition of poverty at $PPP 2.15/day
Hungary
Roma in North
Hungary
Roma in
Kosicky region
Roma in
Presovsky region
Age
0 – 16 years 46% 43% 46% 39%
17 – 65 years 56% 57% 53% 59%
65 + years 2% 0% 1% 2%
Number of children in HH
No children 19% 14% 31% 40%
One or two children 24% 29% 60% 46%
Three 57% 57% 9% 14%
Education
Incomplete primary 35% 14% 34% 45%
Completed primary 33% 79% 46% 39%
Secondary 5% 0% 2% 0%
Secondary special 28% 7% 18% 16%
Tertiary 0% 0% 0% 0%
Source: Growth, Poverty and Inequality, World Bank, 2005, UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
Additionally, for Slovakia the commonly agreed indicators for poverty and social
exclusion adopted by the members of the European Union were computed (Table
4.7). The most common indicator, at-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers,
reaches 88% for Roma in the Kosicky region, while it is only 21% for Slovakia as a
whole. Seven out of every eight Roma individuals are living below the poverty line
of 60% of national median income. The relative at-risk-of-poverty risk gap, which
measures the actual income gap of those below the poverty line, suggest that Roma
are receiving less than half of that poverty threshold income level. In other words, on
average, the poor Roma in these regions are clustered under the threshold. The last
two indicators measuring population living in jobless households are quite alarming –
as high as 93% of all Roma children live in jobless households in Kosicky region in
comparison of 13% for the country as a whole. For adults, that share varies between
67% and 85% vs. 11% for Slovakia. Living in a jobless environment contributes to
low incentives to invest in one’s education and the lack of role models within the
families could be detrimental for the upbringing of young Roma in Eastern Slovakia.
Table 4.7 Slovak poverty indicators according to the EUROSTATS
Slovakia
Roma in
Kosicky region
Roma in
Presovsky region
At-risk-of-poverty rate after social
transfers
21% 88% 85%
Relative at-risk-of-poverty gap 39% 49% 43%
Children aged 0 - 17 living in
jobless households
13% 93% 86%
People aged 18 - 59 living in
jobless households
11% 85% 79%
9
Source: Eurostats (see Box 1.1 in Annex for definitions), UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
II. 2 Expenditures overview
Another way how to assess the welfare is to measure the consumption in terms of
expenditure. In some cases, such measures are considered better indicator of welfare
than poverty rates based on income, as it permits a direct assessment of the ability of a
household to meet its basic needs. Furthermore, studying expenditures allows for
particular spending habits to emerge which are consequence of efforts to cope with
insufficient resources. Therefore, in this section the analysis of expenditures is
included as well.
Note that households with similar expenditures but of different size and composition
will have different individual allocation. Large families are more likely to have
greater expenses but not necessarily per capita. Because poverty measures are very
sensitive to household composition, the calculations are based on per equivalent adult
expenditures
the household).
Annual household expenditures are used as the main measure of household welfare.
Table 4.8 shows average annual per capita expenditures, in Euros PPP for crosscountry
comparison, by main categories. Overall, the average annual expenditures of
a Roma household in the North Region are 56% of the national Hungarian average.
For Roma in Eastern Slovakia, the situation is even worse, with average annual
expenditure of only about 40% of that of an average Slovak household. As a
consequence of higher incidence of poverty, Roma have lower average expenditure
than the national averages, and devote a higher proportion of total expenditures to
food purchases and a lower proportion to education, health care and consumer
durables.
Table 4.8 Average annual per capita expenditures (Euros PPP)
Hungary Slovakia
Roma in
North
Hungary
Roma in
Kosicky
region
Roma in
Presovsky
region
Food 950 868 923 530 567
Housing maintenance 673 695 358 210 200
Transport 681 305 45 50 53
Clothing / Shoes 204 246 207 88 98
Medicine / Healthcare 231 69 104 60 50
Domestic products 206 171 109 82 74
Cigarettes / Alcohol 202 102 191 87 90
Entertainment 293 252 12 2 2
Total 3,442 2,709 1,934 1,108 1,135
2 (where expenditures are adjusted for both the size and composition ofSource: Statistical Yearbook of Hungary 2003, table 5.11, p.128, Statistical Yearbook of the Slovak
Republic (table VI.1-2.), UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
Note: Annual amounts are converted in Euro PPP using exchange rates from OECD and ECB.
2
for any children below the age of 15 years old.
OECD equivalence scale uses weight 1 for head of household, 0.5 for any additional adults and 0.310
The main expenditure category is food, and average spending seems slightly lower in
Slovakia than in Hungary reflecting structural differences in food prices. Roma
households in the North which are spending on average only 3% less than the national
average. For this reason, it could be asserted that Roma households in North Hungary
do not suffer malnutrition. Nevertheless, as their total incomes are far smaller, their
food share becomes much larger. On the other hand, Roma in Kosicky and Presovsky
regions are consuming about a third less than the Slovak averages and their food
expenditures are 61-65% of the national average, which suggests that Roma
households consume smaller amounts of (as well as cheaper) food. Such average
magnitudes may be concealing cases of malnutrition.
The next two largest expenditures, in Hungary, are on housing maintenance and
transportation. Housing maintenance, which includes rent and utilities, exhibits a
considerable difference. Roma households in the North region spend on average EUR
PPP 358 vs. 673 nationwide, only about half of the Hungarian average. For Roma in
Kosicky and Presovsky regions, the amount they spend on housing falls even lower to
29% of national average. Part of these differences may be explained by their, often,
large outstanding payments in housing, electricity and water (see Figure 4.1). Another
explanation lies within their homeownership characteristics (see section 3). As for
transportation costs, Hungarian households spend, EUR PPP 681 annually while on
the other extreme, an average Roma household in the North region spends a mere 7%
of that amount. Roma in Kosicky and Presovsky regions spend similar amounts. One
important explanation is the (lack of) purchases of vehicles, fuel, and accessories,
which are made mainly by middle- to upper-income families. Indeed, in the survey,
only 1% of all Hungarian vulnerable households report owing a car.
The other categories exhibit regional differences as well. When it comes to expenses
on clothes and shoes, alcohol and cigarettes Roma in the North region spend as much
as national averages, and about half as much on medicine and health care and
domestic products. Roma in Eastern Slovakia seem to spend more on medicine and
healthcare, about 80% and alcohol and cigarettes, about 87% relative to Slovak
national averages. As for clothing and shoes and domestic products they spend about
38% and 45% of the national averages. More notably, the actual amounts per capita
and shares in total expenditures are much higher for cigarettes and alcohol than those
for medicine and healthcare, which has a direct implication on their poorer health.
Figure 4.1 Expenditure shares
28%
32%
48%
48%
50%
20%
26%
18%
19%
18%
20%
11%
2%
4%
5%
6%
9%
11%
8%
9%
7%
3%
5%
5%
4%
6%
6%
6%
7%
7%
6%
4%
10%
8%
8%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Hungary
Slovakia
Roma in North
Hungary
Roma in Kosicky
region
Roma in Presov
region
Source: UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
11
Figure 4.1 presents the shares of the main expenditure categories. Looking more
closely at average expenditure shares for different categories, spending on food (a
commonly used proxy for welfare) clearly stands out. Expenditures on food weigh
more heavily on Roma household in all of the three regions. Next, by importance, are
the categories of housing maintenance, clothing and shoes, cigarettes and alcohol.
When those households become better-off, it should be expected their expenditure
shares in transport, medicine and healthcare, and entertainment to reach the national
averages.
Expenditure patterns show the poverty status of Roma households, with high shares of
expenditures on food. But they also outline the contours of the poverty cycle Roma
are caught in: the smallest shares of their household budgets devoted to education
make it more difficult for young Roma to escape poverty. They spend similarly low
shares on health care and consumer durables. Moreover, given the larger numbers of
children in Roma households, these low shares of expenditures on health and
education underscore the Roma communities’ vulnerability and thus contribute to
their perpetual poverty trap and state dependence.
Many households who are vulnerable to poverty face great difficulties in covering
their utilities bills, such as water, electricity, and heating and they cumulate unpaid
bills for several months. The average outstanding utility bills sometimes amount to
more than 175% of their total monthly expenditures. National sources do not provide
information on such indebtedness; however it seems that Roma households are in
more critical situation concerning outstanding payments for water, electricity and
housing-related payments. The magnitudes often make prospects for breaking this
circle of outstanding payments unrealistic. The severity of the problem is also
confirmed by the low share of expenditures on housing and utilities Roma households
have, seen from the previous section. Many Roma households spend less on housing
and utilities simply because they cannot afford paying regularly their utility bills –
despite the threat of being cut off from the electricity or other utilities supply.
Table 4.9 Outstanding utility bills
Roma in
North Hungary
Roma in
Kosicky region
Roma in
Presovsky region
Fraction of households in arrears
Water 19% 9% 3%
Electricity 14% 15% 7%
Other overhead 11% 8% 4%
Food debts n.a. 8% 2%
Average amounts per capita in arrears (Euros PPP)
Water 114 212 98
Electricity 80 154 190
Other overhead 350 291 195
Food debts n.a. 103 44
Source: UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
12
The fraction of households in arrears are the highest for Roma in the North, 19%,
mostly in water, then electricity and lastly in housing. For Roma in Eastern Slovak
regions, electricity represents the highest burden. According to the actual average
amounts though other overhead costs, such as heating, telephone, etc. are the highest
for Roma in North Hungary reaching on average EUR PPP 350 per capita (Table 4.9).
Surprisingly, the fractions of households who are in arrears among Roma in Eastern
Slovakia appear to be lower than those in North Hungary, but their average amounts
(as shares of household income) are relatively much larger.
Figure 4.2 outlines the severity of indebtedness of households as a share of average
total monthly expenditures. Roma in all three regions rely on debt with Roma across
the border in Slovakia, particularly in Kosicky region being most indebted in all
categories. Share of housing liabilities reach up to 175% indebtedness for Roma in
the Kosicky region, followed by 130% water and 112% electricity arrears. As shares
of monthly expenditures, overhead costs such as heating and telephone bills, remain
the main burden to Roma families. In the case of Slovakia, the survey asked
additional question on food indebtedness, which occurs rarely but represents a
substantial share of total household monthly expenditures which points to the few
cases of extreme poverty facing risks of malnutrition.
Figure 4.2 Outstanding payments as share of monthly household
expenditures
39
130
70
42
112
97
69
175
136
0
63
35
0 50 100 150 200
Roma in North
Hungary
Roma in Kosicky
Roma in Presov
Water Electricity Housing Food debts
Source: UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
There are three additional categories of expenditures, which are not included in the
monthly break down usually reported by national sources. In the VGS, households
were asked about their annual expenditures on consumer durables, healthcare and
education. These are fair indicators of individual well being, beyond satisfying the
subsistence needs while providing families with means for sustainable development.
Unfortunately, comparing these expenses with national averages is quite problematic
as these three general questions on expenditures do not correspond to the
classifications used in the national household budget surveys due to incompatibility in
methodology. One thing is however clear from the data, few Roma households
spend too little on consumer durables – this was also confirmed by our previous
analysis on possession of usual household appliances. For example, the Hungarian
average expenditure amount on consumer durables is about EUR PPP 288, which
includes purchases on motor vehicles. For Roma in the North, who are spending
positive amount, the average expenditure is 85% of that national mean, even though
most of the households do not possess a car, not even other common household
appliances. A second observation is the very lower expenditures on education
supplies (such as text books and other school supplies) and its negative implications
13
for successful completion of grades and obtaining diplomas. Lastly, Roma, in all
three regions spend much lower amounts on health care, medicine and doctor visits
with vulnerable Roma households in the North spend 65% of the national averages.
Two additional questions from the Hungarian survey (those are missing for Slovakia),
were asked based on a qualitative self-definition of households. From those who had
children in school, 43% of the Roma in the North region said that they were not able
to pay the cost of education for their children. When asked whether there were
schools within reach where the children could continue their studies, only 2% claim
that there are no schools within reach. This clearly indicates that poverty induced
financial difficulties constitute significant obstacles to education which could in turn
lead to a poverty trap for young Roma.
III. Demographics and Education
Other determinants of poverty, according to UNDP publication (2006), include
number of children in the household, education and skill level of the household head.
Therefore Section III. focuses on demographics and education of Roma in North
Hungary, Kosicky and Presovsky regions.
III.1 Demographic structure of the population
Roma birth rates have historically been high across Eastern Europe, as they reflect the
Roma demographic characteristics and reproduction behaviors. Roma families have
traditionally been large as they place highest value in having children. However,
Roma demographics are not just about population growth: they have substantial labor
force and other socio-economic consequences for the current and next generations.
Table 4.10
Hungary
North
region
Roma in North
Hungary
Distribution
Children ( 0 – 14 years) 17% 16% 43%
Younger adults (15 – 39 years) 34% 36% 38%
Older adults (40 – 59 years) 27% 27% 15%
Elderly (60 + years ) 22% 21% 4%
Average age n.a. n.a. 22.3
Ratios
Children and elderly per 100 adults 59 62 88
Children per 100 adults 25 27 81
Elderly per 100 adults 34 35 7
Number of elderly per 100 children 137 128 8
Number of household members
1 26% 25% 4%
2 29% 29% 12%
14
3 20% 20% 13%
4 + 25% 26% 71%
Average household size 2.6 n.a. 6.5
Source: Hungarian Micro-Census 2005, UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
The demographic structure in the North region is not very different from national
averages (Table 4.10). However, focusing at the Roma populations in the North, the
composition changes dramatically in favor of the young – 40% are children under the
age of 15 and only 6 are elderly of 60 years or more. The number of elderly per 100
children is 137 for Hungary and 128 for the North region alone. In the case of Roma
in the North, the picture becomes even younger. The ratio of elderly per 100 children
is a mere 8 which confirms their much higher average fertility rates and shorter life
expectancies. This is important to keep in mind when forecasting Roma future labor
force.
Table 4.11 Demographic indicators
Slovakia East Slovakia
Roma in East
Slovakia
Distributions
0 – 14 years 19% 22% 42%
Male, 15 – 59 years 33% 32% 27%
Female, 15 – 54 years 30% 30% 26%
Male, 60 + years 6% 6% 2%
Female, 55 + years 12% 11% 3%
Average age 37.1 n.a. 22.4
Number of household members
1 n.a. n.a. 3%
2 n.a. n.a. 10%
3 n.a. n.a. 9%
4 + n.a. n.a. 78%
Average household size n.a. n.a. 5.7
Source: Slovak Population census 2001, UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004
.In the same way, the distribution of households by size in the North region does not
differ too much from the country as a whole – slightly lower fraction of single
member households and slightly higher fraction of households with four or more
members. For the vulnerable groups, the situation is very distinctive – individuals
rarely live alone but rather in large households, with on average 6 or more members.
In table 4.11, the age distributions is computed for the entire Eastern region (Kosicky
and Presovsky together), in order to match the indicators from the Population census.
Similar to the case of Hungary, Slovakia’s poorer eastern region is populated by
younger than average people who live in much bigger households. One direct
implication with respect to budgetary consequences is that fewer Roma rely on the
state for pension benefits while a majority depends on social assistance for child and
unemployment benefits. In both countries, similar to the EU as a whole, the majority
populations are aging and the sustainability of the national pension schemes for future
15
generations depends on high current fertility. Roma minorities seem a budgetary
burden today but in the future they may be the principal contributors to the welfare
systems in order to support the elderly majority populations. The average age in
Slovakia is 37 years old while among Roma in East Slovakia and North Hungary it is
only 22.
III.2 Educational attainment of the population
Table 4.12 presents the educational attainment of the population, which is the most
important determinant for assessing the human capital level of the labor force and
their prospects of working their way out of poverty. Data on educational attainment
of the entire Slovak population is not published by the census and therefore Roma
data is compared to the educational attainment of Hungary.
Education in both countries is mandatory for young children and adolescents – in
Hungary up to the age of 18, while in Slovakia it is compulsory for the first 9 years
regardless of actual age, or up to about the age of 16. For this reason, in both
countries, even among Roma in the three poorer regions, most of the population has
completed at least some primary school – about 94% of all Roma in Eastern Slovakia
vs. only 63% of Roma in North Hungary. The fraction of highly educated individuals
drops sharply after primary school with about 12-17% of Roma completing at least
secondary school and almost no one with university qualifications.
The education attainment is shown in the literature to be perfectly correlated with
potential earning power of the individuals. The lower educational attainment suggest
that even if all Roma find employment, their labor income will still reflect their lower
skills and thus will confine them in a low-income subgroups of the population.
Having few professional qualifications and diplomas makes it more difficult for them
to move up the professional lather even if they cumulate several years of experience
and makes them less preferred (for employment or promotion) than other individuals
who hold various certifications and degrees.
Table 4.12 Educational attainment of population
Hungary
North
region
Roma in
North
Hungary
Roma in
Kosicky
region
Roma in
Presovsky
region
No schooling
(10 + years)
0.7% 0.8% 11.0% 3.6% 3.1%
Completed at least primary
school (15 + years)
88.8% 86.2% 63.1% 94.3% 94.0%
Completed at least secondary
school (18 + years)
38.2% 33.2% 17.1% 15.9% 12.4%
Completed tertiary education
(25 + years)
12.6% 9.3% 1.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Source: Hungarian Population Census 2001, UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004
The problems directly related to lower educational attainment, such as poor
employability and low income generating potential, are likely to persist in the near
future due to the dire situation of the Roma children and adolescents today.
Aggregate enrollment rates in 2004 compared to the national indicators show the clear
16
phenomena of poverty trap. First, enrollment rates in primary school are close to
100% for Roma in North Hungary and are as high as 119% for Roma in Presovsky
region reflecting mandatory schooling which unfortunately does not guarantee
successful level completion. Secondly, sharp drop in enrollment rates occurs in
secondary schools and at university level. In Hungary and Slovakia where 94-97% of
all children at the age to be in secondary school are actually attending only merely 14-
18% of the corresponding Roma are attending high schools. This disturbing fact
should be preoccupying the authorities. As for tertiary level, there are practically no
Roma university students in any of three regions. The main channel for poverty
alleviation through accumulation of human capital seems ineffective and thus can
maintain parts of the population in poverty for generations ahead. The low
enrollment rates in higher education reflect low adaptation of this population to the
requirements of a changing labor market and destines many of them rely on the state
welfare or may force them to enter a grey sector in order to provide for their
subsistence(see Table 4.13).
Table 4.13 School enrollment in 2004
Hungary Slovakia
Roma in
North
Hungary
Roma in
Kosicky
region
Roma in
Presovsky
region
Primary school 98% 99% 98% 117% 119%
Secondary school 97% 94% 14% 16% 18%
Tertiary school 60% 36% 2% 1% 1%
Source: World Development Indicators, UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004
Note
enrolled in particular level.
: Rates are computed as total number of pupils enrolled over the number of children of age to beThe high enrollment rates in primary school, mentioned above, are partly explained
by mandatory schooling in both Slovakia and Hungary. On the other hand, among
Roma children in Eastern Slovakia enrollment rates are boosted much above 100%
which may be due to older children returning to school in order to complete their
primary degree. The recent social reform took place in Slovakia in 2004 in order to
better motivate this finding. One of the aspects of the reform consisted in cutting
child care benefits almost by half while introducing stipends for low-income children
conditional on attending school as incentives to increase their enrollment and
eventually their educational attainment. The presence of conditional transfers for
poor families’ parents in addition to free lunches and book supplies provided at
school, partly explains the particularly high enrollment rates among Roma children in
Slovakia for primary education. Even though the reform provides financial incentives
for secondary and tertiary schools as well, their enrollment remains low as it may be
too early to account for any positive impact.
In both countries, attending secondary schools and especially universities requires
successful completion of primary school. High drop out rates, interruptions from
school for long periods of time and not fulfilling all requirements for obtaining final
diploma are all clear causes (in addition to the obvious financial ones) for Roma
children not to continue their higher educations. Rather than low “Roma value of
education” main explanation about the enrollment rates lies within objective grounds.
Various systematic forms of direct and indirect discrimination and excessive isolation
in schools nowadays contribute for Roma parents’ lower incentives to send their
17
children to school. One in three Roma children, attending school, are not in the
correct grade suggests that they are unable to complete the school curriculum, are
often repeating grades and are stigmatized as “losers” which implies poor prospects of
these children upon reaching working age. One in four Roma children is set apart in a
special school for disabilities with little prospect to acquire the minimum necessary
for continuing at secondary or university level.
The low level of qualification of Roma in terms of lower level of completed schooling
has direct implication of their employability. Their low qualification does not depend
alone on lack of motivation but is largely caused by the shortage of funds,
discrimination as well as inadequate adaptation of the school system to meet their
particular needs. Low enrollment rates and low educational attainment thus leave
individuals unprepared for the labor market, especially in an economy where no low
skill jobs are being created, and highlight the budgetary consequences in supporting
the welfare of these groups for the future. Public policy should address these
systemic factors that reduce access to education can therefore reduce discrimination
(for example providing Roma children with adequate preparatory pre-school classes
could dramatically increase their chances of coping with the school material and thus
decrease the probability of dropping out or ending up in a special school). The same
applies for other factors like improving the Roma families’ income opportunities,
which would result in decreased involvement of children in the household economy
and income generation and would improve their ability to prepare for school (UNDP
2003).
IV. Housing, Living Conditions and Health
Material deprivation, pitiable housing and living conditions as well as poor health are
correlates of poverty.
Housing and living conditions have direct implications on consumers’ behavior and
on construction industry prospects, among others. In growing economies, as
households’ income increases, a direct impact is observed in home improvements and
rising living standards. Given that Roma families have a low starting point, as a
consequence of well-targeted public policies, much progress is to be expected in this
area.
The questions on housing from VGS were designed to match the information
provided by latest Censuses on general dwelling characteristics in both Hungary and
Slovakia (Tables 4.14 and 4.15) and provides with a good baseline comparison.
Question on “features of household’s living conditions” shows that 34% of Roma
households in North Hungary live in old houses in relatively good condition, and 36%
live in dilapidated homes or slums. Only about 13% live new houses in good
condition and 11% of them live in flats. Moreover, from those who lived in
dilapidated houses or slums, most have lived in the same settlements 15 years ago,
which clearly underlines how permanent those poor living conditions have been for
these Roma households. Similarly, Roma in Eastern Slovakia live in poor conditions
with 18% of Roma families living in shacks, i.e. dwellings, which were not initially
built for housing and 7 % live in wooden houses, 59% are living in brick houses and
16% are living in a flat in an apartment building.
18
The sometimes unclear property ownership, as a consequence, prevents the
improvements of the housing conditions – individuals are unable to maintain and
invest in buildings and local infrastructure. Those who do not own their land/home
are limited in their ability to make needed improvements to their homes. On average,
95% of Hungarian households are direct owners of their home or through a relative.
In the North region as a whole, that fraction remains similar but it falls to 69% for
Roma there. By opposition, the Hungarian census reports 3% of property owned by
municipality or local government, while in the VGS close to 30% for Roma in the
North report living in a “property of the self-government/state”. This adds to the
insecurity and discomfort as well as to the precarious living conditions of many Roma
families. The transition process has created problems with the legal status of Roma
housing, in part because poverty rights were often not clearly defined during
communism. Some Roma were evicted from state-owned apartments when housing
subsidies were withdrawn, properties were privatized, or returned to prior owners.
Many Roma are living illegally in dwellings, either because they had no choice but to
squat or because the property rights on their buildings were transferred following the
transition (OSCE 2000). In other cases, poor Roma have intentionally become
squatters. These developments have seriously limited access to social services, as
residency and ID papers are frequently required for social assistance benefits, health
care, and education.
Table 4.14
Hungary
North
region Roma in North Hungary
Total surface of dwelling
Less than 29 2% 2% 17%
30 – 49 15% 12% 30%
50 – 79 42% 42% 29%
80 + 41% 44% 23%
Mean size 78 m
2 80 m2 60 m2Average sq. meter per capita 31 m
2 31 m2 14 m2Number of rooms
1 11% 9% 40%
2 41% 42% 39%
3 32% 34% 19%
4 + 16% 15% 2%
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Hungary, 2003, table 6.1, Hungarian Population Census 2001, UNDP
Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
Mean size of homes, again, does not differ very much between the national and
regional averages but for the vulnerable groups it decreases from 80 to 60 square
meters in the North region. In addition, after controlling for bigger household sizes,
the average square meter per capita is less than half for Roma in the North in
comparison to national averages, only 14 vs. 31 square meters. This suggests that the
often large Roma families live in twice as small dwellings than the average
Hungarian. The survey data show that Roma living quarters are smaller than others,
have larger households, and are consequently more crowded. Almost 80% of all
19
Roma household in the North regions live in one or two rooms vs. only about 50%
nationwide, while 71% of them have more than four household members vs. only
25% for Hungary as a whole.
Assessing the level of comfort, in all indicators – access to piped water, flush toilet,
piped gas and sewer systems - the Roma families are far behind the Northern regional
and national averages. Lack of water, gas, electricity, and public services, such as
waste collection, contribute to the deterioration of many Roma neighborhoods and to
the emergence of ghettos. Another consequence of unclear property ownership is
prevention to legal access to water and electricity. Houses are often constructed with
makeshift materials and they do not comply with basic construction and safety
standards. Lack of garbage collection also seriously affects living conditions and
creates health problems for residents. Additionally, lack of garbage collection
perpetuates negative stereotypes about poor hygiene among Roma. Many families
lack access to running water, only 55% of Roma in the North region. As a
consequence, poor health conditions are linked to the inadequacy of the water supply
– only 45% have flush toilet or bathroom inside their home. Many Roma complained
that their drinking water was contaminated and caused diseases among their children.
In Hungary as a whole 91% of the population reports having access to sewer system
and 89% have bathroom at home. For Roma in the poorer North region, only 33%
have access to sewer system and 45% have bathroom at home.
Table 4.15
Slovakia Kosicky Presovsky
Roma in
Kosicky
region
Roma in
Presovsky
region
Housing features (averages)
Living space (m
Rooms 3.2 3.4 3.3 3 2.5
(m
People/room 1 1.1 1 2.8 3.1
2) 56.1 59.1 57.9 51.9 52.32/person) 17.5 15.9 17.3 13.2 11.7Share of households
Central heating 76% 75% 77% 3% 4%
Bathroom or shower 93% 92% 93% 34% 34%
Automatic washing
machine
61% 61% 58% 10% 16%
Personal computer 12% 10% 12% 2% 1%
Car 39% 40% 39% 9% 11%
Source: SOSR Population census 2001, UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
Similar is the depiction of the living conditions of low-income Roma minorities in
Eastern Slovakia. The average living space and the number of rooms per household
are slightly smaller for Roma in Kosicky and Presovsky regions in comparison with
the country as a whole. However, due to their bigger family size, the space per person
decreases to as low as 11.7 square meters per person for a Roma in Presovsky region
while the number of people per room there is three times the national average. The
degree of poverty is seen very clearly among the ownership of basic amenities: only
20
4% of Roma households in Eastern Slovakia report having central heating vs. 76% in
the entire country, 34% with bathroom or shower inside their home vs. 93% for
Slovakia.
According to home ownership, only about 10% of all Roma households in Slovakia
there are living in municipal or state owned dwellings. Table 4.16 also shows access
to three additional facilities, in line with the Millennium Development Goals. In
terms of access to piped water and piped gas, and availability of flush toilets inside
their homes, Roma in Eastern Slovakia seem equally deprived as Roma in Northern
Hungary and intervention in that area is essential in order to prevent major health
risks.
Table 4.16
Hungary
North
region
Roma in
North
Hungary
Roma in
Kosicky
region
Roma in
Presovsky
region
Ownership
Property of a
private person
95% 96% 69% 90% 89%
Municipal/state
ownership
4% 3% 30% 9% 10%
Other 1% 1% 2% 1% 1%
Facilities
Piped water 89% 86% 55% 50% 49%
Piped gas 69% 65% 17% 17% 14%
Flush toilet 86% 80% 45% 33% 35%
Source: UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
Ownership of consumer durables (Table 4.17) among Roma household give details
about their daily household chores – the lack of common household appliances
constrains Roma women and girls to spend their time in traditional housework and
childrearing. Ownership of car is quite unusual and only a few of Roma households
possess a personal computer or telephone lines, both in North Hungary and in Eastern
Slovakia, which limits further their likelihood in finding and keeping employment, as
well as it restrains the learning tools available for their children.
Table 4.17 Consumer durable goods stock (% of reporting households)
Hungary Roma in North Hungary
Car 44% 11%
Refrigerator 75% 81%
Washing machine 70% 80%
Television 96% 93%
Personal computer 18% 3%
Mobile phone 71% 37%
Source: Hungarian Statistical Yearbook 2003 (table 5.12), UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
Poverty in Roma settlements is closely linked to regional economic conditions,
proximity of the settlement to jobs or public services, and the degree of ethnic
integration or segregation of the settlement. From the survey it seems that Roma live
21
in much higher concentration with other Roma. Some of the explanation is purely
economic as Roma rely much more on other family members and relatives for all
sorts of needs – from help in case of emergency to financial assistance, thus proximity
is more efficient for such cooperation. Non-Roma populations, on the other hand,
have greater access and rely more heavily on official providers for such services –
banks, hospitals, etc. Other explanations may include religious differences and
language barriers, but these are not obvious from the vulnerable group survey. Roma
religious identification is very similar to the Non-Roma, so this may not be an
important determinant for their concentration in settlements. As for language barriers,
only very few households use primary language as Romany/Gipsy there are no
significant language barriers apparent from our survey either.
Another important component of welfare is health status. Roma have generally worse
health than non Roma and is attributed to unhealthy lifestyle factors including poor
diets and smoking and poor housing conditions. The prevalence of transmissible
diseases associated with poor living conditions is found higher among them,
especially in more isolated settlements and are associated with overcrowding at home,
unsafe water supply, lack of waste disposal and proximity to environmentally
contaminated areas – all characteristics of Roma living conditions. Other factors
linked to deteriorating health status are insufficient clothing and high alcohol
consumption and inability to purchase common medicine supplies, as we saw in the
expenditure section.
V. Labor Market Situation
Weak labor market competitiveness and the effects of discrimination are widely
perceived as major causes of the poverty and exclusion experienced by Roma.
Indisputably, employment is the principal source of the income needed to escape
poverty. Yet, Roma are facing inadequate employment opportunities for various
objective and subjective reasons. Among Roma low-skilled jobs predominate and are
associated with low incomes, poor job quality and weak social and employment
protection. Those differences with national averages in unemployment and the type
of employment influence the sources and level of Roma income. Roma have limited
opportunities to reenter the workforce, so unemployment rates, and particularly longterm
unemployment, for Roma are often exceptionally high.
Roma have historically had connections to traditional occupations. But few of these
connections still exist and development policies to revive them seem unsuccessful and
undesirable. During communism, Roma were most frequently employed in
manufacturing industries, because of their lower education. During the post-transition
period, they were the first to be laid off and then they faced restricted employment
opportunities.
The most important sources of measuring unemployment are national labor force and
household surveys. These surveys ask about economic activity in general and can
reflect both informal and formal employment. On the other hand, in the vulnerable
group survey questions pertaining to labor market differ somewhat between Hungary
and Slovakia. In the case of Slovakia, the questions match the country’s labor force
survey very closely, while not for the case of Hungary. In this report are presented in
22
the same tables both countries, the regions of interest and the Roma populations there
in particular. The actual comparison between the two countries should be done with
caution.
A main conclusion and policy recommendation is to modify the currently welfare
system to promote job creation for Roma rather than provide them with financial aid
alone, as this weakens them and makes them more dependent on social assistance,
decreases their self-respect and motivation.
V.1 Labor market overview
The Table 4.18 presents the global overview of the population by economic activity
and the most common ratios. In Hungary 51% of the population is employed vs. 40%
in Slovakia. The situation of Roma in the North region of Hungary sharply falls to
only about 17% being employed and is comparable to Roma in the Eastern regions of
Slovakia, 17-20%. On the other hand the fraction of unemployed individuals in the
population is 3% in Hungary and 9% in Slovakia. Unemployed individuals among
Roma in Eastern Slovakia remain the same range, 6-8%, while that fraction reaches
45% of the Roma population in North Hungary. This is partly explained with the
differences in definition of unemployment and the methodology used in the survey.
Most of those unemployed Roma in North Hungary are actually economically
inactive as they may have been without a job for a very long time. Indeed, the
fraction of economically inactive population is about 75% for Roma in Eastern
Slovakia much higher than the national average of 51%.
Table 4.18 Labor market overview
Hungary Slovakia
North
region Kosicky Presovsky
Roma in
North
Hungary
Roma
in
Kosicky
Roma
in
Presov
Distribution by economic activity
Employed 51% 40% 45% 37% 39%
17% 20% 17%Unempl. 3% 9% 5% 11% 10% 45% 6% 8%
Econom.
inactive 46% 51% 50% 52% 52% 38% 74% 75%
Ratios
Unempl.
rate 6% 17% 10% 22% 20%
73% 23% 30%Empl.
rate 51% 40% 45% 37% 39% 17% 20% 17%
Particip.
rate 54% 49% 50% 48% 48% 62% 26% 25%
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Hungary 2003, tables 4.2 and 4.19, pp 86 and 107, Statistical yearbook
of SR 2004, regional data 2003, UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
The most common ratios additionally clarify the labor market overview. Again there
are large differences between Roma from North Hungary and East Slovakia which are
due to methodology used. The unemployment rates among Roma in Kosicky and
Presovsky regions range between 23 and 30%, which may be lower than what is
usually estimated and is much lower than that of North Hungarian Roma. These
23
unemployment ratios remain quite high in comparison with the national averages –
6% for Hungary and 17% for Slovakia. Some of the explanation lays in the fact that
many people are not counted as unemployed but as economically inactive. Many
Roma lack regular jobs and high unemployment rates may indicate involvement in the
informal sector. In addition, many people are classified as working/employed
because they have worked on a farm owned or rented by a member of their
household, either working on land or other farm tasks, or have cared for livestock
belonging to a household member (this is about half of all who are working). As can
be seen in the income section later, those individuals have no labor earnings even
though they are counted as working.
In previous studies, Roma unemployment rates were often projected to be close to
100%. The dataset provided in vulnerable groups’ survey allows for the
unemployment rates of Roma in Eastern Slovakia to be pinned down quite precisely.
It reveals to be much lower than usually expected Roma unemployment rate. That is
not something to rejoice about but it clarifies more on the actual problem – Roma are
not simply unemployed, they have exited the labor force. Instead the analysis and
policy recommendation needs to focus on the low employment and participation rates.
Employment rate among Roma in Kosicky and Presovsky regions are as low as 17%
and their participation rate are less than half in comparison with the national average.
Participation rate for Roma in North Hungary is 62% which is fueled by high
unemployment; however, the employment rate is only 17%.
One explanation for Roma low employment rate is their demographics – Roma are
mostly young with more than 40% of them younger than 15 years old, who are
supposed to be in school. The other crucial explanation is that unemployed Roma
have exited the labor force and are discouraged to search for jobs, therefore,
development policies need to focus on increasing their employability and creating
incentives for individuals to re-enter the labor force. Current government policies, as
for example in Slovakia, are already targeting the low employment rate and have
implemented social reforms in 2004 by introducing lower personal income tax and
more active labor market policies. Results of these are still to be measured in the near
future. Another issue is whether such policies are enough to address the systematic
socio-economic problems of Roma minorities.
Undeniably, education remains the major factor for improving ones labor market
outcomes. In Eastern Slovakia, Roma employment rates increase by education
reaching 100% for the very few university graduates (Table 4.19). Education affects
positively also participation rates. Not surprisingly, unemployment rates fall steadily
with more schooling confirming the returns on education. The unemployment rate for
Roma in Presovsky region with only basic education is 41% but it drops down to 13%
for those with secondary education and 0% for tertiary. The above mentioned effects
of education on labor market ratios are preserved for Roma in Northern Hungary.
24
Table 4.19 Economic activity ratios by education
Roma in
North Hungary
Roma in
Kosicky region
Roma in
Presovsky region
Unemployment rate
Primary 79% 28% 41%
Secondary 46% 19% 13%
Tertiary 0% 0% 0%
Employment rate
Primary 14% 30% 24%
Secondary 45% 50% 54%
Tertiary 50% 100% 100%
Participation rate
Primary 65% 42% 41%
Secondary 83% 62% 62%
Tertiary 50% 100% 100%
Source: UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
Of course, education here is too broadly defined and many subtle differences
distinguish Roma from non-Roma for a given school level. The actual acquired
qualifications and diploma as well as the particular fields of schooling are what
matters on the labor market. Cumulated skills and years of uninterrupted working
experience, as well sound health, are drivers for successful market outcomes. Other
factors which might account for lower performance of Roma on the labor market
include lack of information among them of available employment opportunities, lack
of physical access to suitable positions, and discrimination against Roma workers.
The existing barriers to employment and spectrum of available occupations explain
some of the difference in wages for Roma with equivalent level of education.
The second most important determinant of labor market outcomes is age as a proxy
for cumulated experience (Table 4.20). In the framework of usual life cycle, labor
outcomes, such as employment and participation rates, exhibit a hump shape function
with age – increasing until the peak of mature age and then slowing decreasing
towards retirement age. In case of Roma, both employment and participation seem to
increase up to about 30-39 age group, which corresponds to the prime age for
physically intensive occupations, and then gradually decrease. However, age alone
does not absorb much of the problems due to a weak start of their working life with
very poor initial human capital.
Unemployment rates by age show a serious problem among most young, 15-29 age
group as those individuals are not attending school, are therefore lacking advanced
skills and have not cumulated yet much experience. There are also incidences from
the datasets of children working at the age of 15 which limits their opportunities to
cumulate additional skills and knowledge because of not attending school. They are
particularly vulnerable to poverty for the reason that as they grow older, being
unemployed and not attending school will leave them with too few options to compete
25
on the labor market. Unemployment rates for 15-29 years old Roma in Kosicky and
Presovsky regions vary between 23 and 36% but reaches 80% for Roma in North
Hungary. For Roma between 30 and 39 years old the situation seems to worsen.
Roma are more likely to be laid off and to find themselves in between jobs. Adding
to this fact, their lack of skills and scarce experience makes it even more difficult to
be employed with age. This is a direct consequence of their lower school enrollment
and attainment coupled with not being able to find jobs corresponding to their
minimum skills.
Table 4.20 Economic activity ratios by age
Roma in
North Hungary
Roma in
Kosicky region
Roma in
Presovsky region
Unemployment rate
15 – 29 years 80% 23% 36%
30 – 39 years 67% 38% 37%
40 – 49 years 68% 16% 25%
50 + years 61% 14% 18%
Employment rate
15 – 29 years 12% 32% 21%
30 – 39 years 26% 30% 34%
40 – 49 years 20% 40% 36%
50 + years 13% 34% 34%
Participation rate
15 – 29 years 63% 42% 32%
30 – 39 years 78% 48% 54%
40 – 49 years 63% 47% 48%
50 + years 34% 39% 42%
Source: UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
V.2 Unemployment profile
According to the International Labor Organization (ILO) definition, in order to be
considered unemployed, a person must be: a) without work; b) willing and able to
work; and c) actively seeking work. The survey data used for Hungary reflect a
broader definition of unemployment, in which discouraged workers are treated as
unemployed. The so defined unemployment rates are far higher among Roma than in
the whole countries (more than twice as high as for Roma in Eastern Slovakia). This
is partly due to the survey design but also reveals distinct phenomena: some people
consider themselves as unemployed even though they have recently worked while
others do not define themselves as unemployed but would be so classified according
to the criteria used here. Since, for many, unemployment is associated with the
absence of a regular job, those involved in informal or irregular employment may
define themselves as unemployed even though they may be engaged in some sort of
work – which is captured in the case of Roma in Slovakia. Regardless of the
overestimated unemployment in North Hungary, East Slovakia numbers still remain
relatively high.
26
Next the profile of the unemployed will be detailed in order to understand better their
characteristics and to address their vulnerabilities. Both countries report the main
distributional characteristics of the unemployed by duration, age and educational
attainment. In Hungary, the unemployed are more or less equally distributed between
short and long term unemployed, 24% for 1-3 months and 37% for more than a year.
In Slovakia, as the unemployment rate is a little higher, also the distribution is a little
skewed, with 61% of all unemployed for a year or more. In that respect, the
distribution of unemployed Roma in the three regions is similar to that of Slovakia as
a whole with 67-73% of them being without a regular employment for a year or more.
20% of all unemployed Roma in North Hungary have never had a job in their life
(Table 4.4).
Table 4.21 Unemployment profile
Hungary Slovakia
Roma in
North Hungary
Roma in
Kosicky
Roma in
Presovsky
Duration
1 – 3 months 24% 14% 10% 6% 9%
4 – 6 months 16% 9% 6% 5% 5%
7 – 12 months 23% 15% 14% 16% 19%
1 year or +
50%Never worked
37% 61%
20%
73% 67%
Age groups
15 – 29 years n.a. 41%
52% 43% 46%30 – 39 years n.a. 23% 25% 36% 28%
40 – 49 years n.a. 23% 16% 12% 18%
50 – 59 years n.a. 13% 7% 8% 8%
Highest educational attainment
Primary (incomplete) 3%
36%Primary (completed) 30%
23%
52%
75% 88%
Secondary 61% 73% 12% 25% 12%
Tertiary 6% 4% 1% 0% 0%
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Hungary 2003, tables 4.11 and 4.12, p.94, Statistical yearbook of the
SR, 2004, p237, UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
Similarly by age, Roma in Eastern Slovakia are matching the age distribution of
average unemployed Slovak with 43-46% between the age of 15 and 29. North Roma
show particularly high concentration of unemployed adolescents, both boys and girls,
representing more than half of all unemployed Roma there. These young individuals
do not attend school and also are not working for wages. In summary, overall, the
unemployed Roma in all three regions, are very young, more than 3/4 are less than 39
years old. Main explanation is the demographic composition in that area – more than
80% of the population there is less than 39 years old with poor education.
27
Weak educational background is often cited as a key contributing factor to the high
levels of Roma unemployment. By distribution across education level, in Hungary as
a whole about 33% of the unemployed have at most primary education and 61% of
the unemployed have at least some secondary education. The main explanation of this
relatively educated unemployment is the fact that the educational attainment of the
Hungarian population as a whole is relatively high. While in Hungary as a whole, the
unemployed remain relatively educated, the most vulnerable in the North region, as
well as in Eastern Slovakia, 88% of them have at most primary education, which
make them very unappealing for employers to hire and thus more likely to remain on
the dole longer. Similarly, in Slovakia, only 23% of the unemployed have primary
while this rate reaches 88% for unemployed Roma in Presovsky region.
V.3 Employment profile
As the issues with unemployment definitions have been established, it seems more
appropriate to focus analysis and policies on the employment figures. Moreover, the
employment numbers are comparable across the three regions of interest.
Roma who are employed are most commonly working in industry and services (Table
4.22). Interestingly enough, their predominant sector varies with the regions. For
example in Kosicky region most employed Roma work in the services industry and
secondly in agriculture and forestry, which is not traditionally typical for Roma
populations. This is most likely due to the more available jobs in services and the
scarce employment opportunities for them in manufacturing and mining there. On the
other hand, over 53% of all working Roma are employed in manufacturing and
construction in North Hungary. This is consistent with pre-transition employment
patterns, when Roma were most frequently employed in low-skilled jobs in industry,
including manufacturing and mining. Lastly, Presovsky region shows the least
concentration of Roma in services.
These different sector concentrations lead to a hopeful interpretation that Roma
employment responds to the regional industry distributions and are not confined to be
in a single sector where they are most vulnerable to structural changes. However,
relative to the national Hungarian and Slovak averages they are still underrepresented
in the services. Fewer Roma reported working in education, social services and
public administration. The low levels of Roma employment in these areas may limit
access to these services, including education and health care, as there are few Roma
who can bridge cultural barriers and facilitate interactions between Roma and non-
Roma service providers. Also for all three regions, the share of Roma working land is
much higher than the national averages, which has clear implications for their wages.
Given these considerations and their low skills, it is less likely that the sector
distribution will change much unless more unskilled jobs are created in the services in
the short term and improving access and accumulation of education in the medium
term.
In immediate consequence of choice of sector is the relative wage income. The
higher than average concentration of Roma workers in manufacturing and
construction, in agriculture and forestry, and in the same time their underrepresentation
in the driving services sector results in lower monthly gross earnings.
In Hungary as a whole, for example, average monthly gross earnings in
28
manufacturing, mining and electricity were 7% lower than national average; in
construction 32% lower; services are reported by subgroups separately (retail,
banking, education, etc.) almost all of them above national average.
Besides the sectors of activity, the types of employment influence the sources and
level of Roma income. Only 2% of all employed Roma in North Hungary work as
private entrepreneur vs. 10% in the country as a whole, which reflects some major
structural differences in access to information, funding and markets. Access to local
capital may be crucial explanation for Roma self-employment and entrepreneurial
activities. Microfinance has grown rapidly with the transition helping households
absorb structural shocks and increase self-employment (Forster et al. 2003). At the
other extreme, the share of Roma private entrepreneurs in Eastern Slovakia is 21%
which is double the national average there. This could be a consequence of recent
beneficial policies promoting small- and medium-sized enterprises there. A
consistent monitoring and overtime analysis is needed in order to assess the medium
term implications and whether those policies address permanently Roma problems.
Moreover, in the case of self-employment considerable benefits may appear only after
a certain period of time. Encouraging Roma to be self-employed and create jobs for
themselves is one way to provide with channels for poverty alleviation.
Also many Roma reported working in jobs without a permanent contract. Roma were
more commonly employed in jobs with either no contract at all, or contracts of less
than one year. This likely reflects the large share of Roma who are active in the
informal sector. Even among Roma who reported that they were not employed,
nearly twice as many Roma claimed to be doing some kind of side work. These
patterns indicate a higher level of vulnerability of Roma in the labor market.
Table 4.22 Employment by sectors and status
Hungary Slovakia
North
region
Roma in
North
Hungary
Roma
in
Kosicky
region
Roma in
Presovsky
region
Distribution by industries
Agriculture and
forestry
5% 6% 4% 10% 39% 35%
Manufacturing
and
construction
31% 38% 36% 53% 18% 37%
Services
industries
64% 56% 61% 37% 44% 29%
Employment status
Employee 82% 90% 86% 97% 79% 79%
Private
entrepreneur
10% 10% 9%
2% 21% 21%Other 7% 0% 5% 1% 0% 0%
Source: Hungarian Micro-Census 2005, Statistical yearbook of the SR, 2003, UNDP Vulnerable
Groups Survey 2004.
29
The general demographic trends of Roma populations affect their employment profile,
as seen in the age groups breakdown – in Hungary and the North as a whole, a quarter
is less than 29 years old and 30% of the employed in their “prime age”, i.e. 40 – 49
years old (Table 4.23). For Roma in the North region, the age distribution is more
skewed to towards the young. Employed there are slightly younger, on average, with
35% below 29 and only 20% in the 40 – 49 years range. Among employed Roma in
Eastern Slovakia, there is similar concentration of young workers, 45% of all
employed Roma in Kosicky region are less than 29.
Distribution by education of employed individuals: as with the unemployment profile,
the distribution of employed across education level in Hungary and the North as a
whole is very similar to the population profile, with 61-65% of employed individuals
with at least secondary education. This share is only about 35% among the Roma in
the North. By contrast, 1% nation wide of all employed has less than 8 years of
schooling, while this share is up to 15% among Roma in the North, which makes
them exposed to high risks of losing their job. Furthermore, there is an immediate
implication of the education level on the wages those people earn. Under the
assumption that earned wages correspond to educational level in terms of acquired
human capital or skill level, it is expected that the Roma average labor income should
be much lower than that of the national/regional average. Indeed, the average
monthly gross earning in the North region is 13% less than the Hungarian average.
Table 4.23 Employment profile
Hungary Slovakia
North
region
Roma in
North
Hungary
Roma
in
Kosicky
Roma
in
Presovsky
Age groups
15 – 29 years 27% 26% 25% 35% 45% 36%
30 – 39 years 25% 27% 26% 33% 18% 22%
40 – 49 years 30% 31% 32% 20% 20% 24%
50 – 59 years 17% 16% 16% 12% 12% 15%
60 + years 2% 1% 1% 1% 4% 3%
Highest educational attainment
Primary
(incomplete)
1% 1% 15%
Primary
(completed)
20%
5%
18% 47%
65% 61%
Secondary 61% 80% 65% 35% 35% 39%
Tertiary 18% 14% 16% 4% 0% 1%
Source: Hungarian Population Census 2001, Statistical yearbook of the SR, 2003 p220, UNDP
Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
Overall, in the three regions of interest, due to Roma lower educational attainment,
61-65% of the employed have at most primary education and consequently their
earning potential will be lower in comparison with the national averages. However,
educational attainment of the employed Roma shows some positive effects – the
distribution is not just mimicking the Roma populations as a whole. More than a third
of the employed have completed at least secondary school while among Roma as a
whole it was about half of those rates. In other words, educated people are twice as
30
likely to be employed. In the long run a development priority must be improving
Roma educational attainment in order to close their income gap.
VI. Income and Earnings
This section concentrates on the actual sources of income and earnings and points out
the similarities and differences between Roma in three regions of interest. For
comparison purposes all amounts are computed in 2004 Euros PPP. Unfortunately,
national and regional numbers on income are not widely distributed by the statistical
offices. HSCO and SOSR are reporting only aggregate income, social benefits, and
transfers for the countries as a whole but not on individual level. In summary, the
specific social welfare systems in place in Hungary and Slovakia are perfectly
reflected in the social assistance profile of Roma in the three regions. Inter-country
differences in eligibility reflect contrasting program design and eligibility criteria
across the two countries. The 2004 social reform in Slovakia, for example, is an
important factor for some results that were found.
Social protection benefits are important sources of income for all households in the
three regions. For Roma, state transfers comprised about half of total household
income. Because of their different characteristics, Roma and non-Roma tend to rely
on different benefits (UNDP, 2006). Roma are more frequently eligible for, and
receive, child allowances, unemployment benefits and social assistance benefits.
These benefits are typically linked to larger family sizes, and greater likelihood of
being poor and unemployed. In contrast, pensions are less important for Roma,
because they are less likely to have a contribution history and be eligible for benefits
and due to the smaller share of elderly within the Roma population.
The distributions of households by number of earners, individuals aged 15 years old
or more who were employed in the previous month, in all three regions depict an
alarming picture (Table 4.24). Even though the definitions of active earner differ
between the two countries the trends there coincide – most vulnerable households do
rely on the state. Among all Roma households from North Hungary 63% have no
adult earners. In Kosicky region as many as 89% of all Roma households rely on
other than labor sources. The high concentration of households with no active earners
is in line with the morose unemployment situation of Roma minorities depicted
previously. These households consist of unemployed or economically inactive
individuals and consequently rely on income from other sources such as social
assistance for unemployment, childcare and pensions. Between 4 and 9% of Roma
households consist of two adults earning income.
As expected, the average annual household income increases with the number of
earners. An immediate implication for policy is to create incentives for more people
to become active earners in order for their family income (and wealth) to increase. As
for the magnitudes, Roma in Eastern Slovakia seem to receive half of the amount
Roma in North Hungary both on a household and on an individual level. This
disparity reflects major structural differences between the two countries and do not
contradict our analysis so far. Another explanation for the much lower amounts in
Slovakia is related to the methodology used – due to the strict definition of
31
employment used. Indeed, in Slovakia many of the employed Roma have not earned
any strictly positive labor earnings such as wages, salaries or other payment either in
cash or in other form for their work. Lastly, some of the differences in amounts may
be due to the latest reform in Slovakia which resulted in cuts in benefits and
redefinition of eligibility.
Table 4.24 Distribution and average income by earners (Euros PPP)
Roma in North
Hungary
Roma in
Presovsky region
Roma in Kosicky
region
Distribution of households
No earners 63% 83% 89%
One earner 28% 11% 7%
Two or more
earners
9% 6% 4%
Average annual income per household
No earners 5,620 2,886 3,006
One earner 7,806 6,700 7,165
Two or more
earners
10,317 9,291 10,266
Average annual income per capita
No earners 1,332 591 644
One earner 1,609 1,172 1,577
Two or more
earners
2,360 1,682 2,313
Source: UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
Note: In Slovakia, all labor earnings are reported on individual basis while social income is reported
by the person entitled to it for all other members
income levels of each household member.
. Total household income is computed by summing theThe three main components of total household income include earned income from
work, income from social welfare programs, and income from other sources (such as
begging, fortune telling, etc). Unlike general beliefs, it is clear from the collected
data that the latter source is of insignificant magnitudes. Given the low share of
earners, one main source remains for Roma – social assistance. The average amount
of social assistance benefits should decrease with number of earners – these family
members have less need for supplementary resources. Indeed, the average annual
social income per household and per capita is decreasing with the number of earners
in the household (Table 4.25). However, even when there are two adults earning in
the household, since their total income is below the socially accepted minimum,
almost all households are eligible for some financial help from the state.
32
Table 4.25 Average annual social income (Euros PPP)
Roma in North
Hungary
Roma in Kosicky
region
Roma in Presovsky
region
Average annual social income per household
No earners 5,508 3,006 2,886
One earners 4,299 3,229 3,010
Two or more
earners
2,885 2,080 1,562
Average annual social income per capita
No earners 1,290 644 591
One earners 817 644 502
Two or more
earners
504 384 299
Source: UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
A more interesting question is to disentangle the importance of the various social
benefits. From the survey data, the following principal sources of revenue are
distinguished – labor earnings, childcare support and unemployment benefits (Table
4.26). A marginal source of income, which includes money received from interest,
capital, from gambling, heritage and presents, aids and private pensions, represents,
on average, less than a 1% of total income, and it can be ignored. Roma in all three
regions seem to earn very similar amounts from working and exhibit the similar
increases with number of earners. This can be explained with the fact that Roma in
those regions seem to have similar low skilled jobs and are earning minimum wages.
The child benefits are also in comparable magnitudes except that in Hungary the
benefits increase more steeply with the number of children. For Slovakia, the much
more gradual increase is explained by the recent reform. Main component of the
reform was to modify the simple incentive to have more children into one where
parents invest more in their children’s education
practically inexistent for Roma in Eastern Slovakia, due to the latest reform which
imposed much stricter restrictions for contributions and benefits. As most Roma there
are long-term unemployed and have not contributed (enough or at all) to the social
funds, they become therefore ineligible to receive the newly specified unemployment
benefits, as the data shows.
3. Lastly, unemployment benefits are3
school stipends to children of low-income families, conditional on attainment.
2004 Reform in Slovakia consisted in a cut the existing child benefits and the implementation of33
Table 4.26 Average annual income sources (Euros PPP)
Roma in North
Hungary
Roma in
Kosicky region
Roma in
Presovsky region
Average annual labor income per household
One earner 3,476 3,936 3,690
Two or more earners 6,666 8,186 7,729
Average annual family benefits per household
One child 1,237 1,108 1,290
Two children 2,587 1,755 1,971
Three children 3,850 1,904 2,324
Four or more children 5,779 3,283 3,160
Average annual job related benefits per household
One unemployed 696 0 29
Two or more
unemployed
1,588 0 0
Source: UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
Table 4.27 shows shares of households receiving positive labor income, childcare
assistance or unemployment benefits. Probably more Roma households are
beneficiaries even if the amounts are on average lower. Indeed, only 39% of all
households receive positive labor earning among Roma in the North, which explains
partly why 55 and 77% of all households there receive respectively some
unemployment benefits and childcare support. As in Hungary the share of
households receiving positive labor income is very low, reaching an alarming low 9
percent for the Roma households in Kosicky region. As for the family benefits, the
Roma in the East of Slovakia are very similar to the Roma in Northern Hungary with
77 percent. The main difference between two countries comes from the job related
unemployment benefits, where in Slovakia barely 3 - 4 percent of all Roma families
in the East report receiving those benefits. This particular low share of households is
most likely due to the recent social reform.
Table 4.27 Shares of households receiving benefits
Roma in
North Hungary
Roma in
Kosicky region
Roma in
Presovsky region
Shares of households receiving labor income
One earners 95% 89% 73%
Two or more earners 96% 60% 91%
Shares of households receiving family benefits
One child 91% 97% 90%
Two children 100% 100% 88%
Three children 100% 89% 100%
Four or more 97% 99% 100%
Shares of households receiving job related benefits
One unemployed 46% 0% 4%
Two or more
unemployed
79% 0% 0%
34
Source: UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
So far the analysis studied the total household income. The survey provided also
information on total individual income. Table 4.28 examines the average annual
individual incomes by gender, age groups and education. First observation is that
Roma women in North Hungary have on average higher income – they are principal
receiver of childcare support (which on average is more than the supplements for
unemployment). In the case of Roma women in Eastern Slovakia, they receive
slightly less than Roma men there, partly due to the above mentioned change in social
contributions. Roma women are traditionally more involved in childrearing and other
housework that are not reflected in monitored income. They usually earn less by
working but they qualify for more social benefits and consequently the gender gap is
minimized. Across age groups, individual income peaks between 30 and 39 for Roma
in the North Hungary and in Presovsky regions. For Roma in Kosicky region,
revenues seem to increase with age up to 50 - 59. After 60, with arrival of retirement
pensions, individual income increases a bit in North Hungary but not in Eastern
Slovakia. Most uniform is the increase of individual income by highest educational
attainment across the three regions suggesting better accumulation of skills and
experience.
Table 4.28 Average individual income profile (Euros PPP)
Roma in North
Hungary
Roma in
Kosicky
Roma in
Presovsky
Average annual individual income by gender
Males 2,510 2,615 2,634
Females 3,344 2,252 2,087
Average annual individual income by age groups
15 – 29 years 2,884 1,933 1,972
30 – 39 years 3,598 2,471 2,872
40 – 49 years 2,577 2,742 2,682
50 – 59 years 2,324 3,009 2,765
60 + years 3,079 2,901 2,779
Average annual individual income by highest educational attainment
Primary (incomplete) 2,818 2,319 2,402
Primary (completed) 2,873 2,184 2,379
Vocational 3,499 3,580
Secondary
3,407
3,965 3,475
Tertiary 4,669 9,113 2,782
Source: UNDP Vulnerable Groups Survey 2004.
In conclusion, Roma household rely heavily on social welfare. A major policy
recommendation implication is to create incentives for such households to go without
social welfare as their burden will become unsustainable for the future governments
and taxpayers. The reform in Slovakia is targeting to break the cycle of state
dependence by cutting benefits and defining more strict eligibility criteria on one side
and on the other side by allowing for creation of more employment opportunities. In
35
both countries, extensive active labor market policies and programs are set in place to
accompany such transitions form vulnerability to poverty toward prosperity. Without
robust monitoring and accountability it is hard to measure short term impact and to
predict long term impact on Roma vulnerability.
VII. Mobility
Another important aspect of the socio-economic background is the mobility patterns
of people in border regions and their motives. During transition years, it is likely to
see increased mobility of households, seeking better employment opportunities. Most
likely seasonal workers or even permanent residents have moved from more
economically depressed areas across one country as well as across the border.
VII.1 Internal migrations
In the literature, internal migration has found to be one of the reasons for the current
high segregation of Roma in the cities. Previous research in Hungary traced down the
migration of Roma from the countryside during the economic crisis at the end of the
1980s. Faced with growing unemployment, many Roma moved to Budapest in search
of better opportunities. Over time, due to declining living conditions and poor access
to municipal services, conditions in these neighborhoods severely deteriorated.
Common side effects associated with slums appeared, including drug addiction and
rising crime (Ladanyi, 1993). The continuing deterioration of living conditions and
employment opportunities has probably led to continued rural-urban migration.
On the opposite, during 2000-2003, internal migration in Hungary as a whole has
been characterized by a net negative migration to Budapest and other towns and a
positive net migration to villages. According to HCSO, less than 5% of the population
moved in 2003
well as in other towns declined after 2001. In contrast, between 2001 and 2004, the
population in villages has been increasing steadily due to adverse demographic trends
and internal migration. The HCSO reports also the directions of migrations in 2003,
and there too it seems to be some sort of revival of appeal towards villages. This
trend is not observed among Roma populations, which predominantly live in
segregated areas in the cities.
The HCSO distinguishes between permanent and temporary internal migration.
Permanent migrants have given up their place of residence – similar to the migration
questions in the UNDP survey, while temporary migrants keep their permanent
dwellings. The permanent alone or permanent and temporary migrations together,
show the trends described above. If we look at temporary migration alone, only in
2003, we see positive migration towards Budapest and other towns and negative
towards villages.
According to VGS, 90% of all Roma households in North Hungary have never moved
and are living in the same settlement as 15 years ago. Thus, the overall mobility of
vulnerable households for the last 15 years is about 10%, twice the national average.
That makes the vulnerable Roma twice more likely to move, most of them moving
4. After a net increase during the 1990’s, the population in Budapest as4
Statistical yearbook of Hungary, 2003, tables 3.14 – 16, p. 4936
from countryside to town rather than the other way around, contrary to national
trends. About half of those who have moved in the last 15 years have moved from the
country probably in search for more jobs in the towns. A third has moved to the
countryside probably for the purpose of working land.
However, the question on motivation reveals a different story. The major cause for
changing location for Roma is family reasons, 55%, while 15% responded for
economic reasons and only 2% for security reasons or felt forced to move. These
answers may seem surprising given their dire economic situation but it is very
representative for Roma cultural differences. Family values are considered of utmost
importance for Roma minorities and should be incorporated when designing
development programs.
In the survey, mobility questions differ between the two countries with additional
information provided in Slovakia’s vulnerable group survey. About 15% of all
respondents in Eastern Slovakia have lived in other municipality than the current one.
This fact exhibits a relatively high mobility, i.e. one out of every six individuals has
lived elsewhere for sometime. Out of all those who have lived elsewhere, 12% have
lived in another municipality 3 or more months (i.e. 2% of all respondents), which is
surprisingly low. Even though it seems that the vulnerable groups move substantially
more, they do not stay away from home for long periods of time. That could suggest
two phenomena: 1) that the high mobility is only for short periods of time and those
moving individuals return home without settling down in other municipalities; 2) or a
more or less “nomadic” pattern where individuals move from one location to another
after less than 3 months. However, given the limitations of the survey, we could not
measure the intensity of these mobility patterns, i.e. how many moves were made in a
lifetime or how often they were initiated.
Slovak Roma give the following most frequent reasons for migration, with equal
weight: (i) marriage, (ii) family reasons and (iii) moved with family, answers very
similar to those of Roma from the Hungarian survey. Roma decisions to change
location are mainly motivated by founding a new family or following a family
member. Moreover, due to relatively large size of households, this explains the high
number of family members following the household head.
The fact that the more than two-thirds move for reasons related to family is not so
unanticipated, considering that our sample comes from the poorest subpopulation in
Slovakia and Hungary. In richer industrialized countries, the individuals who move
for better careers or education are likely to be from the upper quintiles. Therefore, a
more important aspect to study is the indirect motivation of poorer individuals to
move – what are the implications of those who moved on their socio-economic status.
High rates of subjective unemployment and the importance of income-generating
activities conducted within extended families suggest that behind “family reasons” for
migration there could be indirect economic reasons. Indeed, we could assert that
those who have moved are performing better on the labor market with higher
employment and participation rates and lower unemployment rate in comparison with
those individuals who have always lived in the same municipality. The higher
mobility is beneficial for making contacts, acquiring skills and experience among
others. Therefore, even though the main reasons were stated as family formation,
those mobility choices have led to improved economic situation. This is suggesting
37
that the matchmaking is also driver for better outcomes in the labor market. If that is
the case, even though there are cultural Roma specifics, measures to improve their
employability rather than control for early marriage may help better alleviate them
from poverty.
VII.2 External/international migrations
Unlike common expectations, there is no evidence of significant migration patterns of
Roma households and individuals between North Hungary and Eastern Slovakia.
Fractions of people who identify with the bordering nationalities’ cultural values and
traditions and Roma, on national and regional level, are reported in table 4.29. North
Hungary has about five times the national average of Roma and twice that of Slovaks,
including those who are Hungarian citizens. According the Hungarian statistical
yearbook, the largest influx of foreigners, recorded between 1997 and 2002, has been
from Romania. On the other hand, the VGS shows no Hungarian Roma have
emigrated from another country. Unlike common expectation, there is no significant
migration of Roma households from Eastern Slovakia into North Hungary. This
suggests that perhaps the international mobility is generated mostly by middle- and
upper-income families who can afford it, but not among the most vulnerable to
poverty groups.
Table 4.29 Fractions of population
Hungary
North
region
Slovakia
Kosicky
region
Presovsky
region
Slovakian 0.27% 0.5%
- - -Romanian 0.09% 0.05%
Roma 1.33% 5.36% 1.67% 3.89% 4.01%
Ukrainian 0.05% 0.06% 0.2% 0.27% 0.86%
Hungarian
Czech
- - -- - 9.68% 11.15% 0.1%- - 0.83% 0.65% 0.48%Source: Hungarian Population Census 2001, Slovak Population Census 2001.
Similarly, in Kosicky and Presovsky regions in Slovakia, the share of Roma is three
times higher than the national average. The fraction of Hungarian population in
Kosicky region is higher than national average, while the Ukrainian minorities are 4
times more in Presovsky region. Some of the ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia
may have moved to Hungary and it would be helpful to study their characteristics.
Unfortunately, the Hungarian dataset from VGS does not show any international
migration among the vulnerable groups. There seems to be no noteworthy cross
border Roma migration between Slovakia to Hungary. Again, this may suggest that
moving, traveling and commuting are expensive and if any, it is generated by middleand
upper-income individuals and families.
As for international migration among vulnerable Roma households on the Slovak
side, 90% of all the international migrants among the VGS arrive from the Czech
Republic, with Germany and Ukraine following with about 3% each. Once again,
there is no particular movement between Hungary and Slovakia from the VGS. The
38
top four reasons for those who moved from abroad remain the same as the reasons for
internal migration: family reasons (33%), return to hometown/ village (19%),
marriage and moved with family (14% each). The employment situation of those who
have moved from abroad is again better than that of those who have always lived in
the same municipality.
VIII. Conclusion
This Chapter generates a detailed cross-section description of the current situation of
Roma minorities. However it remains only a static, one time evaluation and cannot
portray the latest dynamics among those vulnerable groups. In most aspects of life,
Roma minorities in Eastern Slovakia and in Northern Hungary bear similarities and
are particularly vulnerable to poverty in comparison with national and regional
averages. There seem to be enough room to explore those cross-border characteristics
to elaborate adequate social development policies.
Prior to implementing new policies, it is vital to increase the monitoring of existing
social policies in place in order to assess their effectiveness. In both countries, in
Slovakia as well as in Hungary, various programs targeting low-income families and
individuals are designed to alleviate them from poverty. However, their
accountability is almost impossible to assess. (For example, in 1992 “Zero Grade
Classes” were implemented in Slovakia, a free one-year pre-school program which
was designed to prepare children for basic school and mainly targeted districts of high
Roma populations. Fifteen years later, no evaluation study has been performed on the
program while the problem is aggravated.) Before any new social programs are
designed and more taxpayers money is spent, a robust evaluation of the current
system is required by increasing data collection on many levels – in schools on
performance of children of low-income families, in labor bureaus on addressing
adequately Roma needs by current active labor market policies, in social welfare
points on housing, living and health conditions. National statistical offices have
already a range of monthly and annual surveys that could be extended to Roma. This
data should be collected and progress over time should be estimated using wide range
of tools available in the literature.
39
References
Hungarian Statistical Yearbook, 2003
Statistical Yearbook of the Slovak Republic, 2004
World Bank (2002), Slovak Republic: Living Standards, Employment and Labor
Market Study
World Bank (2002), Poverty and Ethnicity: A Cross-Country Study of Roma Poverty
in Central Europe
World Bank (2002), Poverty and Welfare of Roma in the Slovak Republic
World Bank (2005), Roma in an Expanding Europe, Breaking the Poverty Cycle
World Bank (2005), The Quest for Equitable Growth in Slovak Republic
World Bank (2005), Growth, Poverty and Inequality, Eastern Europe and the Former
Soviet Union
UNDP (2003), Avoiding the Dependency Trap
UNDP (2005), Human Development Report
UNDP (2006), At risk: Roma and the Displaced in Southeast Europe
40
ANNEX
Box 1.1: Definitions of EUROSTATS poverty indicators
At-risk-of-poverty rate.
below 60% of the national median income. Equivalized median income is defined as
the households’ total disposable income divided by the size and composition of the
household, and is attributed to each household member.
Share of persons with an equivalized disposable incomeRelative at-risk-of-poverty gap.
of persons below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold and the threshold itself, expressed as
a percentage of the at-risk-of-poverty threshold.
Difference between the median equivalized incomeIncome quintile ratio.
population with the highest income (top quintile) to that received by the 20% of the
country’s population with the lowest income (lowest quintile). Income must be
understood as equilvalized disposable income.
Ratio of total income received by the 20% of the country’sDispersion of regional unemployment rates.
unemployment rates.
Coefficient of variation of regionalEarly school leavers.
education and have not received education or training in the four weeks preceding the
survey.
Share of persons aged 18 to 24 who have only lower secondaryPopulation living in jobless households.
living in jobless households expressed as a share of all children. Proportion of all
people aged 18–59 years who live in jobless households as a proportion of all people
in the same age group. Students aged 18–24 years who live in households composed
solely of students are not counted in neither numerator not denominator.
Proportion of children (aged 0–17 years)Box 1.2: Definitions of World Bank poverty indicators
Poverty rate.
Measure the fraction of individuals below the poverty line.Poverty debt.
line. This measure takes into account how far the poor, on average, are below the
poverty line.
The average poverty debt is a measured as a percentage of the povertyPoverty severity.
deeper into poverty than others.
This measure takes into account whether some of the poor areGini index.
inequality.
A measure in the interval [0; 1] where 0 is perfect equality and 1 is worstlink:http://europeandcis.undp.org/uploads/public1/files/Working%20paper%20Eastern%20Slovakia%20Northern%20Hungary%20Roma%20Poverty%20and%20Social%20Exclusion.pdf
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